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                                                            Abstract 
 
This thesis examines immigration policy in postwar Canada.  Its focus is on the changes to 
immigration policy implemented between 1945 and 1963 by the governments of Mackenzie King, Louis 
St. Laurent, and John Diefenbaker, and on the events, ideas, and influences that drove those changes.  The 
story is told through extensive primary-source research from the archival records of the federal 
Immigration Branch, the departments of Citizenship and Immigration, Labour, Agriculture, External 
Affairs, and the Privy Council Office.  The Parliamentary record (Hansard) is also carefully examined, 
together with contemporary media reporting on immigration issues, the correspondence of politicians and 
policy-makers, and the statutes and regulations that established immigration laws during the period.  
Among the topics discussed are: the development of a legislative, regulatory, and administrative 
framework for immigration policy; the impact of international events on policy decisions; the resistence 
to immigration reform from within immigration bureaucracy; and the impact of racism and racial 
‘preferences’ on policy.  Throughout the period, the political considerations presented by these issues 
remained uppermost in the minds of those responsible for Canada’s immigration policy.    
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i. Two Speeches 
On May 1, 1947 Prime Minister Mackenzie King presented to the House of Commons “in broad 
outline” the components of his government’s postwar immigration policy.1  The speech was important, 
and King had laboured over it.  His diary records that on the evening of April 29 King had summoned “P. 
and G.”2 to Laurier House to re-work the draft.  “It was much in need of revision,” King complained, and 
lacking in overall “definiteness.”3  
There was irony in the prime minister’s complaint.  Now approaching the end of his long tenure, 
Mackenzie King was never a man inclined toward ‘definite’ pronouncements, even in earlier times, and 
this speech held true to form.  It was nevertheless an important statement, recalled and cited long 
afterward, and widely acknowledged as the basis for Canada’s immigration policy until the early 1960s.4   
The prime minister’s speech announced the government’s intention “to foster the growth of the 
population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration.”  Its details described proposed legislative 
and regulatory revisions, outlined initiatives toward European refugees, and provided carefully crafted 
assurances affirming Canada’s absolute right to regulate all aspects of immigration on a selective basis 
and in “such numbers…as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.”  These components 
will be examined in the chapters which follow.  Significantly, King’s opening words revealed the 
philosophical premise that characterized his, and his government’s, views on the subject.  Immigration, 
the prime minister declared, was a “problem”, and “like other major problems of the day…must be 
viewed in the light of the world situation as a whole.”5 
                                                          
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1947: III, 2644-7. 
2 “P.” was J.W. (Jack) Pickersgill, head of the Prime Minister’s Office since 1945. “G.” was almost certainly Mines 
and Resources Minister J. Allison Glen, whose department housed the government’s Immigration Branch, although 
there is little evidence of significant input by Glen into the speech. Pickersgill, however, contributed extensively to 
its wording; see Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir, 293-4.   
3 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Diary of William Lyon Mackenzie King, April 29, 1947. Implicit in this remark 
(and typical of King) was the notion that those tasked with drafting the statement had failed to capture the prime 
minister’s intended message. Elsewhere, Pickersgill recalled that King had continued to refine the speech on the 
day he delivered it: Pickersgill and Forster, The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 4, 1947-1948, 34.  
4 Files from the St. Laurent PMO contain several earlier draft versions of the statement dated March and April, 
1947, suggesting the importance of the issue to the government: LAC L.S. St. Laurent Papers, MG 26 L, Vol. 225, 
File I-17, Immigration 1937-1954. 
5 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1947: III, 2644. 
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King’s message to Canadians was twofold.  First, he and his government were fully prepared to meet 
the challenges of this national “problem”.  Secondly, they were committed to ensuring that no 
“fundamental alteration in the character of our population” would occur as a result of increased 
immigration levels.6  
Almost one year later, on April 5, 1948, Hugh L. Keenleyside delivered a speech on immigration at 
the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.  Keenleyside was mid-way through a distinguished 
public service career, most of which was spent in diplomatic and foreign-service roles, but he had been 
appointed deputy minister of the Department of Mines and Resources in 1947.  The federal government’s 
Immigration Branch thus fell within his portfolio.   
A former professor of history, Keenleyside began his address with an overview of the history of 
immigration in Canada, from pre-Christian times to the present.  Then, turning to current issues, 
Keenleyside offered detailed insights into the government’s plans for immigration policy, and in so doing 
went much further than his prime minister had gone a year earlier.  It was clear, he noted, that the war had 
substantially increased the nation’s economic potential, creating a “large national capacity”7 for 
immigrants.  King had affirmed his intention to permit no change to the nation’s demographic 
“character”, but Keenleyside’s message was different.  Barring another war or unforeseen economic 
disaster, Canada’s economic potential was enormous, but the development of that potential would require 
very high levels of immigration, and that would assuredly mean changes to the demographic composition 
of the country.  A review of policy changes implemented since the end of the war made this implication 
clear.  (These included a revitalization of the government’s immigration service, and extensions to the list 
of “admissible relatives” of Canadian relatives.8)  Like King’s earlier statement, Keenleyside’s speech 
also provided details about the policy direction the government would pursue in future. 
ii. “A Nation of Immigrants”? 
Dr. Keenleyside reminded his audience that “Canada is a nation of immigrants.”9  The phrase is a 
familiar truism in the multicultural society of twenty-first century Canada, commonly repeated by 
academics, journalists, and others, and evoking general agreement.  While the reaction of Keenleyside’s 
student audience was not recorded, the notion was probably less familiar to them.  The Canada they knew 
in 1948 had been closed to immigration throughout the 1930s and during the Second World War.  Few 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 2646. 
7 Keenleyside, “Canadian Immigration Policy”, 233.  (This article purports to be “for the most part identical” to the 
speech.) 
8 Ibid., 234. 
9 Ibid., 222. 
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would have had direct experience with immigration, or viewed themselves either as immigrants or the 
descendants of immigrants.  Instead, most would have self-identified as uniformly British in both heritage 
and subject-hood, Christian, and white.  A challenge therefore confronted politicians and policy-makers: 
Postwar Canada required immigrants, but most Canadians neither imagined themselves as part of an 
immigrant tradition, nor identified favourably with others seeking to immigrate.  Quite simply, they did 
not identify with the notion of a “nation of immigrants”.  Mackenzie King, who managed to avoid the 
platitudinous phrase in his 1947 statement, understood that reality, and was determined to navigate 
cautiously over its dangerous terrain.  There were economic, political, and social issues to be considered.  
Although delivered a year apart, the speeches of both the prime minister and deputy minister must be 
understood as the outline of a cautious and complex policy initiative, designed to balance the nation’s 
economic need for immigrants with other factors, including widespread public aversion to immigration. 
iii. A Focus on Policy 
This dissertation will examine Canadian immigration policy during the years following World War 
Two.  It will endeavour to document the formation, implementation, and administration of immigration 
policy by a succession of postwar governments, and to position this topic within a broader process during 
that period of the transformation to a modern Canada.  It will also examine the political issues and 
concerns which shaped immigration policy.  Although aspects of immigration history have received 
scholarly attention, many areas remain unexplored and will comprise the subject matter of this project.  
These include postwar legislative changes to Canadian immigration law and the creation of a new federal 
department to administer them, and numerous incremental policy revisions which opened the nation’s 
doors to new immigrant groups.  A focus on policy will illuminate the myriad postwar influences upon 
the government in this area – domestic and international, from within its own bureaucracy, and from 
without.  
Scholars have generally offered unenthusiastic (and sometimes highly critical) appraisals of postwar 
immigration policy.  Typically, they describe the government’s activities as having been motivated by a 
“mixture of altruism and self-interest,” clearly inferring that that latter component was predominant.10  
They frequently note the ‘flexibility’ which characterized the administration of immigration policy 
throughout this period, without examining how such broad discretion came to be.11  Such assessments, 
                                                          
10 Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, 193.  The authors are describing Canadian responses to refugee 
crises in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in 1956 and 1968.  See also Avery, Reluctant Host, 144-68, which applies the 
phrase to Canada’s initiative concerning European displaced persons following the war.  One general study of 
refugee policy uses less equable terminology; see Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?    
11 See, for example, Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy, 14-6; 225. 
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however, raise legitimate questions.  Are they uniformly accurate and comprehensive?  Do they apply to 
all who were responsible for the formulation and enforcement of postwar immigration policy?  Are they 
fair descriptions of the postwar period, given that some 2.1 million immigrants - many from countries not 
traditionally viewed as “preferred” sources –entered Canada between 1945 and 1961?12   
This dissertation will also test scholarly theories about immigration by focusing primarily upon policy 
changes that were implemented by postwar governments.  It will explore the question of whether policy-
makers formed and executed a strategic, forward-looking plan for postwar immigration, and whether such 
a plan – if it existed – strove to lead public opinion or simply to respond to it.  The first chapter will 
review the academic literature on this topic.  It will examine not only analyses of the post-1945 period, 
but will also review scholars’ interpretations from or pertaining to earlier periods, even before the 
depression and wartime periods, since many earlier analyses influenced policy during the postwar period.     
It is unlikely that postwar developments in immigration policy can be understood without 
consideration of the events, conditions, and approaches that preceded them.  The second chapter will 
therefore explore the evolution of the ‘flexible’ immigration infrastructure described by scholars.  It will 
trace the development of a statutory and administrative framework for immigration policy that was 
formed during the early twentieth century.  Postwar policy-makers inherited an established administrative 
system from that preceding period, and the evidence suggests that they expected to continue to use it 
without making dramatic alteration in either policy or procedure.  The chapter concludes that the 
distinguishing characteristic of that system was its almost total independence from parliamentary or legal 
oversight, and from public scrutiny. 
The third chapter will analyse the evidence as to the government’s intended policy direction 
immediately following the War, during the final years of Mackenzie King’s tenure.  As with other 
chapters, one goal is to determine whether public policy may have preceded public opinion in ways that 
have not previously been recognized.  This study does not pretend to offer an exhaustive analysis of 
postwar public opinion on the issue of immigration.  The examples presented – more anecdotal than 
scientific – include ministerial correspondence, parliamentary debate, and contemporary newspaper 
commentary.  Public opinion polling was new to postwar Canada and, as the examples cited demonstrate, 
its results were often imprecise.  It is therefore reasonable to conclude that policy makers drew their 
perceptions about public opinion from the elements of civil discourse, examples of which are examined 
throughout this work.          
                                                          
12 Rawlyk, “Canada’s Immigration Policy, 1945-1962”, 288.  See also Bothwell, Drummond and English, Canada 
Since 1945, 32.  Both sources quote Canada Year Book statistics. 
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Subsequent chapters four through seven will generally follow a chronological format presented by 
developments during the terms in office of the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments, between 1948 
and 1963.  They will document a process of gradual, incremental change in this policy area, and the issues 
and influences that drove that process. 
Each chapter will examine legislative, regulatory and administrative developments for those periods.  
An examination of the parliamentary record will comprise an important part of this work, for it was in 
Parliament that politicians often revealed their true attitudes and ideas about this controversial and highly 
political topic.  Nevertheless, while it is tempting to view each government as a distinct period within this 
topic, artificial distinctions and categorizations will be avoided.  The historical evidence reveals at most 
two discernible phases to the postwar transformation in Canadian immigration policy, and they do not 
necessarily correspond to the timelines of successive governments.  During the initial postwar period, 
from 1945 until the early 1950s, changes to immigration policy were undertaken reluctantly, and usually 
in response to international pressure.  Later, particularly from 1955 onward, a series of incremental 
changes demonstrated increased willingness to open the nation’s doors to new immigrant groups.   
By assessing the parliamentary and archival records, contemporary media accounts and commentary, 
and the memoirs of those responsible for immigration policy, this thesis will endeavour to answer the 
questions presented by the topic: Was there a strategic and deliberate forward-looking plan for postwar 
immigration?  Was immigration policy comprised of something more than an opportunistic mixture of 
‘altruism and self-interest’?  Was it formulated by policy-makers whose world views were more 
progressive or humanitarian than those of the “average” postwar Canadian citizen?  And did those policy-
makers seek to lead public opinion, or simply react to it? 
With a focus on both politics and policy, this thesis describes the postwar changes to Canada’s 
immigration policy, the factors that drove those changes, and their impact on the nation’s development.  
Consideration of the questions presented by this topic has identified diverse influences which both 
propelled and impeded policy change, and has produced several conclusions.  Postwar international 
pressure created by the refugee crisis in Europe was an initial driver of change.  Later, there were 
domestic and economic challenges to be addressed, as policy makers sought to meet the nation’s growing 
need for immigrants during periods when traditionally ‘preferred’ sources were becoming unreliable.  By 
the mid 1950s, these realities produced initiatives which began look to new sources for immigrants.   
Among the impediments to change, racism and entrenched, preferential selection criteria were key 
factors, as were bureaucratic inertia, interdepartmental friction, and tensions between the immigration 
bureaucracy and the government.  The highly ‘flexible’ and discretionary system described in chapter two 
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developed with full cooperation between government and its civil service, but it was the latter group 
which clung most persistently to that system during the postwar period.   
This thesis concludes that political concerns, more so than economic factors, social influences, or 
even notions of ‘altruism’ or self-interest’, exercised the greatest influence on postwar immigration 
policy.  By examining the issues presented by this topic, and the diverse ideas and events that influenced 
policy, this thesis reveals a process of gradual, incremental policy transformation.  That process began 
following the end of World War Two in 1945, and culminated with amendments to the Immigration Act 
regulations in 1962.    
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Chapter One   
Approaching Canada’s Immigration History  
 
Immigration has intrigued Canadian scholars for many decades.  Historians, sociologists, 
economists, political scientists, anthropologists, journalists, and others have offered interpretations 
concerning the effects of immigration upon Canadian development and the policies pursued in response to 
it.  Not surprisingly, their work has often reflected the contemporary theoretical priorities of their 
disciplines.  
Among historians, only the early practitioners appear to have been generally disinterested in this 
subject.  Canada’s prominent early and mid-twentieth century historians such as H.A. Innis and D.G. 
Creighton may have been, as Carl Berger explains, “nationalists of various hues,”1 but the experiences of 
immigrant groups who formed the Canadian nation do not seem to have concerned them.  Innis, for 
example, acknowledged that the “contact of Europeans with the Indians was essential to the development 
of the fur trade,”2 and his seminal work recounted the commercial elements of that interaction.  However, 
Innis emphasized economic and geographical forces, rather than any human group, as the key actors in his 
historical narrative.  As Berger notes of Innis’ work, the “net impression created was one of overall 
human helplessness” in the face of a “material environment that constrained and channelled human 
effort.”3  Early in his career, Innis concluded that the fur trade’s “heavy one-way traffic made the trade 
discouraging to settlement.”4  Thereafter, he paid little attention to immigrant “settlers.”  Neither The Fur 
Trade in Canada nor The Cod Fisheries5 included any reference to immigration in their indexes (although 
the latter work explored various conflicts between fishers and “settler” groups in North America).  
Throughout Innis’ work on the development of “staple” resources, immigration seems to have figured 
prominently only in his study of the timber trade, where “a bulky export commodity … favoured a large 
return cargo and thereby provided a stimulus to immigration and agricultural settlement.”6     
Although strongly influenced by Innis, particularly in his early work, Donald Creighton paid 
more attention to the subject of immigration.  Creighton shared Innis’ focus upon natural and 
geographical influences in the development of the nation, but he at least acknowledged the founders of 
                                                          
1 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 259. 
2 Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History, 9. 
3 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 102. 
4 Innis, Problems of Staple Production in Canada, 6. 
5 Innis, The Cod Fisheries, The History of an International Economy, 53-4; 99-100; 105-6 and 108-9. 
6 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 99. 
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Canada’s early commercial and political elites as immigrants, from the American colonies and, later, from 
Britain.7  His later work showed increasing interest in the topic.  Creighton recognized, somewhat 
uncharacteristically for him, the efforts of French officials to strengthen their North American colonies by 
promoting immigration to New France in the seventeenth century.8  He also noted the “spectacular” 
effects of immigration upon Canada from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of war in 1914, and 
again following the Second World War.  Creighton was careful to explain that “the overwhelming 
majority” of newcomers to the Canadian west between 1901 and 1911 were “English-speaking in origin.”  
Other immigrant groups, in his view, introduced “a new and strange element” who formed themselves 
into “cultural islands [that] sought to resist the levelling tide of North American civilization.”9  Their 
arrival may have comprised “the greatest migration of peoples which had ever come to British North 
America”10 but for Creighton, the immigrants who mattered most were the intrepid explorers, merchants, 
and visionary politicians of earlier times, and not the “strange” interlopers who came later and in great 
numbers.  
The views of Arthur R.M. Lower presented one notable exception to the early historiographical 
tendency to ignore immigration, although Lower was not so much ‘interested’ in immigration as he was 
adamantly opposed to it, throughout his career.  Like Creighton, Lower was influenced by Innis, but 
extended his own studies of resource development in order to connect them with his greater historical 
passion – understanding “the emergence of the sense of a national community in Canada.”11  For Lower, 
the development of such a national community was paramount, and in his assessment it was impeded, 
rather than sustained, by immigration. 
Among his anti-immigration views, Lower subscribed to a ‘displacement theory’ which posited 
that incoming groups caused the departure of native-born Canadians, primarily to the United States.  
Through selective, if not altogether spurious, statistical and scientific analysis, he rejected the notion that 
immigration significantly increased population or stimulated economic development.  Natural increase 
alone, he argued, would have provided suitable levels of population growth, without the dislocations 
created by large-scale immigration.  Lower concluded that immigration was not only “unnecessary” but 
downright detrimental, since “‘cheap’ men will always drive out our ‘dear’ men.”  Among its attendant 
evils, the “constant renewal of blood generation after generation” had driven living standards downward 
                                                          
7 Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 22-3; 208-10. 
8 Creighton, Dominion of the North, 59-61. 
9 Creighton, Dominion of the North, 410-3; 569-70. 
10 Ibid., 410. 
11 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 117. 
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and turned Canada into “a training ground for American citizens.”12  Lower continued throughout his life 
to lament the diluting effects of immigration on the development of a homogeneous Canadian 
‘nationality.’13   
Lower’s theories, like those of Innis and Creighton, were justifiably discredited by later scholars.  
They remain relevant, however, to any consideration of immigration policy, not for their accuracy but for 
their influence.  In their disinterest or disapproval, Innis, Creighton, and Lower reflected the general 
disdain toward the immigrant that was prevalent in both English and French Canada in the early twentieth 
century.  It is also significant that Lower characterized immigration as a long-standing national 
“problem,” just as Mackenzie King would do in his 1947 policy pronouncement.  Lower’s views on 
immigration appeared periodically in popular media,14 and there is evidence of their influence upon the 
government.  J.W. Pickersgill, who helped draft the 1947 policy statement and later served as 
immigration minister, had been a junior academic colleague of Lower in Winnipeg, and later recalled that 
he had been “influenced considerably by Arthur Lower’s views in the 1930s.”  Pickersgill categorized his 
own attitude toward immigration as “conservative,” a candid acknowledgement for the lifelong, partisan 
Liberal.15 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, scholarly works with a primary focus on 
immigration were rare and, by later standards, undistinguished.  Like Lower, other commentators 
invariably framed the topic as a ‘problem’ in both its social and demographic implications.  One early 
example was J.S. Woodsworth’s 1909 publication, Strangers Within Our Gates, which sought to draw 
attention to the “great, commanding, overwhelming problem”16 confronting Canada as a result of rapid 
and unrestrained immigration.  Woodsworth understood the plight of many of Canada’s incoming ethnic 
groups, and he was sympathetic.  Yet Woodsworth believed that a “flood” of immigrants “from all parts 
of Europe” was turning Canada into “the Old World’s dumping ground.”  In his opinion, assimilation was 
the only solution; but how, he wondered, “shall we weld this heterogeneous mass into one people?”17  
                                                          
12 Lower, “The Case Against Immigration,” 572-3.  (Lower is identified erroneously here as “R.M. Lower”.) In 
fairness, Lower’s major historical survey supported his anti-immigration argument with more statistical detail and 
analysis of the social impacts of “mass immigration”: Lower, Colony to Nation, 494-6. 
13 In later years, Lower’s views seemed to soften.  He remained convinced about immigration’s detrimental impact 
upon the development of a national homogeneity, but suggested that his real concern had been that “our 
thoughtless and selfish immigration policies … have all been founded on the desire for cheap labour.”  See Heick, 
“Historical Perspectives: An Interview with Arthur R.M. Lower,” 534.   
14 See, for example, Lower, “Can Canada Do Without Immigrants?” 3-4; 70-1. (This is an almost verbatim version of 
the Queen’s Quarterly article referenced in footnote 10, above.) 
15 Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole, 293. 
16 Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates, 162. 
17 Ibid., 166-7.  For an unusually enlightened early perspective, see Arthur Hawkes, The Birthright. Published in 
1919, Hawkes’ flowery call for a uniform Canadian citizenship that would include even ‘foreigners,’ also showed 
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Much of the book was devoted to Woodsworth’s descriptions of various ethnic groups and cataloging 
them according to their ability to be assimilated. The racism inherent in that exercise is arresting today, 
but illustrative of the cultural and intellectual milieu in which twentieth century views on immigration and 
race were forming.18 
A different perspective on the immigration ‘problem’ was offered by Andre Siegfried’s The Race 
Question in Canada, published in 1906.  Siegfried, a French political scientist, presented a wide-ranging 
analysis of Canadian political life, particularly the role and activities of parties, in which he also assessed 
the demographic impacts of immigration upon French Canada.  First, there was the “leakage” of 
population through emigration to the United States, a trend for which neither immigration (from France) 
nor natural increase could compensate.  Siegfried also observed that while thousands of European 
immigrants recently arrived in Canada “make haste to assimilate themselves to their Anglo-Saxon 
environment in the West,” no corresponding trend was occurring in Quebec.  Finally, there was the 
“penetration” of American influence, through immigration and investment, a trend which Siegfried 
interpreted as threatening to both French and English Canada.  But it was French Canada, “still bowed 
under the burden of defeat,” to which the “problem” of immigration posed the greatest immediate threat.19 
More comprehensive examinations of Canada’s immigration history gradually began to appear.  
Among the first was University of Toronto professor W.G. Smith’s A Study in Canadian Immigration, 
published in 1920.  Initially undertaken as a study commissioned by the Dominion government, the work 
suffered (as Smith modestly acknowledged) from “many defects.”20   Nevertheless, he outlined in broad 
strokes the various immigration movements, from “the days of Champlain and Cartier” through to the 
massive early twentieth century influx.21  Smith expended much effort cataloguing and describing the new 
ethnic groups, and analysing the various challenges which immigration had raised:  assimilation, 
urbanization, illiteracy, and the influx of delinquents and “defectives.”  His concluding chapters suggested 
solutions to these problems, through more rigorous screening and enforcement of exclusionary legislative 
provisions and increased efforts to ‘Canadianize’ alien newcomers.  Unsurprisingly, Smith’s arguments 
                                                          
insights of empathy and self-awareness:  See pages 117-8, and 295: “Do we want the ‘foreigner’ to become a 
Canadian? … What has been done to make him feel like a Canadian? If nothing has been done, is he to blame – or 
are we?”    
18 Historian Frances Swyripa describes Woodsworth’s effort as “a succinct handbook to the crystallizing ethnic 
hierarchy” of its time: Swyripa, Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Studies and the Canadian Prairies, 254.  
Indeed it was. 
19 Siegfried, The Race Question in Canada, 181-93. 
20 Smith, A Study in Canadian Immigration, 3.  
21 Ibid., 37-67. 
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also reflected the prevailing racial views of his time.  “It goes without saying,” he concluded, “that … 
those who are born in the British Isles will be preferred … as immigrants in our midst.”22  
  Less condescending, and narrower in scope, was a 1928 study of British emigration to North 
America during the century prior to Confederation by historian Helen Cowan.  Cowan ambitiously 
documented the causes of emigration during that period and the hardships endured by those who departed 
Britain in various migratory ‘waves’.  She also examined the role and influence of the state upon the 
immigration process; in both Britain and North America.  (Some officials promoted immigration; others 
were opposed, or demonstrated insensitive and unhelpful ‘laissez-faire’ attitudes that offered no 
protection to migrating groups.)  Finally, Cowan detailed efforts to reform the process and improve 
protections for migrants, both at sea and upon arrival.   
Cowan strove to describe “the heroic quality of the human outpouring which peopled the British 
North American colonies.”23  To their credit, both Cowan and Smith avoided some of the condescension, 
and racism, that characterized other contemporary viewpoints.  Still, there were substantial deficiencies.  
As historian Franca Iacovetta has noted, their work displayed a “racial bias” toward immigrants of British 
stock, and revealed “far more about policy and settlement patterns than the day-to-day lives of 
newcomers.”24  
Other scholars followed.  A decade later, Norman MacDonald’s Canada, 1763-1841: 
Immigration and Settlement offered a different perspective on the topic.  Like Cowan, MacDonald 
reviewed the economic and political causes that propelled emigration from Britain,25 and – also like 
Cowan – he generally avoided racial assumptions and stereotypes.  MacDonald, however, focused 
primarily upon Imperial land regulation in British North America, documenting the overall 
ineffectiveness of various settlement schemes and land-grant programs.  Throughout the period, he 
argued, “the Imperial government practised in all the Colonies a complicated and wasteful system of 
disposing of Crown lands.”26  MacDonald concluded with a description of the economic and social 
consequences of settlement for the development of the colonies.  The strength of his study lay in that 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 178. 
23 Cowan, British Emigration to British North America, x.  
24 Iacovetta, “Manly Militants,” 221. 
25 MacDonald succinctly summarized the long list of contributing factors: “overpopulation and destitution, 
engrossing and higher rents, industrial disturbances and agricultural depressions, unemployment and low wages, a 
restricted market and high taxation, hunger and discontent.”  MacDonald, Canada, 1763-1841: Immigration and 
Settlement, 28. 
26 Ibid., 510. 
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economic analysis, and MacDonald appears to have been among the first to examine immigration 
primarily as an economic phenomenon, an approach which later scholars would embrace.  
MacDonald identified one issue that would become a recurring concern for later commentators 
when he noted the “constant stream of emigrants across the Canadas and into the United States.”  This 
“lamentable exodus” he wrote, was “one of the most conspicuous and unfortunate effects of the evils in 
the land system of the British North American Colonies.”27  Evidence that many newcomers remained 
only briefly before ‘re-emigrating,’ usually to the United States, was attracting scholarly attention.  
However, re-emigration presented a particular challenge for scholars because it was difficult to quantify 
accurately.  (“The emigrant,” as one sociologist observed, “is not a loud figure in history.”28)  One 
detailed analysis of this phenomenon was undertaken by economist Roland Wilson in 1932.29  Wilson 
explained that Canada had maintained “reasonably accurate” records of immigrant numbers only from 
1897 onward, and in earlier periods had documented immigration from Britain but not the United States.  
Official statistics respecting emigration, moreover, were almost non-existent.  Wilson therefore resorted 
to detailed examination of census data and the records of various carriers, completing the exercise by 
factoring in an estimated death rate, in order to fill in the statistical gaps.  His most noteworthy 
determination was that in all but sixteen of the fifty-eight years covered by his study, Canada had incurred 
a net loss in population from this “net-migration” process.30  Concern over emigration would remain an 
important component of the perceived ‘problem’ of immigration, as Lower’s views demonstrated.  
A later generation of historians, also dedicated to narratives that were ‘national’ in scope, 
included some analysis of immigration themes in their work, often reaching optimistic conclusions 
regarding the development of particular regions or economic sectors during various periods.  Describing 
the period 1896-1921 as one of great transformation, Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook acknowledge that 
more than two million newcomers “added a new ethnic dimension to Canadian life” during that period, 
and challenged the “old Canada.”31  However, the authors generally characterize the settlement of 
Canada’s prairie west through immigration as a resounding success, albeit one accompanied by some 
racial tension. Special praise is accorded Laurier and Interior minister Clifford Sifton, as skilled 
politicians whose acuity proved equal to most problems, including immigration.32  Others offer similar 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 522-3. 
28 Popiel, “A Barbarian Power?” 151. 
29 Wilson, “Migration Movements in Canada, 1868-1925.”  (Wilson was an Australian whose academic sojourn in 
Canada appears to have been brief. I found no record of other publications by him on Canadian subjects.)  
30 Ibid., 178-81. (The period 1901-1914, of course, showed net gains in population in every year except 1909; see 
Table X, 182.) 
31 Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, 1. 
32 Ibid., 50; 54-68. 
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views of the post-1945 period.  Desmond Morton, for example, writes: “Millions of newcomers to the 
country found their skills and talents in such urgent demand that older citizens even forgot their 
prejudices. Prosperity did marvellous things for tolerance.”33  Alluding to one important influence on 
postwar policy, John English explains how a “desire to behave responsibly internationally opened 
[Canada’s] doors” to thousands who sought refuge from postwar Europe.34 
A more detailed (and less glowing) analysis was offered by Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and 
John English in their political and economic survey of Canada during the first half of the twentieth 
century.  There were, the authors explain, significant differences between the Laurier government’s policy 
intentions, and the actual results achieved, as significant numbers of immigrants who had been expected 
to engage in agriculture gravitated instead toward urban centres.35  Moreover, the attitudes behind those 
policy intentions were certainly “not free of prejudice.”  Numerous legislative provisions and policies 
designed to control, restrict and discriminate, rather than promote immigration, are documented.36  John 
H. Thompson and Allen Seager offer a similarly frank appraisal in their study of the inter-war period, as 
they discuss various immigration policies and the racialized views and preferences that lay behind them. 
In particular, they note the cynical politics that characterized immigration policy under Mackenzie King 
in the 1920s.  These included vague campaign promises to encourage immigration, and a commitment –  
not fulfilled – to reform discriminatory rules in return for third party support following the 1926 election.  
Thompson and Seager also document the government’s 1925 agreement permitting railway companies to 
operate a private an extra-legal recruitment process bringing immigrants from Europe, an arrangement 
they characterise as a “most remarkable abdication of federal responsibility.”37  Later, and even more 
reprehensibly, “Canada’s response to the flood of 800,000 Jews who poured out of Europe to escape the 
concentration camps was to raise the dam of immigration restrictions even higher.”38  These themes 
would appear prominently in other analyses. 
Economists were among the first from other academic disciplines to investigate immigration 
policy.  In 1951, Mabel Timlin published the results of a study of Canada’s ‘absorptive capacity’ which 
she had undertaken for the Dominion government at the request of Hugh Keenleyside.  Timlin 
                                                          
33 Morton, “Foreword,” in English, Years of Growth, 4. 
34 Ibid., 43. 
35 Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada, 1900 - 1945, 60-1. 
36 Ibid., 56-9; 246-7.  (In an earlier work on post-1945 Canada, the authors dwelt only briefly on the subject. They 
noted that the “flow of immigration after the Second World War landed hundreds of thousands whose sole desire 
was to adapt as quickly as possible to English-speaking society,” but otherwise limited their analysis to a 
presentation of postwar immigration statistics: See Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada Since 1945, 31-3; 
154.)  
37 Thompson and Seager, Canada 1922-1939, 130. 
38 Ibid., 322. 
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persuasively argued the economic benefits that higher immigration levels would create, through increased 
domestic consumption and expanded productivity and exports.  She concluded that “a larger population 
for Canada should mean a higher physical product per capita and hence higher real incomes for Canadian 
citizens.”39  The Liberal government, focused by this time on the management of an expanding postwar 
economy, undoubtedly welcomed Timlin’s views.   
A later and more comprehensive economic study was Alan G. Green’s Immigration and the 
Postwar Canadian Economy, published in 1976.  Green supplemented a chronological review of postwar 
immigration policy with detailed economic analysis.  Although he did not openly dispute Timlin’s 
argument, Green adopted a different approach to the ‘cause and effect’ factors that had influenced policy, 
as he theorized that foreign demand for Canadian staple products stimulated the domestic requirement for 
labour, thereby triggering periods of substantial immigration into Canada.40  Generally, however, Green 
was not inclined to criticise.  He noted understandingly that “flexibility” had been the “central feature” of 
immigration policy during the twentieth century, a necessary feature since “small countries like Canada 
must be able to adjust their policies to offset or cushion the impact of alteration in the world demand for 
its products.”  Not surprisingly, Green concluded that immigration must be understood as “an economic 
not a demographic phenomenon, and policy should reflect this bias.”41   
More recent and more scientific is The Immigration Dilemma, a 1992 publication edited by 
Steven Globerman.  Globerman contributes a summary of the economic factors that influenced 
immigration policy, carefully distinguishing those from more traditional (and non-economic) cultural and 
demographic arguments.  The volume’s emphasis, he explains, is on “empirical evidence bearing upon 
the major policy issues” rather than “theoretical” analysis.  Currently, Globerman noted, “most 
economists do not argue for the elimination of restrictions on the movement of people. That is, they 
generally support the maintenance of barriers to immigration.”42   Nevertheless, as one contributor 
observed, “the economic objections … asserted by the opponents of immigration have all been falsified in 
the past decade or so.”43  The volume’s various articles “reinforce other studies suggesting that the 
historical impact of immigration has been relatively modest.”44  Many scholars would disagree with this 
conclusion, but in their generally dispassionate view of the topic economists have remained consistent.45  
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41 Ibid., 225. 
42 Globerman, “Background to Immigration Policy in Canada,” 2; 12. 
43 Simon, “The Economic Effects of Immigration: Theory and Evidence,” 145. 
44 Globerman, “Background to Immigration Policy in Canada,” 15. 
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European immigration to Canada began with the observation that “Canadian immigration policy can only be 
15 
 
Representatives of other academic disciplines, including sociology and political science, 
gradually joined the immigration debate.  John Porter’s pioneering 1965 study of the relationship between 
social ‘class’ and power remains a leading example of the former.  Porter devoted considerable analysis to 
the importance of mobility, ethnicity and migration in the formation of a class structure within Canadian 
society, at one point describing the country, with some bewilderment, as “a huge demographic railway 
station.”46  His analysis, however, was penetrating and insightful, and Porter did not hesitate to challenge 
other perspectives.  For example, he agreed in part with Lower that “nationalist sentiments … are unlikely 
to develop when the population of a country has been built up and dissipated as Canada’s has been,” but 
otherwise disputed Lower’s argument that “cheap” immigrants drove out “dear” Canadians.  “It is 
difficult,” Porter reasoned, “to see how immigrant peasants affect the career opportunities of the 
professional … or … skilled classes because skilled jobs require skilled workers.”  To Porter, the more 
accurate interpretation was that “cheap unskilled immigrant labour was replacing cheap unskilled 
Canadian labour as the latter was drawn into the United States by somewhat higher real wages.”47  
Clearly, Porter recognized the importance of both cultural and economic influences on immigration 
policy.  The selection of ‘suitable’ immigrants, he noted, follows “evaluations by the ‘charter’ members 
of the society of the jobs to be filled and the ‘right’ kind of immigrants to fill them.”48 
Despite having been written a half century ago, Porter’s work remains persuasive.  Later 
sociologists would contribute to the field by examining immigration more narrowly, through the 
experiences of particular groups.  Contributions by Porter’s contemporaries, however, proved less 
enduring.  Writing in 1950, for example, S.D. Clark suggested rather mildly that “in many ways the 
Canadian community has been a northern extension of the American,” and that “cultural differences” 
among newcomers tended to disappear upon settlement in North America.  “The breakdown of cultural 
differences on the frontier,” Clark concluded, “hastened the development of a single Canadian type.”49  
Although Clark’s later work on the development of a Canadian community received much acclaim, this 
early analysis now appears regrettably superficial.   
                                                          
understood in terms of the country’s participation in a wider transatlantic labour market.”  (Avery, Dangerous 
Foreigners, 9.)  However, Avery also documented numerous non-economic influences which emerged, particularly 
after World War One: “Whereas before 1914 economic considerations had been paramount, now the principal 
criteria became political and cultural acceptability.”  Ibid., 90.  
46 Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 33. 
47 Ibid., 37; 58-9.  (With this line of argument, Porter also disputed the analysis of political scientist D.C. Corbett, 
whose optimistic views are discussed below; see Porter, 39-40; 58.) 
48 Ibid., 60. 
49 Clark, “The Canadian Community,” 375-6; 386. 
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Political scientists also joined the postwar discussion.  Among the first was UBC professor David 
Corbett, whose 1957 publication offered a detailed but generally uncritical analysis of postwar 
immigration policy.  Corbett noted understandingly the irreconcilable interests and contradictory views 
that confronted policy makers, from both French and English Canada.50  Still, numerous aspects of 
immigration policy troubled him; the overt discrimination against certain ethnic groups; a vague 
legislative framework that permitted unfettered administrative discretion; and the subterfuge in such 
regulatory devices as literacy tests and ‘continuous journey’ requirements. Corbett’s insights on these 
issues were remarkable for his time, but he was satisfied to conclude that “post-war immigration has been 
very successfully absorbed, indeed seized upon, by the Canadian economy.”51   
Political scientists who followed later contributed less sanguine appraisals.  In 1987, Reginald 
Whitaker offered a highly critical interpretation, single-mindedly documenting secretive and 
undemocratic components to postwar policy.  Particularly egregious, in Whitaker’s view, was the 
government’s application of security screening procedures (implemented in response to the Gouzenko 
affair) to exclude applicants from certain countries, and especially any who were suspected of left-wing 
political views.52   James Eayrs presented an equally acerbic assessment of the history of Canada’s 
exclusionary immigration policy toward India, an embarrassing legacy as Canadian and other 
Commonwealth leaders sought to deal with Indian independence during the late 1940s.53 
Studies of a socio-historical nature comprise the most recent body of work within postwar 
immigration historiography.  Publications in this category are numerous.  Although disparate in subject 
and theme, they often document the experience of particular groups, or episodes or periods when 
admission to Canada was restricted.  Other common qualities include a focus on the wartime or 
immediate postwar period, and highly critical assessments of government immigration policy, particularly 
as it impacted certain groups.  Historian Irving Abella offered a memorable example when he ruefully 
observed that “Canada is a peculiar nation. Peopled by immigrants, it is a country, paradoxically, which 
hates immigration.”54 
Abella’s work was among the early contributions to this field.  He and co-author Harold Troper 
examined the period before and during World War Two when Canada systematically denied entry to 
desperate European refugees, particularly Jews.  None Is Too Many described more than the details of an 
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53 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 226-8. 
54 Abella, “Foreword,” in Roberts, Whence They Came, vii. 
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exclusionary immigration policy; it also documented “a Canada of the 1930s and 1940s permeated by 
racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.”  Response to its publication was so emotional that in a 
subsequent edition the authors found it necessary to remind their readers – and perhaps themselves – that 
the book was “first and foremost a work of history.”55  Elsewhere, the authors offered an equally 
categorical appraisal: “Canadian immigration policy had always been as ethnically selective as it was 
economically self-serving.”56 
Historian Franca Iacovetta has contributed substantially to the historiography of postwar 
immigration, approaching the subject from several directions.  Iacovetta’s Such Hardworking People 
(1992) presents a detailed study of the experience of postwar Italian immigrants in Toronto.  She 
documents the skills, resources, and strategies, which enabled their successful “transition from being 
peasants in an underdeveloped rural economy to becoming proletarians in an urban industrial economy.”57   
Focusing primarily on the experiences of this group – its many challenges and hardships – Iacovetta’s 
thesis emphasized the importance of many socio-historical factors: gender; family economy; racism; 
immigrant agency; and militancy, all of which contributed to a complex transformation process.   
Iacovetta’s assessment of Canadian immigration policy was direct and critical.58  She also noted 
that immigration historians generally had not, as of yet, “explored in detail the relations between 
immigrants and immigrant policy.”59  In a later work, Iacovetta undertook to address this 
historiographical deficiency.  The book’s title – Gatekeepers – foretells many of its conclusions, which 
criticize governments, the media, and other organizations involved in receiving, acclimatizing, and 
‘Canadianizing’ postwar newcomers.  In between these two studies, Iacovetta also produced a detailed 
historiographical paper, reviewing both “general trends” in immigrant history and, in greater detail, the 
more recent socio-historical themes.  Anticipating her later work, she advocated for greater emphasis on 
immigration policy through examination of “the many encounters between immigrants and those 
members of the host society who also affected immigrant life.”60   Her conclusions, however, placed 
greater emphasis on the need for “more specialized studies of … immigrants and immigrant 
communities,” and “a more inclusive and synthetic approach.”61  Policy, presumably, would comprise just 
one element of such an approach. 
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Other contributions to this area have varied in both substance and quality.  Iacovetta explains that 
the 1980s and 1990s saw “a noticeable shift away from studying policy,” and toward documenting the 
experience and perspective of particular immigrant groups.62  The results, she observes, were mixed.  
Studies of various Baltic groups are among the least successful, often appearing both “rushed and 
superficial” and “ahistorical in approach.”63  One such example is Milda Danys’ examination of postwar 
Lithuanian immigration to Canada.  Danys based her work upon archival research and extensive oral 
interviews, but the work’s main weakness was its failure to support conclusions with evidence.  
Observations regarding the motives of bureaucrats responsible for policy administration frequently appear 
speculative64, and the author’s main conclusion – that the government favoured Baltic refugees – is 
likewise unsupported by evidence.  This is especially unfortunate given that the argument is likely 
accurate.   
Estonian groups have fared little better.  Karl Aun’s The Political Refugees, published in 1985, 
reads like a cultural celebration designed to introduce the Estonian community to Canada’s ‘charter’ 
ethnic groups.  Aun’s treatment of postwar immigration policy is brief and uncritical.  He notes, for 
example, that most Estonian refugees permitted to immigrate were vastly over-qualified for the farm 
labour jobs to which they were recruited, but concludes: “We should not blame Canada since most other 
countries did not even offer what Canada did.  …Any country would consider its own need first and 
assign the unsolicited immigrants to jobs its own people would not do.”65  Somewhat less magnanimous 
is Linda Mannik’s recent study of the Estonian group who sought refuge in Canada aboard the SS Walnut 
in 1948.  Mannik, an anthropologist, seeks to describe and interpret the experiences of this refugee group 
through photographs, contemporary media reports, and interviews.  Although policy is not her main 
focus, she demonstrates the impact of racial factors – in official immigration policy, in popular media, 
and in societal perceptions about who is ‘acceptable’ – upon the experience of this particular group.  
Mannik is critical of Canadian immigration policy, and she is especially critical of the official 
representations of immigrant history, such as those presented in displays at the Pier 21 Museum in 
Halifax.  However, her criticism is restrained, perhaps due to the unique circumstances under which the 
Walnut passengers arrived in Canada and the government’s quick decision to waive its standard 
processing requirements and grant them immediate admission.66  
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Other ethnic groups have received better historical treatment.   A series of articles compiled by 
Wsevold Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus offers a richly detailed history of the experiences of 
displaced Ukrainian groups in postwar Europe, a small percentage of whom migrated to Canada.67  
Although immigration policy is not the volume’s primary focus, several contributors offer unsparing 
assessments of the attitudes shown by receiving countries, including Canada.  Slow to grasp the enormity 
of the refugee problem (and the reality behind Soviet repatriation demands), Western allies dithered.  
“Offers of resettlement were extended,” as Boshyk explains, “but only when it was politically and 
economically beneficial for the host countries to do so.”68  Historian Harold Troper and archivist Myron 
Momryk provide succinct explanations of the problem which the refugee crisis presented for Canadian 
authorities, and of the restrictive regulatory framework upon which Canadian policy was based.69  
Elsewhere, geographer Lubomyr Luciuk interprets the experience of postwar Ukrainian refugees as a 
search for “place” on the part of a group left stateless by successive repressions, invasions, and defeats.  
Luciuk’s work emphasizes the efforts of Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and individuals to assist 
postwar refugees, more so than those of the Canadian government.  The work is less an analysis of policy 
than a description of the ongoing wariness that characterized the attitude of the government toward its 
Ukrainian-Canadian citizens and prospective Ukrainian immigrants.  Luciuk acknowledges the factors 
that “inclined the nation’s gatekeepers to take a relatively favourable stance on Ukrainian DP 
immigration,”70 but also described the bitterness caused by the government’s ongoing concerns about 
‘nationalistic’ Ukrainian-Canadian political activities, and among displaced Ukrainians who felt “picked 
over or discarded without the slightest compunction” by immigration officials in European displaced 
person camps.71  Ultimately, for Luciuk, postwar immigration policy amounted to little more than an 
attempt “to preserve … Canada’s Anglo-Protestant status quo.”  As for those responsible for its 
administration, he finds only “a muddled … collection of mediocrities” whose greatest failing, in his 
view, was to be “profoundly unconversant with Ukrainian affairs.”72 
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During the first half of the twentieth century, through legislation and by policy, Canada 
maintained a catalogue of prospective immigrant groups, listed in descending order of preference.  As 
noted above, groups from across this discriminatory ‘spectrum’ have received scholarly attention.  It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the level of criticism directed toward this policy framework has often varied 
according to the experience of the particular group under consideration.  Angelika Sauer examines the 
postwar process by which German (or, more precisely, ethnic German) refugees were admitted to Canada.  
She demonstrates the impact of foreign policy concerns upon Canadian actions in this area, and argues 
convincingly that historians have generally neglected “the international political environment as a 
framework in which immigration policy was shaped.”73  Sauer is not complimentary of the government’s 
handling of this issue, as she documents fumbling responses to decisions by other Allied powers 
regarding postwar Europe taken without Canadian input, and a reliance on private organizations to bring 
German refugees to Canada.   However, she reflects only briefly upon the speedy restoration of this ethnic 
group to ‘preferred’ immigrant status, and reports having uncovered “no conclusive evidence” of 
preferential treatment toward Germans on the part of Canadian officials.  Sauer concludes simply “that 
Germans still held a high place in the public’s ethnic hierarchy,”74  and makes no mention of the fact that 
other refugee groups, equally desperate or deserving, were left waiting.   
Even less critical and more celebratory is a collection of reminiscences published following a 
1989 symposium to commemorate Canada’s response to the 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis.  Edited by 
historian Robert Keyserlingk, this series of articles by academics and former civil servants offers detailed 
insight into this successful emergency initiative.  Particularly useful is the description by a former 
Immigration Branch officer of the postwar expansion of the mandate and administrative capacity of the 
Branch.75  Undoubtedly, the presence at the conference of former immigration minister J.W. Pickersgill 
(who had personally directed the initiative) helped to ensure that criticism would be restrained.  However, 
there are numerous differences in recollection and viewpoint, including a disagreement about origins of 
the historic initiative.  Keyserlingk’s decision to allow these to remain unresolved is the work’s most 
obvious weakness.  
          Others who have examined the experiences of ‘non-preferred’ immigrant groups have reached 
varying appraisals of postwar policy.  In 1963, Ben Lappin’s The Redeemed Children recounted the 
rescue and resettlement of 1116 Jewish war orphans through the collective efforts of the Canadian Jewish 
community.  Lappin’s focus is on the group’s experience upon arrival in Canada and their interaction with 
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Jewish communities and organizations in their destination cities.  The 1947 Order-in-Council authorizing 
their admission to Canada is cited, and the author notes the conditions imposed by the government: “that 
the Canadian Jewish Congress would assume the financial responsibility of maintaining each war orphan 
…and … that the care of the children would be entrusted to accredited case-work agencies.”76  However, 
these stipulations – clearly imposed to preclude any demand on public resources – are noted without 
comment, and Lappin’s account offers none of the criticism of Canada’s anti-Semitic policy history 
which distinguished Abella and Troper’s later work.  More recently, Lynne Taylor’s Polish Orphans of 
Tengeru documents another postwar refugee initiative involving orphaned children. Taylor recounts the 
experiences of a group of displaced Polish Catholic children who arrived in Canada via Africa in 1949.  
The story is told against a background of complicated international postwar politics and disputes, and 
although Canadian immigration policy is not a primary focus, the depiction of a confused, directionless 
policy is very clear.  Historian Marlene Epp offers a similar perspective in her study of Mennonite 
refugees, many of whom were women displaced and widowed during the war.  Once again, immigration 
policy is not the central focus, as the author documents an arduous refugee experience and the often 
uncomfortable relationship between those who came to Canada and the established Mennonite 
community.  There are, however, numerous policy insights.  For example, Epp describes the extensive 
relief and administrative work undertaken in refugee camps by the Mennonite Central Committee, 
functions which government emissaries might reasonably have been expected to perform.77  Elsewhere, 
she notes that “in the two years immediately after the war, Canada’s doors remained firmly closed,” 
although restrictions were eased later, under categories such as the ‘close relative’ provisions, after 
persistent lobbying by community groups.78   
As with other studies of ‘non-preferred’ immigrant groups, those documenting the experience of 
African and West Indian immigrants are unsparing in their appraisal of postwar policy.  The statutory 
framework provides the foundation for these analyses.  One scholar notes that successive Immigration 
Acts and the policies implemented under them affirmed “the racialization of potential immigrants through 
a nationality preference system”79 under which ‘non-whites’ were invariably ranked last.  Elsewhere, 
sociologist Agnes Calliste examines the history of domestic labour programs under which small numbers 
of Caribbean women were permitted to immigrate early in the twentieth century and in the postwar 
period.  Such ‘schemes,’ Calliste demonstrates, responded to ongoing demands for cheap domestic labour 
in occupations which Canadians and other preferred immigrant groups avoided.  The program “did not 
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indicate liberalization of Canada’s immigration policy.”  Instead, it “reinforced the racial, class and 
gender stereotypes about black women being inherently suited to domestic work,” thereby perpetuating 
“the oppression of black working-class women.”80  Sociologist Alan Simmons concurs, arguing that 
legislative revisions during the 1960s represented a belated shift toward a “non-racist” (but not “anti-
racist”) immigration policy.  For Simmons, the continuation of the domestic worker program after the 
legislative revisions of 1962 and 1967 “continued to reinforce … stereotyping and discrimination,” and 
thus perpetuated the racist principles which had long characterized Canadian policy.81 
Several survey works also contribute to the historiographical literature in this area. Among these 
are recent studies by Valerie Knowles, and by Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, which present 
general chronologies of Canada’s immigration history.82  Both offer useful introductory overviews, 
particularly in their treatment of early twentieth century and postwar developments, although both strive 
mightily to avoid criticism in their analysis of immigration policy.  The latter work, co-authored by a law 
professor, contributes substantially to the literature through explanation and analysis of many important 
legislative, judicial, and administrative developments.   
Two earlier survey histories complete the immigration literature.  In 1977, historian Gerald E. 
Dirks introduced refugee policy as a distinct category within Canadian immigration history.  His detailed 
study carefully delineates between refugees and other migratory groups, and traces a policy development 
process that evolved in response to diverse and conflicting pressures.  In Dirks’ view, however, the 
approach that emerged was often uninspired.  “The world’s refugee problem,” he explains, “had increased 
rather than decreased following World War I and the Russian revolution. The policies of Canadian 
governments failed to reflect this condition.”83  Dirks identifies numerous factors – nativism and 
antisemitism; a fear of exacerbating poor economic conditions; policy disputes among government 
departments; and widespread indifference to the outside world – to explain an immigration strategy which 
he characterizes as “unimaginative, plodding, and inadequate,”84 during the immediate postwar period.  
                                                          
80 Calliste, “Canada’s Immigration Policy and Domestics from the Caribbean,” 134; 150-1. (Calliste also notes 
growing pressure by Caribbean people upon the Canadian government for a more open immigration policy. 
Examining this issue in greater detail, historians Bruce Muirhead and Greg Donaghy document the challenges 
encountered by postwar governments as they attempted to articulate “a coherent strategic vision for [Canada’s] 
relations with the Caribbean,” particularly from 1956 onward.  Trade and foreign aid issues, along with 
immigration pressures, compounded those challenges: Donaghy and Muirhead, “Interests but No Foreign Policy,” 
279-89.)  
81 Simmons, “Racism and Immigration Policy,” 88.  Notably, in his conclusions Simmons seemed prepared to 
acknowledge some gradual improvement over time.  By 1989, he declared, “Much of the evidence on racism in 
Canadian immigration policies is ambiguous” (111). 
82 Knowles, Strangers At Our Gates, and Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic. 
83 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, 43. 
84 Ibid., 148. 
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Canada’s eventual participation in various refugee initiatives is shown to have been undertaken 
grudgingly and in response to growing pressure from new sources including the international community 
and the media, or from within the government’s own bureaucracy.  At best, Dirks argues, Canada’s 
refugee policy until the mid-1960s “consisted of a series of ad hoc measures,” upon which economic 
factors exercised the greatest influence. Political considerations were also relevant, as were humanitarian 
concerns, although the latter, Dirks concludes, were “the most difficult to assess … as a motivating force 
in government refugee policy.”85   
In her 1972 publication, Canada and Immigration, political scientist Freda Hawkins offered an 
overview of postwar immigration policy that remains the most ambitious work on the subject.  Hawkins 
contextualizes Canadian policy by comparison with other jurisdictions, showing that Canada was one 
among many receiving nations to adopt highly selective criteria based primarily upon economic factors. 
She also reviews in detail the “preconditions of Canada’s postwar immigration operations.”  Along with 
the international and economic pressures which other scholars have identified, Hawkins explores other 
influences on policy, including “the design and functioning of Canadian federalism,” (a reference to the 
shared constitutional jurisdiction over immigration between the provinces and the federal government) 
and conflicting and troublesome currents of public opinion, especially in French Canada.86  Hawkins’ 
research included interviews with civil servants from several federal departments, many of whom are not 
identified but were among those responsible for administrative operations and program delivery, in 
Canada and abroad.  Hawkins’ interest in (and empathy for) the recollections of these current and former 
employees adds a perspective not evident in other studies, which typically focus almost exclusively on the 
activities of political decision-makers or senior bureaucrats.87 
Hawkins argues that postwar immigration policy reflected neither a coherent plan nor a consistent 
strategy.  “It is commonly believed,” she concludes, “that Canadian immigration policy is arrived at by a 
careful balancing of conflicting pressures originating in the Canadian community as a whole. In my view, 
nothing could be further from the truth.”88  Perhaps it should not surprise that Hawkins identifies the 
Prime Minister’s 1947 policy statement as the origin of these deficiencies.  Mackenzie King’s lofty but 
                                                          
85 Ibid., 228; 254.  
86 Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 88.  Elsewhere, structural problems within the public service, and a lack of 
political consensus are also cited as factors which influenced, or inhibited, postwar policy; Ibid., 333-8. 
87 Insights provided by these interviews included recollection of an “unsatisfactory relationship” between the 
Citizenship and Immigration Branches following their 1950 merger into a new federal immigration department (96-
8). Elsewhere, they describe widespread morale problems among immigration officials who felt “unappreciated” 
and “hampered,” by a lack of support and clear policy direction from the government, conflict and competition 
with other departments, and poor immigration legislation (336-7).  
88 Ibid., 348. 
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ambiguous references to “population growth,” to “economic development” and to “absorptive capacity,” 
she concludes, “had never been adequately discussed or explored at the political or official level.”  By the 
end of the King-St. Laurent era, Hawkins finds “no evidence…of a forward-looking, developmental 
approach on the part of the government, [and] no suggestion of experiment, inquiry, or objective 
assessment of results.”89  Regulatory and legislative changes implementing more liberal immigration 
criteria during the 1960s are attributed vaguely to some “indefinable moment, buried deep in the 
Diefenbaker era,”90 and not to any earlier postwar developments.  Hawkins’ assessment is not unique, but 
by its detailed focus on policy, this work offers a significant contribution to this area. 
Each of the works described above has contributed to an understanding of how immigration has 
shaped Canada.  Yet the topic is so broad and diverse that no single explanation or approach – economic, 
social, or political – can be exhaustive.  Even as a collective, the historiographical literature leaves 
significant areas unexplored.  Suspicion and recrimination often prevail, as shown by the number of 
studies that describe only ad hoc approaches and self-serving motivations to immigration policy in 
Canada.  Some focus upon only one factor, or a single ethnic group, thereby eschewing the 
multidimensional nature of policy.  Policy, however, is a diverse concept, with many component elements 
and different meanings.  The Canadian Oxford Dictionary acknowledges its frequent connection to the 
legislative process, defining policy as “a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a 
government.”91  Policy, therefore, encompasses both anticipated (“proposed”) and actual (“adopted”) 
outcomes.  Few of the works noted above endeavour to precisely define policy, or recognize its 
component parts, before launching into their analyses.  They seldom distinguish what is planned from 
what is ultimately achieved, through the enactment of legislative provisions and the implementation of 
regulatory orders and operational policies to apply and enforce those provisions.  They also frequently 
overlook the degree to which policy comprises a response to unexpected events or circumstances.  The 
following chapters will contribute to the literature in this area by considering each of these elements as 
important components of immigration policy.  Among the questions to be addressed is whether the 
literature on postwar immigration policy is complete, or whether a different and more policy-focused 
perspective may offer new understanding and insight.    
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Managing the ‘Problem’ of Immigration:   
The Evolution of a Policy Framework 
 
The British statute which created the Dominion of Canada contained provisions designed to 
divide and delineate powers between the federal and provincial governments.  A reading of those 
provisions reveals that the architects of the British North America Act – the ‘Fathers of Confederation’ – 
envisioned a highly centralized union in which the federal government would exercise jurisdiction over 
legislative matters that were perceived to be most important.  Sections 91 and 92 of the Act identified the 
legislative powers to be vested in the central and provincial governments respectively, with the former 
exercising “broader, general powers”1 over such matters as trade and commerce, taxation, defence, 
banking, and criminal law.  The provinces, in contrast, were granted authority over their own 
‘constitutions’, limited powers of direct taxation relating to “provincial purposes,” responsibility for 
hospitals, provincial property and civil rights, and “Generally, all Matters of a merely local or private 
Nature in the Province.”2  As an exultant John A. Macdonald explained, the BNA Act went even further, 
also conferring ‘residual’ powers on the central government:  
     We have strengthened the General Government. We have given the General Legislature all the great                    
     subjects of legislation.  We have conferred on them not only specifically and in detail, all the powers  
     which are incidental to sovereignty, but we have expressly declared that all subjects of general  
     interest not distinctly and exclusively conferred upon the local governments and local legislatures,  
     shall be conferred upon the general government and legislature.3 
 
Neither section 91 or 92 of the BNA Act addressed constitutional responsibility for immigration.  
Instead, a separate provision – section 95 of the Act – authorized both the federal and provincial 
legislatures to “make laws in relation to Agriculture … and to Immigration,” within their respective 
constitutional jurisdictions.  These two subject areas thus became matters of ‘concurrent’ jurisdiction, in 
recognition of the reality that each could be expected to involve both national and local interests.  As 
W.H. McConnell notes, “the fact that most immigrants to a country with a preponderantly agricultural 
economy would engage in farming explains in part the collocation of the two heads of jurisdiction.”4  This 
“collocation” was not merely statutory; the government’s administrative apparatus for immigration 
                                                          
1 McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act, 2. 
2 British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Victoria, Chapter 3, section 92(16). 
3 Confederation Debates, 1865, 33. Quoted in McConnell, 139. 
4 McConnell, 304. 
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remained a branch of the Department of Agriculture “from Confederation until the 14th March, 1892.”5  In 
his landmark study of the Canadian public service, J. E. Hodgetts noted that while “agricultural matters 
… remained marginal until 1886, immigration engaged the full attention of the department until it was 
transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1892.”6  
Conflict between federal and provincial legislation can arise in various ways in a federal system, 
particularly over matters that are subject to concurrent jurisdiction.  Where such conflict occurs, the 
constitutional doctrine of paramountcy operates to resolve it, by providing that federal legislation prevails 
in situations involving duplication or overlap.  The federal government moved quickly, however, to 
prevent confusion in this area, and to establish its legislative pre-eminence under section 95.  Following 
consultations with the provinces in 1868 to delineate federal and provincial roles,7 Canada’s first 
Immigration Act received royal assent on June 22, 1869 and was proclaimed in force on January 1, 1870.  
Jurisdictional conflict was averted, at least initially, as the provinces assumed a “generally auxiliary and 
recessive role … in the immigration field.”8 
Most provisions of The Immigration Act, 1869 were designed to promote immigration and to 
protect immigrants while in transit and upon arrival in Canada.  The Act imposed record-keeping 
requirements on ships’ captains, set limits on the number of passengers in proportion to the size of any 
transporting vessel, and imposed penalties for the carrying of any travellers not identified on passenger 
lists filed with customs officials at the port of departure.  Recruiting agents acting on behalf of inland 
carriers in Canada were required to be licensed.  Even tavern keepers in Canada were obliged to post their 
prices, to prevent the exploitation of new arrivals seeking accommodation.   
                                                          
5 Memorandum to His Excellency The Governor General in Council: Historical Data, October 30, 1935, LAC, 
Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 622, file 923954, reel 10440.  The author of this document is identified as 
“FCB.”  Frederick Charles Blair, a career civil servant, served as assistant deputy minister of agriculture from 1924 
to 1936 and thereafter as Immigration Branch director until 1943.  His relentlessly racist and anti-Semitic 
administration of Canadian immigration policy during that period has been thoroughly documented, particularly by 
Irving Abella and Harold Troper.  (See Abella and Troper, “The line must be drawn somewhere,” and None is Too 
Many.)  Branch memoranda issued by Blair (like this one) often included helpful chronological details about the 
history of immigration program administration, for the edification of his political masters.  
6 Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service, 100. 
7 Provincial and federal representatives agreed that each could participate in the overseas recruitment of 
immigrants: “Ottawa would open an emigration office in London and one on the Continent, followed by other 
agencies as the need arose.”  Similarly, provinces were “free to appoint their own agents as they saw fit”: Knowles, 
Strangers At Our Gates, 70.    
8 McConnell, 306. This jurisdictional harmony appears to have been short-lived.  McConnell reports more than 
twenty instances of provincial immigration legislation being overturned, either by the courts or by the Governor-
General-in-Council (under disallowance powers contained in the constitution) between 1884 and 1908: McConnell, 
307. Typically, such provisions sought to exclude particular groups from entering a province; disallowance was 
usually ordered because the provision in question had exceeded provincial authority.    
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The Act’s preamble acknowledged the concurrent jurisdiction set out in the BNA Act, as well as 
the recently negotiated agreement regarding federal and provincial activities. Other provisions, however, 
demonstrated the government’s intention to establish federal hegemony over immigration policy.  The 
establishment of quarantine facilities and the conduct of medical examinations were to be federal 
responsibilities, as were all decisions in respect of “Lunatic, Idiotic, Deaf and Dumb, Blind or Infirm” 
immigrants, or those deemed “likely to become … a public charge.”  Ottawa, not the provinces, would 
determine any additional payment or surety to be required in such cases, and make all decisions to refuse 
entry to these or other “destitute” travellers.9   In addition, one section foretold the future of policy 
administration in this field.  While the Act did not explicitly confer upon the government the type of 
general ‘regulation-making’ power that characterized later legislation, it did include a provision 
authorizing the “Governor” (i.e. the cabinet) to prohibit the landing of paupers or destitute immigrants 
“by proclamation, wherever deemed necessary.”10   
The Immigration Act, 1869 remained in place, with few revisions, for thirty-five years.11  
Although intended to promote immigration, the Act was not particularly successful in that regard.  
Ironically, it was replaced in the early 1900s – in the midst of the country’s greatest immigration influx – 
by legislation which began to control and restrict immigration rather than promote it.  Canada’s second 
Immigration Act was proclaimed in force in 1906, and was designed to respond to new priorities and 
political problems.  As Kelley and Trebilcock explain, a massive post-1896 wave of immigration had 
generated widespread public concern, particularly in urban areas where “bleak working environments and 
appalling living conditions” were attributed to unskilled, uneducated, and uncouth immigrants from 
Britain and Eastern Europe.12  A new Interior minister, Frank Oliver, replaced Clifford Sifton in 1905, 
and the revised legislation which quickly followed reflected Oliver’s preference for a more restrictive 
immigration policy.   
                                                          
9 The Immigration Act, 1869, Statutes of Canada (S.C.) 1869, Ch. 10, sections 11 and 16. 
10 Ibid., s. 16.  Kelley and Trebilcock explain that this prohibition power was not widely exercised. The significance 
of section 16, therefore, was what it portended rather than what it accomplished.  (Kelley and Trebilcock, The 
Making of the Mosaic, 498n162.) 
11 Amendments to the Act in 1872 added “criminal or other vicious” immigrants to the prohibited classes listed in 
section 16.  Other new sections prohibited the “seduction” of female immigrants, and established a process for the 
“Inquiry into complaints”, by the Minister of Agriculture, “against any railway company or any incorporated 
company, for any offence or violation of this Act.”  From its wording, however, this new complaint provision 
appears designed to resolve disputes among carriers rather than to protect individual immigrants: S.C. 1872, Ch. 
28, sections 6 and 11.   
12 Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 116-7. 
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The 1906 Immigration Act expanded the number of prohibited categories of immigrants, adding 
to the list the “insane,” the “feeble-minded,” and the “diseased,” as well as prostitutes and “beggars.”13  
More importantly, racial origin would replace the occupational criteria which had been utilized to assess 
eligibility under the earlier legislation.14  Several new provisions encapsulated this important policy shift.  
First, the new section 10 explicitly authorized the Governor in Council “to make such orders and 
regulations … necessary or expedient for the carrying out of this Act according to its true intent and 
meaning.”  In other words, the statute now clearly empowered the government to implement immigration 
policy either by regulations promulgated under the Act or simply by way of administrative cabinet order.  
Either approach would ensure limited parliamentary oversight of immigration policy, and would enable 
the implementation of policy changes administratively, without the need for legislative amendment. 
Other provisions in the 1906 statute suggested how this broad administrative discretion would be 
exercised.  Section 30, for example, authorized cabinet “by proclamation or order … [to] prohibit the 
landing in Canada of any specified class of immigrants.”  Another new section empowered the 
government to “provide as a condition to permission to enter Canada that immigrants shall possess money 
to a prescribed minimum amount, which amount may vary according to the class and destination of such 
immigrants.”15  Orders-in-council exercising these statutory powers soon followed.       
The extended period of legislative inactivity which followed passage of the 1869 Immigration Act 
was not repeated after 1906.  Instead, another new Act followed only four years later.  The 1910 
Immigration Act has been described, somewhat euphemistically, as having “amplified” the provisions of 
its predecessor, primarily by incorporating regulatory rules that had been implemented since 1906.16  The 
‘amplifications,’ however, were dramatic, beginning with further additions to the list of prohibited 
classes.  One provision introduced a “continuous journey’” criterion, creating a new test that could be 
applied in order to exclude certain ethnic groups.17  Another section augmented cabinet authority to 
impose landing taxes on immigrants, by stipulating that such fees could now “vary according to the race, 
occupation or destination” of the immigrant.18  For the first time, the Act explicitly authorized the 
government to deny entry to “immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or 
requirements of Canada, or of … any specified class, occupation or character.”19  Lastly, the Act’s 
                                                          
13 Immigration Act, S.C. 1906, Ch. 19, s. 26.  
14 The 1869 statute required passenger lists to identify heads of family by, among other things, their “profession or 
trade”: The Immigration Act, 1869, section 5(2)  
15 Immigration Act, S.C. 1906, Ch. 19, sections 20 and 30.   
16 Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 139. 
17 Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, Ch. 27, section 38(a). 
18 Ibid., section 37. 
19 Ibid., section 38(c). 
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rudimentary appeals process – first introduced in 187220 – was substantially revised, as the “duties and 
procedures of boards of inquiry were … expanded and more fully articulated.”  Once again, however, 
these changes were not designed for the protection of individual immigrants, “who had no right to present 
evidence or to cross-examine on evidence prejudicial to [their] case,” or even to be present at the hearing 
of their appeal.21  Instead, the government’s unfettered authority over immigration policy and program 
administration was ‘clarified.’  In limited situations, the decision of a board of inquiry could be appealed 
to the minister. Otherwise, a statutory privative clause prohibited any further recourse to the courts other 
than for Canadian citizens or persons with Canadian domicile, a status which few immigrants could 
possibly have enjoyed.22 
In 1919, amendments to the 1910 statute extensively revised the legislation yet again.  The list of 
‘excluded’ classes was further expanded to include all persons who had been designated as “enemy 
aliens” during the First World War, as well as any who “believe in or advocate for the overthrow by force 
… of the Government of Canada” or who “are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining 
or teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government.”  Another new section specifically 
authorized the deportation of persons in this category, or any found to be advocating the overthrow of 
“constituted law and authority.”23  These amendments effectively excluded, or subjected to deportation, 
persons from countries with which Canada had been at war, such as Germany and the former Austro-
Hungarian states, including Ukraine. They were also directed toward those whom the government now 
considered “troublesome from a labour-relations perspective,”24 including the organizers of the 1919 
Winnipeg general strike.   
The outburst of legislative activity between 1906 and 1919 has attracted relatively little scholarly 
attention.  Historians have not seemed inclined to distinguish among the 1906, 1910, and 1919 
enactments, but have tended to view them either as separate and distinct developments, or as loosely-
connected components of an ongoing legislative initiative.  Historian Julie Gilmour, for example, points 
to the 1906 Act as the beginning of “what became known as a ‘White Canada Immigration Policy.’”25  By 
contrast, Alan Green identifies the 1910 Immigration Act as the legislative “landmark,” establishing a 
                                                          
20 See footnote 10, above. 
21 Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 140. 
22 Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, Ch. 27, sections 18-23. 
23 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, S.C. 1919, Ch. 25, sections 3 and 15.  ‘Enemy aliens’ had been the focus of 
other legislative actions during the war. The 1917 War-Time Elections Act disenfranchised “tens of thousands of 
immigrants” naturalized after 1902: English, The Decline of Politics, 153-4. One student of this period cites the 
sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 as a particular genesis of wartime “enemy alien” hysteria: Boudreau, “The Enemy 
Alien Problem in Canada, 1914-1921,” 31-2. 
24 Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 185. 
25 Gilmour, “And who is my neighbour?” 162.  
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policy framework that would remain in place for decades.26  To Donald Avery, the 1919 revisions seem 
most significant, demonstrating the “willingness of governments to avoid political controversy” as well as 
an accommodation to wartime “anti-alien hysteria.”27  Similarly, Valerie Knowles describes the 1919 
amendments, and the cabinet orders issued pursuant to them, as signalling a “dramatic shift” in 
immigration policy.28 
While these different emphases are not necessarily inaccurate, neither are they comprehensive.  
The 1910 and 1919 changes in particular responded to specific events and developments, such as the 1907 
anti-Asian riots in Vancouver, racial antipathies fueled by World War One, and the economic recession 
and labour unrest which developed after the war.  It was surely no coincidence that the 1910 Immigration 
Act followed closely an investigation into the causes of the Vancouver riots by the government’s 
ambitious deputy minister of labour, Mackenzie King.  King’s report and recommendations demonstrated 
the kind of equivocal logic that would serve him well in future, intimating that the Asian communities 
victimized by the riots were somehow responsible for their own misfortune, and should in future be 
excluded from Canada on “humanitarian” grounds.29  (King was elected to Parliament in 1908, and by 
1909 he was in cabinet as the nation’s first-ever labour minister.  His views on race were already well 
established and undoubtedly influenced the more restrictive 1910 legislation.30)   
The 1919 amendments, enacted amidst the turmoil of the Winnipeg general strike, also responded 
to immediate political and public pressures. They authorized the exclusion or deportation of immigrants 
coming from countries with whom Canada had been at war, or on grounds that they were radical ‘trouble-
makers’ of the type believed responsible for postwar labour unrest.  Further, in any case where ethnic or 
racial designations might not be sufficiently precise to ensure exclusion, admittance could be denied “by 
reason of any economic, industrial or other condition” in Canada, or “owing to … peculiar customs, 
                                                          
26 Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy, 14. 
27 Avery, Reluctant Host, 234. 
28 Knowles, Strangers At Our Gates, 135. 
29 Gilmour, Trouble on Main Street, 55-7; 110-1. See also W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Ward quotes 
King’s report on the specific issue of Indian immigration.  It recommended the “discontinuance of such 
immigration … in the interests of the Indians themselves” (83).  Curiously, Ward’s study of anti-Asian nativism in 
British Columbia barely acknowledges federal immigration legislation as a response to that phenomenon. His single 
reference to the 1910 Act suggests that “public opinion had little influence” on the statute, which was “merely a 
refinement of existing law and took its origins from within the civil service.” (Ward, 183n67)    
30 Evidently, immigration policy was not always a matter of cabinet unanimity. An entry in King’s diary describes a 
discussion at which ministers considered demands by railway companies for more foreign construction workers.  
“Oliver,” King recorded, “is strong in his opposition to labour being brought into the country … that ultimately is 
not going to be of service for settlement, & favours making restrictions on virtually all save northern people of 
Europe. I agree with him, but we are about alone in this, others preferring to see Ry. [i.e. railway] work hurried”: 
LAC, King Diary, January 10, 1911. (This passage is quoted in Kelley and Trebilcock, 119-20.)    
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habits, modes of life and methods of holding property.”31  The effect of these revisions was to empower 
the government, by regulation and order-in-council, to catalogue immigrant groups into ‘preferred’ and 
‘non-preferred’ classes, on the basis of ethnicity, perceived political inclination, or any other “condition,” 
and to exclude them on any basis which the government, in its sole discretion, deemed applicable.   
The legislative foundation for immigration policy over the next four decades was thus firmly in 
place by 1919.  The development of an accompanying regulatory and administrative framework continued 
apace.  Subordinate legislation, in the form of regulations, is essential to the administration of any 
statutory regime.  “It is beyond possibility,” John Kersell explains, “that Parliament should control in 
detail all the administrative, regulative and other activities of government.”32  Authority to establish 
administrative procedures and policy by regulation is typically delegated by statute to cabinet or to 
individual ministers, thereby ensuring that “within assigned limits, the body [i.e. the cabinet] can flexibly 
apply law or policy.”33  Subordinate legislation, at least in principle, allows for the establishment of a 
workable administrative framework to ensure delivery of a statutory program in accordance with the 
general intent and purpose of the governing statute.  There are drawbacks, however.  As Hodgetts 
explains, such delegated authority can burden cabinet members with administrative matters and distract 
them from pursuing “the main policy goals of the nation.”34  This would become a recurring concern 
among later immigration ministers.    
It is unclear when the government began to issue regulations under its immigration legislation.  
As noted earlier, The Immigration Act, 1869 delegated a limited regulatory power to the government.  At 
that time, however, there was no requirement for government to publish regulations or orders-in-council 
issued under such delegated authority, or even to table them in Parliament.  (As Kersell explains, in 
Canada “developments in regard to parliamentary supervision of the use of delegated legislative powers 
… lagged far behind” other Commonwealth nations.  Britain, for example, established the practice of 
publication in the nineteenth century.35)  The General Index of Parliamentary Sessional Papers for the 
period 1867-1876 shows no entries for regulations or orders under the subject of immigration.  The 
subsequent volume, covering the period 1877-1890, references only a few, and most are described as not 
                                                          
31 S.C. 1919, Ch. 25, section 13. 
32 Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation, 1. 
33 McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act, 45. 
34 Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service, 51. 
35 Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation, 158-63.  In Canada, the “publication and laying” of 
regulations before Parliament was not consistently practiced until World War Two; the legal requirement to do so 
was implemented in 1947 (ironically, by an order-in-council, P.C 3605/1949 under the obscure Public Printing and 
Stationery Act).  A Regulations Act followed in 1950. 
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having been printed.36  Later indexes reference administrative orders more frequently, but often indicate 
that they were not printed or published in the Canada Gazette, a practice which became mandatory in 
later times.  
By the early 1900s, the use of orders-in-council to establish administrative policy had become 
more frequent.  On July 23, 1900, Order-in-Council P.C. 1851/1900 prohibited the landing of pauper or 
destitute immigrants in any Canadian port of entry “until such sums of money as are found necessary are 
provided” to local immigration authorities.37 (Curiously, and unlike the 1880 order issued under the same 
authority, the 1900 order-in-council did not stipulate an amount required.)  One month later, Order-in-
Council P.C. 2062/1900 exercised the authority granted in the 1872 amendments to the Act, by 
“prohibiting the landing in Canada of criminals or vicious immigrants from any European or Asiatic 
Port.”38  A third order-in-council, P.C 1293/1902, issued on August 15, 1902, prohibited “the landing in 
Canada absolutely of any immigrant or other passenger who is suffering from any loathsome, dangerous 
or infectious disease.”39 
One characteristic shared by these orders-in-council was a tendency to extend administrative 
policy to the limit of the authority delegated by the governing statute.  It will be recalled that the 1869 
Act, as amended in 1872,40 empowered the government to prohibit the landing of destitute immigrants 
unless payment was made for their care and transportation.  Implicit in that statutory provision was a 
requirement that any regulation issued thereunder would stipulate an amount of money to be charged in 
that circumstance.  In the 1880 regulation41, the government set the amount at $20.  However, in P.C. 
1851/1900, which extended the prohibition of indigent immigrants from Halifax and to all ports of entry, 
no amount was stipulated.  The result was to provide immigration officials with absolute discretion to ban 
any immigrants found to be “indigent,” regardless of whether they brought funds to support themselves.42  
                                                          
36 General Index to the Journals of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada and of the Sessional Papers of 
Parliament, From 1877-1890, inclusive, Ottawa, 1891. One early Order-in-Council that is extant is P.C. 74/1880. 
Issued under section 16 of The Immigration Act, 1869, this order prohibited the landing of “pauper or destitute 
immigrants in the Port of Halifax” pending payment of “the sum of twenty dollars at least for each … for his or her 
temporary support and transport to place of destination.” LAC, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a, Volume 
387, Reel C-3328. This item, and those cited in footnotes 37 through 39 and 42, below, were accessed online at 
www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/orders/001022-100.01-e.php. on December 19, 2016.  
37 LAC, RG 2, Privy Council Minutes, Series 1, Volume 843.  
38 P.C. 2062/1900, August 23, 1900, LAC, Privy Council Minutes, RG 2, Series 1, Volume 848.  
39 P.C. 1293/1902, August 15, 1902, LAC, RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-1-d, volume 843.  The 1869 Act did not 
authorize the exclusion of ‘diseased’ immigrants. A legislative amendment was therefore required before a 
regulation prohibiting admission on that basis could be established, which explains the later proclamation date for 
this order: See An Act to amend the Immigration Act, S.C. 1902, Ch. 14. 
40 See footnote 11, above. 
41 See footnote 36, above. 
42 A 1908 regulation restored landing charges, increasing them substantially from the 1880 amounts: P.C. 28/1908. 
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P.C. 2062/1900 showed a similar tendency to stretch the authority delegated by the Act.  The 1872 
amendments had added “criminal or other vicious classes” (a category which surely defied precise 
description) to the categories of immigrants subject to administrative exclusion.  The subsequent order-in-
council simply repeated the statutory language, excluding “criminals and vicious immigrants” without 
clarification as to how these characteristics would be determined.  The 1902 order barring immigrants 
afflicted with “loathsome diseases” reflected the same concerns that motivated the earlier regulations, 
referring in its preamble to “the large numbers of immigrants who are now coming from foreign countries 
to Canada and to the United States via Canadian ports.”  It also, like the other orders, granted absolute 
discretion to “the Minister of the Interior or officer to whom he entrusts the matter” to exercise that 
authority.43 
It is clear that the early 1900s saw the formation of an approach to immigration policy that would 
endure beyond the mid-twentieth century.  Statutory regulations, passed by way of orders-in council, 
allowed the government to quickly address concerns raised by high levels of immigration, through 
expanded and often vaguely defined prohibited immigrant “classes.”  Regulations, however, cannot 
exceed the authority that is delegated by the legislation under which they are promulgated, and must also 
reflect – in the words of the 1906 Immigration Act – the true “intent and meaning” of the governing 
statute.  The new Immigration Acts of 1906 and 1910, and the amendments of 1919, demonstrated a sense 
of urgency not only to establish policy by way of administrative order, but also to ensure that the statutory 
language was sufficiently broad to allow for the kind of unfettered administrative discretion that was 
contemplated for this policy area.  Kelley and Trebilcock may exaggerate slightly when they note that 
some prohibitions contained in the 1906 Act had been “passed in earlier orders-in-council”44 (since 
regulations cannot be issued before they are permitted by statute).  However, there is little doubt that the 
substantial legislative revisions during the period reveal a distinctive pattern whereby legislators strove to 
ensure that the legislation remained sufficiently broad in its wording to permit the administrative 
procedures being established under it. 
New regulations followed each statutory revision, continuing at times to extend legislative “intent 
and meaning” to their utmost.  A January 1908 regulation45 implemented the “continuous journey” 
                                                          
43 P.C 1293/1902, 1-2. 
44 Kelley and Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic, 510n113. 
45 P.C. 27/1908, LAC Privy Council Office, Series A-1-a, Vol. 942.  Accessed at 
www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/orders/001022-100.01-e.php. on December 30, 2016.  In this case, the 
statute was not amended to authorize the ‘continuous journey’ exclusion until April 10, 1908, some four months 
after the order-in-council had been issued;  see An Act to amend the Immigration Act, S.C. 1908, Ch. 33, section 1.  
Section 30 of the 1906 Act had simply provided a general authority to cabinet to prohibit “by proclamation or 
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restriction that had been added to the 1906 Act as a tool for the exclusion of certain ethnic groups.  The 
subterfuge in this provision was obvious; prospective immigrants from Asia or India, in particular, would 
find it impossible to travel to Canada “by a continuous journey and on through tickets purchased before 
leaving the country of their birth, or citizenship.”46  American or British travellers, by contrast, could 
easily meet those criteria.  In its preamble, the regulation also conspicuously declared the redress of 
“conditions of over supply of labour at certain seasons”47 to be an important purpose of the 1906 Act.  
Although economic factors were, and would remain, important components of immigration policy, no 
language in the 1906 statute suggested a connection between labour market conditions and the “intent and 
meaning” of the Immigration Act.   
A period of heightened regulatory activity followed the conclusion of World War One and the 
1919 amendments to the Immigration Act, and continued into the mid-1920s.  First, a series of orders-in-
council, issued in rapid succession by the Union and Conservative governments between 1919 and 1921, 
targeted not only the radical immigrants believed to have instigated the Winnipeg strike, but also various 
ethnic groups against whom resentment had grown during wartime.  Groups such as Doukhobors, 
Hutterites, and Mennonites were now excluded completely, while others were subject to prohibitive 
landing fees48.  Likewise, immigrants now identified as “enemy aliens” by the 1919 amendments were 
now excluded.49  Several years later, as tensions eased and economic conditions improved, many of these 
restrictions were reversed through subsequent regulations.   In 1926, Order-in-Council P.C. 534/1926 
effectively reopened the nation’s borders to immigration, citing a renewed need for labour.    
As the legislative and regulatory frameworks evolved, a third foundational component of 
immigration policy also emerged, as the government constructed an administrative infrastructure and 
implemented operational procedures to direct those entrusted with the implementation of policy.  Some 
elements of this administrative sphere were readily visible to the public, while others remained inward-
facing and internal to government.  A review of the materials in this area that remain available reveals 
much about evolving immigration policy from the early years of the program.  Initially, departmental 
                                                          
order” the landing of “any specified class of immigrants.”  While this language may have been sufficiently broad, 
the subsequent statutory amendment suggested that the government feared that it was not. 
46 Ibid., 2.  Peter Ward confirms that the provision was directed primarily at Indian and Japanese immigrants: 
“There being no direct steamship line from India, virtually all Indian immigration was thus eliminated. At the same 
time the door was shut on the Hawaiian route for Japanese immigrants.” See Ward, White Canada Forever, 75-6.   
47 Ibid., 1. 
48 Numerous orders encapsulated these restrictions. Hutterites, Doukhobors, and Mennonites were barred under 
Order P.C. 923/1919 (May 1, 1919) and Order P.C. 1204/1919 (June 9, 1919).  Of these, P.C. 1204/1919 was 
published: Canada Gazette, Vol. 52 Apr.-June 1919, 3824. For an example of the imposition of landing fees, see 
Order P.C. 2668/1921 (July 26, 1921) Canada Gazette, Vol. 55 July-Sept. 1921, 1175. 
49 Order-in-Council P.C. 1203/1919 (June 9, 1919) Canada Gazette, Vol. 52 Apr.-June 1919, 3825. 
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reports by immigration officials described infrastructure projects undertaken following passage of The 
Immigration Act, 1869, but otherwise confined themselves to statistical summaries.50  By the early 1900s, 
however, as immigration policy grew more complicated the reports became more nuanced, but also more 
revealing.  In its 1907 annual report to Parliament, the Department of the Interior proudly noted that the 
previous year’s intake of 189,064 immigrants was “the largest in the history of Canada.”  Then, in 
language that disclosed the true motivation behind Canada’s immigration policy, it continued: 
     The one aim and well established policy of the department during the past few years has been to make  
     Canada better known in the outside world, so as to attract capitalists and desirable settlers to develop  
     her vast natural resources. That this policy has been productive of the desired results is amply  
     demonstrated by the fact that during the past ten years 832,606 persons landed in Canada from every  
     part of the world; of these 584,356 came from the British Isles and the United States.51   
 
The irony in these lines may well have been lost on the dutiful bureaucrats who drafted them.  
(The new 1906 Immigration Act was designed to restrict immigration or at least to provide the 
government with the means to do so, and was enacted in response to growing public objection to current 
immigration levels, albeit from non-British sources.)  “The time would appear most opportune,” the 
report cheerfully concluded, “for continuing with increased vigour the propaganda which has been 
conducted in Great Britain during the past few years.”52  The real policy goal may have been the 
promotion of immigration, but only from preferred sources – Great Britain and the United States. 
Annual departmental reports presented a consistently optimistic picture, even as immigration 
levels declined with the approach of war.  Although overall immigration fell to 208,794 in 1910, the 
Deputy Minister’s 1911 report still emphasized an increase in the number of British immigrants, 
reassuring readers of the program’s success in its efforts “to attract all desirable classes” from Great 
Britain.53  Special praise was reserved for “the new regulations,” which the report credited as a “source of 
protection against certain undesirable classes” which might otherwise have been admitted.  Here was the 
language of the skilled bureaucrat, simultaneously affirming the political acuity in the recent statutory 
revisions and his own department’s resounding success in administering them.   
                                                          
50 See, for example, “Report of the Minister of Agriculture for 1871” in Sessional Papers, Vol. 2, Fifth Session of the 
First Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, Session 1872, No. 2A.  This report described the construction of “large 
and commodious” immigration stations underway at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and in “the new Province of 
Manitoba,” but otherwise primarily summarized statistics on immigrant arrivals for the year (65,722) and 
expenditures on immigration by the government ($133,612.28) both at home and abroad. 
51 “Report of the Deputy Minister of the Interior” in Sessional Papers 1906-7, Vol 41, No. 10, Sessional Paper No. 
25, xxxi. 
52 Ibid., xxxi. 
53 “Report of the Deputy Minister W.W. Cory”, Sessional Papers 1911, Vol 45, No. 16, Sessional Paper No. 25, xxviii. 
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Subsequent annual reports of the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Immigration 
and Colonization (which succeeded it in 1917) grew increasingly political and self-congratulatory in tone.  
The high “quality” of immigrants coming from Britain,54 and the vigorous enforcement of exclusionary 
rules were consistently celebrated.  Readers were reassured of evidence “that a considerable percentage of 
immigration continues to turn to agricultural pursuits.”55  Border security received particular emphasis 
after the war, as Immigration Branch officials described “extra vigilance and care” by field officers in 
preventing the entry of “undesirable classes” in the war’s aftermath.56  By extensive amendment and 
numerous regulatory orders, the Immigration Act had been transformed into enforcement legislation, and 
enforcement meant increased resources and an expanded bureaucracy.  Invariably the reports included 
little data about growth in the size of the bureaucracy, or its attendant costs.  However, reassurances of the 
efficient and effective deployment of those resources became a prominent theme of the government’s 
annual program reports.57  The relatively low – and declining – annual number of deportations was also 
cited as evidence of the program’s success.58  
The final foundational component to immigration policy was comprised of innumerable internal 
directives, memoranda, and bulletins issued from the earliest days of the program.  Essential to the 
delivery of any statutory enforcement regime, these materials are ordinarily prepared for the instruction 
and guidance of program staff, and are seldom intended to be made public.  Accordingly, they often 
disclose information or concerns not evident in other published materials, or policy directions not 
discernible in the governing legislation.  Surviving Immigration Branch files from the early twentieth 
century provide several noteworthy examples. 
      One particularly revealing Interior Department memorandum, dated June 4, 1909, began with an 
acknowledgement that the current Immigration Act had undergone “several” recent amendments, raising 
                                                          
54 “Report of A.F. Jury to Assistant Superintendent of Emigration for Canada, London”, Sessional Papers 1911, Vol. 
45, No. 16, 75. 
55 “Report of the Deputy Minister of the Interior 1912-13”, Sessional Papers 1914, Vol. 48, No. 19, Sessional Paper 
No. 25, xi.  
56 “Report of the Department of Immigration and Colonization 1919-20”, Sessional Papers 1921, Vol. 57, No. 6, 
Sessional Paper No. 18, 28. 
57 In his 1921 report, acting deputy minister W.W. Cory exalted “the work on the ground” of Immigration Branch 
officers during the preceding year, especially their fastidious “checking at the boundary” of prospective 
immigrants. “Had it not been for this,” he concluded ominously, “no one can tell what internal happenings might 
have occurred as the result of the immigration of a class of people whose whole aim and purpose was to 
disseminate strife and foment trouble.” (Ibid., 30.)  No further details were provided, but the allusion to recent 
labour unrest and the regulations enacted in response to it was unmistakable.  
58 “The enforcement of these regulations has had the effect of reducing the deportation of immigrants of all 
nationalities from 1,748 in 1908-9 to 784 in 1910-11.” “Report of the Deputy Minister,” Sessional Papers 1912, Vol. 
46, No. 17, Sessional Paper No. 25, xxxii. 
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the “possibility of misunderstanding” of its exclusionary provisions on the part of the steamship and 
railway companies involved in the transport of immigrants.  Under the circumstances, the document 
continued, it was “advisable” to summarize the government’s current immigration policy “as shortly and 
plainly although informally as possible.”  The following principles were then enunciated: 
1. Money is expended and administration is exercised with the object of securing immigrants whose 
purpose in life is to occupy farm lands, either as owners, tenants, or labourers. 
2. Money is voted and administration is exercised with the object of excluding those whose presence 
in Canada would tend to add to the congestion of our towns and cities. 
 
            Immigration effort is made in those countries which are considered most likely to furnish the    
            people coming within the first of the two classes above specified. 
 
            No immigration effort is made in those countries which are considered likely to furnish the people  
            coming within the second class. 
 
The memorandum continued, summarizing the various “exclusion provisions” applicable to “the 
physically, mentally or morally unfit,” and to those disqualified “for financial or other reasons.”59  The 
message was clear: exclusionary criteria and rules were essential policy components, and they were to be 
strictly applied.  
Neither the authorship nor the intended audience for this early policy summary can be 
determined.  Its first page shows only its date and title.  With photocopying technology still in the distant 
future, it was almost certainly not intended for general distribution among program staff, as would later 
become common practice.  More likely, it served to remind senior immigration officials of the program’s 
guiding principles as they traveled or communicated with field offices.  The document’s current location, 
among records from the 1920s and later, suggests both its importance when it was prepared and its 
continued relevance thereafter.  A decade later, several program bulletins – now issued more frequently 
and identified as “official circulars,” – repeated the 1909 guidelines almost verbatim.60 
Over time, Immigration Branch bulletins and circulars assumed the character of modern 
bureaucratic program materials, addressing general administrative issues and more specific concerns.  A 
1919 circular exhorted inspectors at all Canadian border ports to “keep a sharp lookout” for any travellers 
who might be “Revolutionists or aliens of the Bolshevik persuasion, including I.W.W. workers.”61  Later, 
                                                          
59 In Re Exclusion of Over-Seas Immigrants, Department of the Interior, Canada, 4th June, 1909. LAC Immigration 
Branch Files, RG 76, Volume 624, file 947852, pt. 1, Reel C10440.  
60 Official Circular No. 4, January 1, 1919 reproduced the 1909 document almost exactly, as did Official Circular No. 
8, which appears to have been issued in May 1919: LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Volume 624, file 947852, 
pt. 1, reel C10440.  The file contains several other subsequent iterations of the same material. 
61 Official Circular No. 10, November 21, 1919, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 624, file 947852, pt. 1.  
“I.W.W” referred to the International Workers of the World, the union founded in the United States in 1905. 
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a 1928 circular from immigration commissioner Arthur Joliffe meticulously closed an administrative 
loophole in respect of “applicants” entering Canada in order to comply with outstanding criminal arrest 
warrants.  Previous procedures had provided for the detention of individuals arriving in such situations, 
but allowed for their release if acquitted at trial.  Henceforth, however, deportation was to be automatic 
even for those found not guilty.  Immigration officials were furnished with special “detention orders” for 
use in this scenario, and directed to “at all times have a number of blank copies … available for use on 
short notice.”  (In the event of a conviction, the order would conveniently become “null and void,” since 
existing statutory provisions were sufficient to ensure deportation.62)  Evidently, neither immigration 
officers nor those charged with the development of program policy during these years were encumbered 
by legal principles such as the presumption of innocence or procedural fairness.  
These procedural directives demonstrated an acceleration in the trend, noted above, toward 
expanded and unfettered administrative discretion over immigration policy.  The 1919 amendments had 
sought to exclude wartime “enemy aliens,” persons “opposed to organized government”, and those 
seeking to “overthrow by force or violence the Government of Canada.”63  However, the procedural 
direction to border staff, specifically referring to “Bolsheviks” and “I.W.W. workers,” surely exceeded 
any ordinary interpretation of that statutory language.  Similarly, requiring the automatic deportation of 
immigrants who had been acquitted of criminal charges defied sensible application of the statutory 
provision which excluded “criminals.”64   
In later years, procedural directives issued to program staff by Joliffe and his successor, Frederick 
Blair, sometimes demonstrated greater political acuity, but retained their vigorous approach to 
administering the statute’s exclusionary provisions.  In one circular, Joliffe warned officers to be 
particularly vigilant in “the examination of families coming forward under non-immigration status where 
the head of the family is remaining in the United States,” a scenario in which the Department might be 
manipulated into admitting unsuitable applicants, or alternatively seen as “the instrument of separating the 
family permanently” if the dependents were unable to return.65  In another circular, apparently his last as 
Commissioner of Immigration, Joliffe called for “better handling” of cases of rejection, following 
                                                          
62 Official Circular No. 28, December 11, 1928, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 624, file 947852, pt. 1. 
63 S.C. 1919, Ch. 25, sections 3 and 15. 
64 By this time, the statutory language excluding “criminal” immigrants had actually been narrowed from its earlier 
“criminal and vicious” terminology.  The current provisions excluded only “persons who have been convicted of 
any crime involving moral turpitude,” and those involved in prostitution: S.C. 1910, Ch. 19, subsections 3(d)-(f).  
Quite simply, Official Circular No. 28, appears to have had no statutory foundation.  
65 Official Circular No. 34, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 624, file 947852, pt. 1.  This document is 
undated but was probably issued some time before the Immigration Branch was placed in the Department of 
Mines and Resources in 1936.   
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incidents where an elderly traveller and a small child – both intending to visit relatives – were turned 
away.  Ever defiant, Joliffe concluded: “While rejection in both cases was right, the method of handling 
was wrong and inspection officers must always keep in mind that special cases call for special 
treatment.”66  Gradually, sensitivity toward the political dangers presented by immigration was 
increasing.67 
Not all policy developed within the immigration bureaucracy focused on exclusion.  The archival 
record also documents initiatives undertaken during periods when the government sought to encourage 
immigration, particularly during the mid-1920s.  Federal-provincial conferences discussed joint initiatives 
to publicize and promote immigration in Britain and the United States, shared best practices on intake 
from various regions,68 and lamented the ongoing challenge in getting the desired “class” of settlers.  
“The free homestead lands,” one report noted, “are no longer an attraction … when limited [as in some 
provinces] to one hundred and sixty acres.”69  Minutes of these proceedings proudly documented 
numerous promotional activities: advertising campaigns; topical publications extolling various regions or 
helpful topics like Women’s Work in Canada; and the distribution of “some three hundred and fifty 
thousand copies” of a Canadian atlas to British schoolchildren.  Conference attendees even imagined a 
future in which “motion picture publicity” might reach “20,000,000 viewers per week with movie images 
and ads.”70  Elsewhere, correspondence between the Immigration Branch, Canadian railway companies, 
and the Government of Switzerland documented a scheme to colonize several hundred Swiss farming 
families to British Columbia in 1936-7.71  (Blair, ever cautious and precise, actually supported the 
project.)  These promotional initiatives, however, were never recounted with the same enthusiasm as was 
generated by policy discussions concerning enforcement techniques or exclusion. 
Few policy issues appear to have eluded Blair’s watchful gaze as he consolidated his bureaucratic 
fiefdom.  A 1936 proposal to incorporate his Immigration Branch into a reorganized department of 
                                                          
66 Department of Mines and Resources Official Circular No. 37, October 15, 1937, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 
76, Vol. 624, file 947852, pt.2. 
67 Around 1931 or 1932, the government appointed one R.J.C. Stead as ‘Director of Publicity’ for the Department of 
Immigration and Colonization: The Canada Year Book, 1932, 162. 
68 Report on Federal-Provincial Conference on Immigration and Colonization, November 1923, LAC Immigration 
Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 625, file 951760, pt. 3, Reel C 10,441. 
69 Report of Immigration Publicity Conference, December 7and 8, 1920, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 
625, file 625, pt. 2, Reel C 10,441, 17-8. 
70 Ibid., 3-5; 16. 
71 I found no other historical reference to this particular initiative, which seems most noteworthy for its timing, 
given that a 1931 Order-in-Council had effectively closed Canadian borders to immigration throughout the 
Depression (although one of its exceptions applied to ‘agriculturalists’).  Blair, however, was by this time at the 
height of his exclusionary powers, as his relentless and successful opposition to the admission of Jewish refugees 
during this period clearly demonstrated; see Abella and Troper, None is Too Many.    
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“Mines, Resources and Colonization” elicited a lengthy – and apparently unsolicited – submission from 
Blair to his minister T.A. Crerar.  “While the name Colonization has been carried around since 1917,” 
Blair lectured, “it has never meant much because the Department has never really been actively engaged 
in colonization.”  The lesson continued: “We administer the Immigration Act not the Immigration and 
Colonization Act. The Act relates entirely to immigration and that is the chief, in fact almost the only, 
function the Department has.”  For this reason “amongst others,” Blair concluded, removing immigration 
from the department’s title would be “a great pity.”72  Evidently the argument succeeded, at least in part.  
Later that year, an Order-in-Council divided the Department of Mines and Resources into five branches, 
including the “Immigration Branch.”73 
Although many policy details were kept from public view, it is evident that neither 
embarrassment nor shame were the reason.  The Canada Year Book, the government’s yearly almanac of 
statistics and important developments, made no secret of the racial biases that informed immigration 
policy throughout the early 1900s.  The 1914 edition, for example, unabashedly reviewed various 
initiatives to restrict Chinese, Japanese, and “Hindu” immigration.  “Canada has consistently followed a 
policy of exclusion with regard to immigration from oriental countries,” the publication explained.  For 
Chinese immigrants, there were “head taxes,” first imposed in 1885, and increased from their original 
level of $50 to $500 by 1903.74  Japanese immigration had required a different approach.  Following the 
1907 Vancouver race riots, negotiations between Canada and Japan led to the enactment of regulations by 
the Japanese government “for the restriction of emigration from Japan to Canada.”  As a result, Japanese 
immigration “though annually increasing from 1910 to 1914, has been kept within bounds, the number in 
1907-08 being 856, and in 1914-15, 592.”75   A disturbing increase in “Hindu” immigration levels had 
been successfully addressed by the regulations imposing continuous-journey and other “money 
qualifications” criteria.  As a result, “from 1909 to 1913 the number of Hindu immigrants did not exceed 
12 annually.”76  In general, the Year Book reassured its readers, the regulatory program of exclusionary 
rules had “greatly improved” the overall “standard of quality” of immigrants since 1900.   
                                                          
72 Memorandum: Hon. T.A. Crerar, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 622, file 923954, Reel 10440. 
73 P.C 2396/1936, LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, Vol. 622, file 923954, Reel 10440.  This Order-in-Council 
went on to appoint Frederick Charles Blair Director of the Immigration Branch.  (The number of this order is not 
clearly legible and may have been 0396/1936.)  
74 The Canada Year Book 1914, 678. The Chinese head tax program was both an effective exclusionary tool and a 
source of revenue: “Chinese immigrants have increased from 1,884 in 1908 to 7,445 in 1913 and 5,512 in 1914. For 
the year ended March 31, 1914, the revenue for the Chinese head tax amounted to $2,637,000, which is more 
than the amount expended upon immigration in the same period.” Ibid., 678. 
75 Ibid., 678. 
76 Ibid., 678-9. The Year Book documented one close call in 1914 when a desperate group of Hindu migrants 
attempted “to test the efficacy of the Canadian laws restricting oriental immigration.”  A few passengers aboard 
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Subsequent Year Books continued to celebrate program successes in restricting immigration from 
‘undesirable’ sources.  The 1919 edition explained the recent measures implemented to exclude 
“Anarchists,”77 and in later years, measures to exclude various ethnic groups – “Asiatics”, “East Indians,” 
and “Eastern Europeans” – were reviewed in detail almost annually.  While no effort was made to deny 
race as a frequent basis for exclusion, the explanations could still be disingenuous.  The exclusion of 
Indians, one Year Book acknowledged, had caused embarrassment at several Imperial conferences 
“because of its reaction on the loyalty of the Indian peoples to the Empire.”  In response to the criticism, 
“it was pointed out that the reasons for existing restrictions were purely economic and did not involve the 
inferiority of those restricted.”78  Elsewhere, economic rationalizations proved more useful: “The 
immigration … of labourers belonging to the Asiatic races, able because of their low standard of living to 
underbid the white man in selling their labour, is fundamentally an economic rather than a racial 
problem.”79  Later accounts conveniently incorporated the language of the 1919 amendments, justifying 
the exclusion of “southern and Eastern European” groups simply because they were “less readily 
assimilated.”80  
Some scholars have noted with admiration the ‘flexibility’ of Canada’s immigration policy 
framework as it evolved in the early twentieth century.  Economist Alan Green theorizes (as did Mabel 
Timlin before him) that a small nation like Canada “must be able to adjust [its] policies to offset or 
cushion the impact of alterations in … demand for its products.”  Orders-in-council offered the ideal 
“legislative device” to implement specific restrictions based on immediate economic or political concerns, 
and to quickly remove those restrictions when conditions changed.81   To others, however, this ‘flexible’ 
system was extremely troubling: secretive, undemocratic, and removed from Parliamentary oversight.  
Reflecting on an administrative framework still in place in the 1950s, D.C. Corbett noted that “the Act 
gives the Cabinet a vaguely defined and all-embracing power to make regulations excluding people on 
various grounds.”  To Corbett, this revealed a mindset that “prefers the system of ministerial 
                                                          
the Komagata Maru satisfied officials that they were returning to Canada, and were allowed to land. The rest, 
however, were refused admission. “Some amount of rioting took place, but eventually the Hindus were induced to 
desist from their attempts to land, and the sailing of the ship from Vancouver on July 23 closed the matter so far as 
Canada was concerned.” (Ibid., 679.) This confidence that the matter had been finally resolved would eventually 
prove to be premature.   
77 The Canada Year Book 1919, 647. 
78 The Canada Year Book, 1921, 15. Reactions among Canada’s Imperial allies to such dissembling can only be 
surmised. A 1917 Imperial War Conference resolution affirmed the right of all Commonwealth governments 
“including India” to restrict immigration “from any of the other communities.” This ‘solution’ – a declaration that 
all members were entitled to discriminate – likely offered scant comfort to India, but demonstrated that hypocrisy 
on this issue was not exclusive to Canada.       
79 Ibid., 125. 
80 Canada Year Book, 1927-28, 191. 
81 Green, Canadian Postwar Immigration Policy, 16; 225. 
42 
 
responsibility to any system which makes immigration procedure a matter of legal rights.”82  Reginald 
Whitaker attributes more sinister motivations than mere administrative expediency, as he decries the 
“racism” that animated immigration policy before World War Two, and a “new,” more ideological 
approach to discrimination “born with the Cold War.”83       
The distinguishing characteristic of the immigration framework was indeed its flexibility.  As 
conditions changed or particular issues arose, the nation’s doors could quickly be opened or closed by 
issuing or rescinding cabinet orders.  By 1923, the Canada Year Book confirmed that “most of the 
restrictive regulations have now been cancelled,”84 in response to improving economic conditions.  A 
1926 order allowed “the entry under permit of any immigrant ‘whose labour or service’ was required in 
Canada,”85 thus removing the last remaining barriers to Eastern European immigrants.  New promotional 
strategies appeared during the brief ‘open’ period which ensued.  Agreements with railway and steamship 
companies subsidized transportation costs and divested responsibility for recruitment activities as well.  
New “assisted passage” programs appeared, culminating in a 1926 “Empire Settlement Agreement 
[which] provided ocean passage, third class from any Port in the United Kingdom to Halifax, Saint John 
or Quebec [for a fare of 3 pounds].”86  The immigration bureaucracy continued to grow, although details 
about its actual size remained vague.  By 1925, the post-war Soldier Settlement Board had become the 
Land Settlement Branch of the Department of Immigration and Colonization, dedicated to ensuring that 
“new settlers are directed to lands where they can have the best opportunities of success and to safeguard 
them from exploitation in the purchase of their farms.”87  As the 1920s drew to a close, the disruptions of 
war and a faltering postwar economy seemed to have been surmounted. “It is expected that 1929 will see 
a considerable increase in British immigrants,” the Year Book predicted, “especially those of the assisted 
classes.”88 
Economic depression, however, brought another reversal in policy direction.  A March 1931 
order-in-council, P.C. 695/1931 barred “the landing in Canada of immigrants of all classes and 
occupations,” except for British and American citizens and their families, or “agriculturalists having 
sufficient means to farm in Canada,” (the only remaining avenue for non-Anglo-Saxons).89   This Order 
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84 Canada Year Book, 1922-23, 214.  The passage continues, with remarkable understatement, to acknowledge that 
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would remain in force, with occasional minor amendments, until November 1947.  It has been accurately 
described as the culmination of a “process of exclusion by legislation” begun in 1906.90  Canada’s 
immigration doors would remain all but closed throughout the 1930s and until the end of the Second 
World War.91  The Order provided a convenient legal basis to refuse even the desperate entreaties made 
on behalf of Jewish refugees in 1938-9.  New concerns, moreover, exacerbated old problems.  Jews were 
not ’agriculturalists’ and they were certainly not British.  Unquestionably their rejection was “strongly 
influenced by Canadian assumptions about Jewish immigrants,”92  but economic concerns also 
contributed.  Writing in 1937, economist K.W. Taylor expressed the prevailing depression-era economic 
thinking on the “problem” of immigration: 
     The prevailing rate of natural increase being so close to the normal absorptive capacity of the country,  
     the renewal of a policy of large-scale immigration can hardly be justified. Acceleration of the post-war  
     [i.e. post-1918] rate of increase can only be achieved by a considerable reduction in the material                   
     standard of life or by a complete change in the basis of the Canadian economy. In large areas of  
     Canada, soil and climate are such that a peasant economy would be possible. But that would involve    
     changes in habits of thought and living and in scales of values that can hardly come in the calculable  
     future.93 
 
The biases about race, ethnicity, and class which informed much of Canada’s early immigration 
policy were not solely attributable to bureaucrats and politicians.  They reflected ideas that were prevalent 
throughout the country.  Correspondence received by the prime minister’s office offered unique insight.  
Following his return to power in 1935, Mackenzie King’s meticulously organized correspondence files 
showed continuing and widespread opposition to immigration from all regions, and from both English 
and French Canada.  In 1935 and 1936, the Montreal and Kitchener city councils each forwarded 
resolutions opposing any pro-immigration measures.  Both cited economic factors to support their 
argument, an approach that might be expected given that welfare and unemployment support were 
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provincial and municipal concerns.94  Organizations advocating on behalf of various business and 
community interests made similar submissions.95  
Correspondence from less mainstream organizations, or from individuals, was often more strident 
in tone and reflected racial animosities rather than economic concerns.  In particular, letters to the prime 
minister from fringe groups and anti-Semitic individuals were extreme in their lack of sympathy for 
Jewish refugees fleeing pre-war Europe.96   Nor, it seems, was any ethnic group immune.  To one faithful 
Liberal in Windsor, Ontario, the “English immigrant” presented a particular menace, since “he no sooner 
lands on our shores than he is mustered into the Conservative party.”97  The prime minister would 
undoubtedly have shared the concern.  
Such communications may not have precisely reflected public opinion. They did, however, reveal 
something about the views that Canadians were expressing to their government.  During King’s tenure, 
incoming correspondence was carefully organized and catalogued.  Writers typically received a polite 
response from the prime minister’s private secretary assuring them that their views had been “carefully 
noted,” or would receive “due consideration”.  Carbon copies of responses were maintained, often with 
notations to indicate whether the writer had favoured or opposed immigration.  Although the prime 
minister surely did not read every letter, some contain notations in pencil with his initials, indicating his 
revisions to the draft reply.  On occasion, there might even be a direct and personal response.  King’s 
reply to one writer protesting against any plan to admit Jewish refugees demonstrated his acute sensitivity 
to the political challenges which immigration issues presented.  “I have read with care your letter … on 
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the question of migration of refugees,” King wrote. “It is a subject on which there is a wide difference of 
opinion.”98  There were many acrimonious voices, and the government was aware of them.  
The outbreak of war in 1939 ensured that immigration would remain at miniscule levels.  
Wartime exigencies also mitigated against any change in policy from the exclusions imposed and 
maintained during the Depression.  Throughout the war, Canada was governed almost entirely by 
administrative order, a situation which one contemporary scholar described as “a massive totalitarian 
regime.”99  Ironically, however, there was almost no activity in the area of immigration, as the 1931 
restrictions remained in place.100  One rare exception was an order-in-council of December 10, 1943 
allowing temporary admission permits for refugees who were transferred to Canada from Britain.101  
There were occasional and limited refugee initiatives, but throughout the war the government of Canada 
“continued to oppose the idea of general admission of European refugees.”102 Immigration statistics did 
not distinguish refugees from other immigrant classes, allowing the government to suggest that refugee 
intake during the war had been generous.  Public concern over refugees increased throughout the war, 
however, and would contribute to postwar policy changes.  Still, on average fewer than 10,000 
immigrants per year entered Canada during the war.103  It is almost certain that a majority of those were 
spouses and family members of military service personnel.     
The federal government began planning for postwar reconstruction and transition to a peacetime 
economy early in the war.  Scholars continue to debate the effectiveness of this planning process, but 
generally acknowledge that it was well underway by 1943.104  In April 1945 the plan was ready and the 
White Paper on Employment and Income, presented to Parliament by Minister of Reconstruction C.D. 
Howe, outlined the government’s proposed course of action.  The White Paper charted an optimistic 
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postwar course, committing the government to maintaining “high and stable” levels of employment and 
income, through public investment, the promotion of trade, and policies designed to encourage the 
expansion of private investment.  It also announced the government’s commitment to Keynesian 
principles of deficit financing “in periods where unemployment threatens.”105  Further details were 
provided in the government’s “Green Book” proposals to the August 1945 Dominion-Provincial 
Conference on Reconstruction.  There, a reorganised and centralized taxation system was proposed, to 
equip Ottawa with the resources to provide standardized ‘services’ nation-wide, and to effectively 
implement the social welfare state.106  
It was an ambitious plan, and the White Paper – clearly intended for public education – was a 
radical document.  Its principal author, W.A. Mackintosh later described the extensive economic analysis 
that went into its proposals.107  Given the prime minister’s own academic background in labour 
economics and industrial relations, and the economic strength of his wartime government, it is almost 
certain that these proposals were comprehensively researched, with due consideration to such factors as 
labour market conditions and – in the language of the time – projected ‘manpower’ requirements.  These 
in turn would have required contemplation of postwar immigration levels.  Yet the subject of immigration 
is not mentioned in either document.  In 1945, as in subsequent years, it is evident that the government 
preferred to avoid any public discussion about immigration, regardless of the policies actually being 
contemplated.    
The return of peace in 1945 brought immense euphoria and relief, but also presented new 
challenges for a weary government and its aging, exhausted leader.  The White Paper proposals 
demonstrated the government’s intention to focus on domestic issues, a strategy born of the “confused 
social atmosphere at the end of the war” and fear that Depression-like economic conditions would 
return.108  New international pressures, however, would soon distract the government from this inward-
looking approach, as Canada responded to the demands of restoring world order and the challenges 
presented by wartime enemies (and even erstwhile allies).  In the uncertainty of the times, the government 
showed no inclination to review its restrictive immigration policy.  Soon, however, international 
obligations would combine with domestic pressures that had begun to appear almost imperceptibly during 
the war, and the postwar transformation of Canada’s immigration policy would begin.   
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The Postwar Years, 1945-1949: 
Planning Continuity, Encountering Change 
 
As details of Nazi atrocities emerged from wartime Europe, the tone of Canada’s public discourse 
about immigration began to change.  Even before the war, there were concerns and criticism directed 
toward the King government.  A November 1938 Globe and Mail editorial castigated the prime minister 
for his silence in the face of recent Nazi “barbarity” (examples of which the Globe had been reporting on 
an almost daily basis).  The editorial continued, inadvertently demonstrating the mixture of humanitarian 
concern and lingering racial antipathy that invariably characterized any immigration discussion: “Defend 
the Jews of Central Europe in their terrible plight or not, we cannot afford to let the spirit of righteousness 
lie dormant while barbarity marches in triumph.”  As to a response, however, the Globe suggested little 
beyond an indignant “official avowal” of each “ruthless act of Nazism.”1  Such criticism may have stung, 
but could hardly have been expected to provoke dramatic action.  There remained, as ever, multitudinous 
opinions as to an appropriate immigration policy.   
Official policy pronouncements remained dispassionate, even academic, in tone.  The 1942 
Canada Year Book acknowledged that “the term ‘refugee’ in recent years has acquired a much wider 
application than when it became familiar after the First World War,” but saw no need to distinguish 
refugees from other immigrants.  “Widespread changes,” whether in policy or in statistical reporting, 
would cause inconvenient statistical inconsistency by rendering “comparison between pre-war and post-
war immigration quite impossible.”  In any case, although the statistics did not distinguish refugees from 
other immigrants, “it is well known that the majority of those who have entered Canada from Europe in 
recent years belong to [the refugee] category.”2   
Although wartime correspondence directed to the government remained divided, sympathetic 
voices were increasingly raised in favour of a more open policy in response to Europe’s growing crisis.  
Correspondence from individuals and various Christian organizations, often quoting scripture, increased 
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significantly, especially following an April 1943 CBC radio broadcast in which University of Manitoba 
professor Watson Thomson urged listeners to petition the government over the plight of European Jews.3   
If the level of public concern was rising during the war, the government received only rare 
inquiries about the issue in Parliament.  CCF member M.J. Coldwell, responding to the throne speech 
which opened the 1943 session, referred briefly to “Jewish refugees from nazi aggression [currently] 
languishing in…prison camps,” but he called on the government to demand “a voice in the inner councils 
of the united nations” rather than for any particular humanitarian action.4  Hansard recorded no further 
discussion of the subject until April of that year, when a Liberal MP asked whether the government would 
attend the upcoming British-American conference on refugees in Bermuda.  When Mines and Resources 
minister T.A. Crerar declined to answer, promising only to bring the question to the prime minister’s 
attention, his colleague was incredulous.  If the minister did not know, then who did?  “He is the minister 
in charge of immigrants, refugees and guests.”5  No response was forthcoming, however, and no further 
parliamentary discussion ensued until Winnipeg MP Stanley Knowles raised the issue of Jewish refugees 
once again on May 28.  Had the government, Knowles asked, received the recent resolution of the 
Canadian Jewish Congress requesting that Canada offer sanctuary to “a reasonable number” of Jewish 
refugees who may have escaped Nazi-held territory, and if so, what was “the attitude of the government 
in this matter”?  This time, the government’s reply was more telling.  The prime minister could not say 
whether the particular item had been received, but he allowed that “having regard to the number of 
communications which have been received on the subject,” it was likely to be “among the number.”  
Mackenzie King also acknowledged that there had been other requests for “a statement with respect to 
refugees from Europe generally, and the government’s attitude towards the problem.”  Rather than 
provide a response “which would refer exclusively to members of the Jewish community,” King promised 
a broader explanation of the government’s thinking on the refugee issue: “I shall, I expect, be making the 
statement in the course of a few days.”6 
The prime minister’s “few days” amounted to six weeks, but on July 9, 1943 he delivered a wide-
ranging update on the war as part of the debate on estimates for the Department of External Affairs.  The 
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speech reviewed recent military developments, the activities of various government agencies, and the 
planning that was underway for postwar refugee settlement and the establishment of a united nations’ 
organization. Also included was a lengthy statement of the government’s “policy” concerning European 
refugees.  “Only the most callous,” King began, could deny the desperate plight of those driven from their 
homes by Nazi persecution, especially the Jewish people.  There were, however, significant obstacles to 
any immediate relief effort.  Most of the oppressed were still “contained within the ring of territories held 
by the axis armies.”  For those few who had managed to escape into neutral countries, there was no 
available means of transportation to carry them to safety.  Quite simply, King explained, there was no 
immediate solution available and “nothing that the allied governments can do to save these hapless people 
except to win the war as quickly and as completely as possible.”7  In other words, there was abundant 
sympathy but no particular policy to announce. 
Somewhat belatedly, King also acknowledged that the April conference in Bermuda had 
produced “certain recommendations” concerning initiatives to assist refugees.  However, the details of 
those deliberations – and, presumably, any commitments given in response – had to remain confidential, 
lest they become known to the enemy and “adversely affect the refugees whom we are trying to aid.”  
Moreover, the prime minister argued, Canada had already accepted “a very considerable refugee 
population.”  Some 9,000 persons had been admitted by way of special orders in council between 1933 
and 1942.  More than 300 Sudeten families had come to undertake agricultural settlement.  Total 
immigration from Europe between 1933 and 1942 was 39,000 “the bulk of whom were refugees.”  And 
these numbers did not include those being accommodated temporarily: British evacuees, German 
internees transferred from Britain, and prisoners of war.  Under the circumstances, King concluded, it was 
just not possible to say how many additional refugees Canada might accept.  All things considered, 
however, Canada’s record on refugee matters was “better than it is frequently made out to be” and would 
stand in comparison to the United States and other Commonwealth nations.  Still, he conceded that 
Canada had not “done all that we could have done and perhaps we have not done all that we should have 
done.”8  
Despite this moment of candour, the 1943 policy statement was otherwise characteristic of 
Mackenzie King: expressing humanitarian concern, affirming that Canada would “play its full part” in 
any future refugee initiatives, but offering no specific commitment as to what that part would be.  The 
refugee situation was dire, but other wartime concerns were more pressing.   
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Whether or not all parliamentarians agreed that the admission of 39,000 European immigrants 
over ten years represented an impressive total, the ensuing debate demonstrated little opposition concern 
and generated little criticism.  Conservative members Howard Green and John Diefenbaker confined their 
comments to other foreign policy issues, while the CCF’s Coldwell suggested mildly that “we might have 
initiated some conferences or made some attempt to solve the problem in a way which I might term more 
Christian.”9  Once again, only Stanley Knowles returned purposefully to the topic of immigration.  
Presenting a meticulous review of Nazi atrocities, Knowles acknowledged that the refugee situation was 
“quite frankly … a subject in which there can hardly be said to be wide public interest; rather it is a 
subject in which, I feel, a lead should be given to our people.”  Canada, Knowles asserted, was simply not 
doing enough: “The point is … that waiting to help these people in the best way we can later on is … not 
good enough in view of the fact that many of them – thousands, perhaps millions – will not be there to 
help.”  Canada should provide sanctuary, because “these people are human and deserve that consideration 
and because we are human and ought to act in that way.”10   
Astonishingly, Knowles’ passionate appeal concluded parliamentary discussion on immigration 
for the duration of the war.  A full year later, in August 1944, Mackenzie King provided another detailed 
update on the progress of the war, again during the debate on estimates for External Affairs.  This time, 
however, he made no reference to refugees.  Neither did the opposition, in reply.11  The intermittent 
parliamentary debate on the issue remained dormant until December 1945 when Liberal backbench MP 
David Croll touched off a lively discussion during debate on supply for the Immigration Branch.  Croll 
acknowledged that the return of overseas service personnel was the only ‘immigration’ Canadians were 
currently concerned with, but he called for leadership and a plan from the government, and soon.  Both 
short-term humanitarian factors and long-term economic ones demanded a careful assessment of 
Canada’s future needs.  Such planning, Croll declared, “must be realistic, intelligent, and rational.”  It 
must adopt a new and very different approach, recognizing that countries traditionally favoured as 
preferred sources were no longer likely to provide immigrants.  It was time, Croll argued, to “divorce 
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immigration from agriculture.”  The nation’s economy was undergoing serious change, and the skills 
needed in future would be those which could contribute to an expanded export trade, to domestic markets 
for manufactured goods, and in the building trades.  Croll also alluded to concepts that would soon 
become familiar to the immigration lexicon.  He noted the importance of assessing the country’s “ability 
to absorb” as part of the planning process, as well as the implications of Canada’s evolving ‘middle-
power’ international status: “We have obligations and responsibilities and we must live up to them.”   
David Croll was a Russian-Jewish immigrant.  He represented a Toronto constituency with a 
significant Jewish population, and he did not mince words as he directed his final remarks to the minister, 
J. A. Glen.  “I cannot help saying,” he concluded, “that we have on our statute books at the present time a 
great deal of racial nonsense.”  As for the department itself, “Let us agree that it was dormant; there was a 
war on, but that is no excuse for not doing anything now.”12  The task of concluding the debate fell to the 
taciturn J.A. Glen, the minister responsible for immigration, who in all likelihood had not enjoyed what 
he heard.  There could be no announcement regarding immigration or any long-range immigration policy, 
Glen declared, since “the first duty of the government is the repatriation of our service personnel and their 
dependents as well as their reestablishment.”13  Once again, there were more obstacles and competing 
priorities than reasons to act. 
One historian has suggested that “the question of immigration and refugee admission was of high 
priority in the minds of many members”14 in the postwar House of Commons.  It may have been, but the 
parliamentary record does not support that generalization.  While several MPs voiced their support for 
Croll’s remarks, most were CCF members representing rural western constituencies with large immigrant 
populations.  Their influence on the government – like that of Coldwell, Knowles, and the few outspoken 
Liberal backbenchers – was limited.  Progressive Conservative members remained virtually silent on the 
refugee issue and on immigration.  The record in Hansard from this period therefore suggests that the 
subject concerned only a few MPs to any great degree, and troubled the government hardly at all. 
The Senate, however, proved less reticent.  It moved in April 1946 to convene a Standing 
Committee on Immigration and Labour, to inquire broadly into Canada’s “problem of immigration.”  
Among the topics to be investigated were the operation and administration of the Immigration Act, the 
“desirability” of admitting immigrants and the “types” to be preferred, the “facilities, resources and 
capacity of Canada to absorb, employ and maintain such immigrants,” and “the appropriate terms and 
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conditions of such admission.”15  With grand flourish, Senator Arthur Roebuck described the fundamental 
issue confronting the committee: Would Canada remain indefinitely “a third-rate power, wielding at most 
a secondary influence in world councils” or would she exploit her “treasure trove” of resources “to 
become one of the most pregnant and powerful of nations?”16  The committee gave itself a wide-ranging 
mandate with terms of reference that seemed to foreshadow its eventual findings and recommendations.   
The Senate committee wasted little time getting to work, convening ten days of hearings between 
May 21 and July 31, 1946.  Immigration Branch director Arthur Joliffe was the first witness.17  Others 
who appeared were representatives of Ukrainian, Polish, Finnish, and Jewish associations, labour leaders, 
transportation companies including the CPR, CNR, and Cunard White Star Ltd., and the Canadian 
National Committee on Refugees, whose chairman B.K. Sandwell was editor of the popular Saturday 
Night magazine.  Individuals, church organizations, and government officials also presented briefs.   
On August 14, just two weeks after its final day of hearings, the Senate committee tabled its 
findings.  Canada’s immigration problems, it announced, fell into three categories and all were urgent.  
First, the Dominion’s own statisticians calculated that some 27 million acres of “unused and reasonably 
accessible land” remained available for agricultural settlement.  There was, however, a “definite shortage 
of farm labour.”  Resolving that shortage would be critical and could ensure that “what has been 
accomplished in the past by immigration … may be repeated in part at least in the future.”18  Since much 
of the land in question was under provincial control, the committee urged immediate consultation with the 
provinces on the issue. 
The second area in need of attention was industry.  The report outlined transformations to the 
economy in industrial and resource development which had been accelerated by the war.  These sectors, 
too, could be further developed through programs that “intelligently selected immigrants in the 
managerial, technical and artisan classifications,” and once again the committee pointed to historical 
examples of industries that had been developed by the skills and knowledge of earlier immigrant groups.19   
Thirdly, there were public and private institutions in need of domestic help.  Numerous witnesses 
had testified to the great numbers of potential immigrants in Europe with housekeeping experience “who 
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would be happy indeed were they admitted to Canada to work as domestics,” whether in hospitals, 
nursing homes, or private residences.20  
The report noted that of all the witnesses appearing before the Senate Committee, none had 
expressed opposition to immigration in principle.  Even organized labour was not opposed, or at least not 
to the extent that had been suggested.21  Moreover,  
There was a consensus of opinion that immigration is of major importance to Canada, for increases 
in population are necessary if we are to hold our place abroad and maintain and improve our 
standard of living at home. Other countries are taking action and world conditions are changing 
rapidly, so that the problem for Canada is extremely urgent.22  
 
Having identified the approach that was needed, the report turned its focus to legislation and 
policy administration.  In its current form the Immigration Act was, in reality, “a non-immigration act 
[whose] main purpose seems to be exclusion.”  The report pointedly noted that “the authority to amend 
the law which is given to the executive has been used by order in council to prohibit all immigration, with 
very restricted exceptions.”23  The most recent of those orders in council, which had relaxed passport 
requirements for incoming refugees, granted permanent status to those admitted since 1939, and 
broadened some admissible classes based on relationship to Canadian residents, were acknowledged only 
as “minor concessions” rather than significant initiatives.24  The entrenched legislative regime, the report 
inferred, was almost beyond repair and would require major revision: “Little is to be gained by a 
discussion of the act in its detail.”  Instead,  
What is needed is a new policy of selective attraction to replace that of repulsion, and a vigorous 
administration that will search out a reasonable number of immigrants who are desirable and then 
find means of bringing them here and of assisting them in being successful after their arrival. 
They should be taught the advantages of life in this country, and be made into Canadian citizens 
in spirit as well as in fact as rapidly as possible.25   
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The report’s recommendations were clear and unequivocal.  Canada required “a well-considered 
and sustained policy of immigration” and it required a great number of people.  An accurate appraisal of 
the report’s significance, however, requires a close examination of its message.  Although there were 
references to Christian duties and moral obligations, especially toward refugees, the report’s principal 
arguments for immigration were economic in nature – sustained industrial and agricultural development 
simply required a greater number of people.  The committee’s argument was not for an ‘open door’ based 
exclusively or even primarily on humanitarian generosity, but instead was framed by concepts which 
would become foundational to postwar policy – absorptive capacity, careful selection, suitability, and 
adaptability to Canadian citizenship.    
Historians have suggested that the Senate committee report “received widespread approval from 
Canada’s press,” immediately generating broad public support for open immigration.26  In fact, media 
reactions varied substantially.  The Globe and Mail provided front-page coverage on August 15 and 
editorialized favourably the following day, commending the Senate committee “for acting when the 
Government continued to sidestep the issue.”  Reflecting its conservative proclivities, the Globe 
interpreted the report as a thorough “condemnation of government inaction,” describing at length the 
“passive” half-measures to help refugees which the report documented and the dissembling behind 
excuses that cited a lack of available transportation: “The committee was told that shipping companies 
could not be expected to acquire vessels suitable for immigrants until the Government’s policy had been 
announced.”27 
Elsewhere, press coverage was more restrained.  The Winnipeg Free Press provided a brief 
summary of the report but eschewed editorial comment, perhaps finding little that would justify its usual 
complimentary treatment of the Liberals.28  The Toronto Daily Star surprisingly did not mention the 
report.  In contrast, the Montreal Star predicted “widespread public approval throughout the Dominion” 
for the report’s recommendation of a vigorous immigration policy, but carefully reassured its Quebec 
readership that the Senate had “rejected the strenuous efforts … by advocates of a wide open door … to 
admit all and sundry.”29  The Vancouver Sun likewise focused upon elements of the report that would 
interest local readers.  It noted the report’s call for a “new policy of selective attraction” to replace current 
exclusionary rules, but reassuringly emphasized that there would continue to be limits:  
On the Oriental immigration question [a longstanding concern to British Columbians] the 
committee reported any question of discrimination based upon either race or religion should be 
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scrupulously avoided in the act and its administration, the limitation of Asiatic immigration being 
based, of course, on problems of absorption. 
 
This racist apologia notwithstanding, the Sun came out in favour of the report, concluding that “[t]he 
addition of 100,000 people a year would not be too great a morsel to digest.”30 
There is no record of any reaction from the government to the Senate report.  The prime minister 
was in Europe at the time of its release, fully occupied with postwar international concerns, and his diary 
made no mention of the Senate’s treatment of the immigration issue.  But the report’s economic 
argument, and its terminology, would appear regularly in later government pronouncements, beginning 
with King’s famous 1947 statement on immigration policy.  This was its major contribution and an 
important impetus to postwar policy.  
Despite its official silence, the government did not remain entirely inert, convening an 
interdepartmental committee on refugee issues in early 1946.  Predictably, this initiative did not originate 
within the Immigration Branch or the Department of Mines and Resources.  Instead, the Department of 
External Affairs, which had previously established its own committee to examine the problem of 
European refugees, provided the impetus.  Representatives of the Departments of Labour and Health, 
together with immigration officials, joined the interdepartmental committee when it met in March.31  On 
May 9, (the day after the Senate voted to convene its standing committee) the Cabinet received and 
considered the interdepartmental committee’s first report on immigration policy.  In their deliberation, 
Cabinet members acknowledged the increasing pressure to act on refugee concerns.  The volume of 
applicants seeking entry to Canada was creating a backlog.  In response, Cabinet approved revisions in 
the immigration regulations “as a short term measure,” permitting the admission of close relatives of 
Canadian residents and relaxing passport requirements for refugees “in certain cases.”32  The May 28 
orders in council (grudgingly described by the Senate as “minor concessions”) implemented those 
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measures.  The Cabinet minutes also noted the committee’s recommendation that a “review of long term 
immigration policy” should be undertaken.33   
These were indeed small, tentative steps, but they represented the government’s first active 
engagement with the issue of postwar immigration policy.  The interdepartmental committee would 
remain in place, expanding in numbers and influence while the Liberals remained in office during the 
1950s.   
The Senate, meanwhile, reconvened its standing committee in subsequent years, and continued to 
exhort the government to greater action.  As deliberations resumed in 1947, Arthur Roebuck noted 
approvingly several initiatives undertaken during the past year, including the admission of some 4,000 
Polish soldiers,34 and the further expansion of classes of admissible ‘close relatives’ to include the 
siblings and orphaned nieces and nephews of Canadian residents.  Additional regulatory changes had also 
been implemented in January 1947 to facilitate admission for those with agricultural, mining, and logging 
skills.35  Roebuck welcomed these initiatives, but he decried the slow pace of policy change and the 
government’s continual “hedging about” with admissibility criteria.36  Once again, the Senate committee 
conducted an extensive round of hearings with an expanded list of officials and organizations as it 
redoubled its effort to promote awareness of the country’s immigration needs.37  Its subsequent report, 
tabled on July 10, noted that public approval for “the admission of a considerable number of carefully 
selected immigrants” had become “more forceful and decided” over the past year.38  The report 
recommended further changes in policy.  The use of regulations, for example, had served “the useful 
purpose of establishing priorities” for groups deemed preferred or most needy, but they now seemed 
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unnecessarily restrictive.  The committee therefore recommended that “greater liberty of discretion in 
special cases” be extended to immigration officials,” to alleviate hardship and remove restrictions on 
immigrants from countries that had been wartime enemies.39   
Although the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour continued to meet into the 
early 1950s, the momentum of its early activities was not sustained.  A much shorter report tabled for 
1948 offered only modest recommendations, including the “[c]ontinued expansion and activity (sic) of the 
Immigration Branch” and the “[a]dmission of a greater diversity of occupational skills and some of the 
highly trained experts in the D.P. camps.”40  Even the previous year’s recommendations had shown signs 
that less progressive notions were entering the committee’s thinking, expressing, for example, preferences 
for immigrants who were married or were related to persons already in Canada.  No report was tabled for 
1949 or 1951, while the 1950 report consisted primarily of an examination of the estimates of various 
branches with immigration-related responsibilities.  In 1952, the Senate confined itself to an examination 
of the government’s proposed new Immigration Act.  Senators were nevertheless pleased with their 
efforts, taking credit for numerous regulatory changes and increased immigration numbers.  “I regard with 
great satisfaction,” one senator declared, “what this house has accomplished in the formation of public 
opinion [and] in the bringing about of more modern regulations.”41  
Kelley and Trebilcock suggest that although the Senate committee’s 1946-48 annual reports were 
forwarded to the prime minister, “it is not clear that they had any direct impact on government policy.”42  
This assessment seems at least slightly harsh, and it is clear that in the House of Commons pressure on 
the government began to increase during 1946-47.  Responding to the throne speech opening the 1946 
session, CCF member Anthony Hlynka delivered an impassioned plea on behalf of refugees, especially 
Ukrainians, facing forced repatriation in Europe.43  Several days later, on March 29, Conservative Gordon 
Graydon questioned the prime minister about refugee policy and Canada’s proposed contribution to the 
crisis.  As usual, King was non-committal.  The whole “question of refugees,” he declared, “is about the 
most difficult problem with which any administration is faced at the present time.”  If and when 
transportation problems eased and conditions in Europe stabilized, a “more liberal attitude” toward the 
problem might be possible.44  
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Vague assurances and non-committal statements, however, did not dissuade the few 
parliamentarians who were genuinely interested in these issues.  And once again, impatience was not 
confined to the opposition benches. An April 3, 1946 motion by CCF member Ross Thatcher, pleading 
for the government to institute a comprehensive immigration program, received support from both sides 
of the House.  “It seems strange,” Thatcher observed, “that during the recent war, at the very time 
Canadians were being urged to … help in eradicating racial intolerance abroad, our own nation was 
practicing similar intolerance … in selecting its immigrants.”45  When David Croll raised the issue again 
in August, the minister’s lengthy response revealed his growing exasperation.  Glen acknowledged that 
the government was under increasing pressure to formulate an immigration policy.  But how could it 
possibly reconcile all demands?  When critics argued “that there should be selective immigration, and in 
the next breath that there should be no discrimination, then I venture to say that … I do not see how we 
can have selective immigration without discrimination.”   
A policy would be forthcoming “sooner or later,” the harried minister added.  A cabinet 
subcommittee had been established to examine the issue, as well as an “interdepartmental committee of 
high-ranking officers.”  The issues, however, were overwhelmingly complex.  Immigration might be a 
straightforward matter of domestic policy, but the refugee issue was “international in scope.”  Revealing 
an attitude of resignation rather than initiative, he continued: 
We have a representative on the united nations organization which will be meeting in September 
… and as one of the united nations Canada will, I presume, be asked to take her share of these 
stateless persons and will have to assume her obligations as a member of the united nations.46   
 
With no specifics and nothing more to add, Glen concluded with a plea for patience.  He hoped to provide 
more in the near future but in the meantime, “we are dealing with the matter as best we can.”47   
Glen’s description of the creation of an “interdepartmental committee of high-ranking officers” 
was made almost in passing.  He offered no information to Parliament about the committee’s mandate and 
– inexplicably – the opposition requested none.  In private, however, Glen was saying much more.  
Passing through Winnipeg in October 1946, he visited with Grant Dexter, the long-time Ottawa 
correspondent (and now editor) of the Winnipeg Free Press.  Dexter’s extensive notes of the discussion 
detailed the policy initiatives that were, according to Glen, under consideration.  “The government,” 
Dexter recorded, “has decided to go in for immigration in a major way. A cabinet sub-committee has been 
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appointed under his chairmanship and the sub-committee has been suitably equipped with experts etc.”  
The parameters of a postwar immigration policy initiative would be enormous: “The plan, Glen says,” 
was: 
1. To wait the outcome of the refugee proceedings at the [United Nations] Social and Economic 
council meeting – to see what other members are prepared to do in the way of accepting 
refugees. 
 
2. Then to call a Dominion-Provincial conference to establish what might be called a national 
mandate. Drew, for example, is strong for large scale immigration; talks of a population of 
25,000,000 in Ontario. Tory-wise, he would offset Quebec. Duplessis [would] probably try to 
hinder or hamper if not oppose outright. The conference would not deal with specific policies 
or plans – just the overall question – do we want them? Moreover, as governments responsible 
for property and civic (sic) rights and, as matters now stand, for the care of the unemployed, 
the provinces might feel they had been slighted if not consulted.  
Anyhow a go-ahead from the provinces is regarded as certain. 
3. Appoint a Royal Commission to review the substantial body of authoritative material on the 
capacity of the country to absorb population (Sirois appendices, Census Bureau… etc.). The 
Commission’s job would not be a complicated one and a report would be looked for in a 
matter of months.  
 
4. Proceed with large scale immigration policy.48 
Dexter was a veteran journalist whose connections within the Liberal party and the King 
government were legendary.  Yet even he seemed taken aback by Glen’s remarkable disclosures.  Dexter 
was also skeptical: “I don’t go bail for any of this,” he concluded, “merely report a conversation.”  
Undoubtedly Glen did exaggerate parts of the story, including his own role in the proposed initiative. (As 
Dexter noted, a Free Press correspondent had recently determined that the interdepartmental immigration 
committee had not yet begun to function.)  But it is evident from the details Glen provided that he was not 
fabricating everything.  A major initiative was under consideration, with both a royal commission and a 
federal-provincial conference to provide the necessary form and substance.  An aggressive, even 
unprecedented, postwar immigration policy was at least under serious consideration. 
Ultimately, Dexter’s skepticism proved justified.  There would be no federal-provincial conference 
on immigration, no royal commission, and no transformational public policy announcement.  Once again, 
the Free Press’ intimate connections to the government secured an explanation of why the plan had 
collapsed.  Correspondent Max Freedman, who succeeded Dexter at the Free Press’ Ottawa bureau, had 
canvassed the issue with various senior Liberals – cabinet ministers Paul Martin and J. L. Ilsley, deputy 
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ministers Clifford Clark of Finance, Lester Pearson of External Affairs, and Hugh Keenleyside of Mines 
and Resources, and Jack Pickersgill.  Numerous factors had led to the demise of the initiative. 
First, as Paul Martin explained, “the programme had bogged down because of political difficulties 
(Quebec)”.  Several versions of a statement, to be given by Glen as minister responsible for immigration, 
“had been prepared and rejected.”  Then there were administrative problems: “the department was not 
equipped to handle a large-scale immigration and was in very low gear. This was Keenleyside’s major 
problem.”49  
A third factor – also uncovered by Freedman – was disagreement among cabinet members and 
senior policy makers.  On one side of the argument was J.W. Pickersgill of the prime minister’s office, 
who explained to Freedman that “he didn’t think much about this immigration talk.”  In fact, the future 
immigration minister’s views were astonishingly candid: 
[Pickersgill] was particularly disgusted by the current chatter about the need for domestic 
servants. What good would they be to Canada? I said the children of many laborers had turned 
into most useful citizens. He agreed. But having domestics simply was pampering to some of the 
worst instincts of bourgeois respectability. He would take all the doctors he could get and 
engineers but not a miscellaneous assortment of people.50 
 
The contrary position was articulated by Keenleyside and Gordon Robertson (also from the prime 
minister’s office), which Freedman also dutifully recounted: 
Quebec was less hostile to immigration than she had been for years and now was the time to 
strike. Many of the immigrants would be Catholic though this could not be said publicly. 
[Keenleyside] thought a minimum figure of 100,000 a year for 10 years should be our objective. 
Gordon said it should be 150,000, in view of the annual loss to the U.S.51    
 
Martin, Keenleyside, and Robertson also shared additional details of the proposed initiative and 
the government’s current thinking on immigration.  So far as Martin knew, “no definite figure had yet 
been set for the number of immigrants Canada should receive this year or annually … for a fixed period.”  
Moreover:  
There were two different aspects of policy that had to be considered: the refugee problem and a 
national immigration policy. The two were separate and distinct. On the refugee problem, if 
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agreed action on the international scale could be obtained, Canada would likely take a percentage 
based on population, of the number of refugees the United States would be willing to receive.52 
 
Keenleyside and Robertson were equally candid, providing Freedman with further details.  They 
described plans to suspend immigration regulations that barred entry to contract workers in cases where 
there might be Canadians capable of doing the job. This would remove a longstanding ‘irritant’ to 
immigration from the United States, although suspending (rather than rescinding) the regulation would 
reassure organized labour that the restriction could be re-imposed if necessary.  In fact, Robertson 
advised, the active promotion of immigration from the U.S. would be a cornerstone of the government’s 
policy, since a dearth of available shipping would continue to limit immigration from the United 
Kingdom and Europe.53  Keenleyside was likewise “most frank” in his disclosures, acknowledging 
criticism from others who felt “he was throwing his weight around too much for a new deputy.”  Among 
other candid admissions, Keenleyside noted that “one of his first tasks was to pep-up the immigration 
branch and to appoint new men, often over the heads of existing officials.”  Keenleyside was more 
impressed with immigration branch director Arthur Joliffe than with other program ‘holdovers,’ but he 
noted that “all had been trained in the bad school of Blair when a policy of no-immigration had been in 
force, and it was rather hard to make them think now in terms of a positive immigration policy.”54  
Despite their differences, Freedman’s Liberal contacts did agree on one issue: the prime 
minister’s intervention would be required to resolve the issue of differing viewpoints and set a course for 
immigration policy going forward.  That intervention soon came, with predictable results.  Mackenzie 
King would undoubtedly have recoiled at suggestions of royal commissions, Dominion-provincial 
conferences, and ground-breaking announcements in this policy area, if they were ever presented to him.  
As we shall see, within weeks of the disclosure of these radical policy proposals to Freedman and Dexter, 
King would return to Ottawa (from UN meetings in New York) and rouse himself from illness and 
exhaustion to address the matter of immigration policy, albeit in a much less sensational manner.    
As months passed and preparations continued for the prime minister’s immigration policy 
statement in May 1947, Glen’s difficulties only worsened.  Whatever policy changes the government 
might be planning, his job was to say as little as possible.  On February 11, 1947 he moved second 
reading of legislation to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act (CIA).  Enacted in 1923, the CIA was the 
only overtly racist federal immigration statute.  The announcement of its repeal might have been expected 
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to draw complimentary reaction, but for the minister there was no such luck.  British Columbia 
Conservative MP Howard Green complained that the government had not identified an alternative policy 
to the CIA.  Failure to do so, Green charged, would threaten the “friendly feeling for the Chinese people” 
that had developed slowly over time.  Green also pointed out that a 1930 order in council, P.C. 2115, had 
prohibited the landing in Canada of all Asian immigrants.  Even with the repeal of the CIA, that 
regulation would still apply, continuing to exclude Chinese immigrants.  What was more, Green argued, 
“an order in council is not a very solid foundation for an immigration policy”.  When Ross Thatcher 
joined the debate with another passionate call for action on European refugees, an embattled Glen could 
only reply that he had introduced a specific legislative measure, and had not intended to initiate a wide 
debate on policy.  Earlier (perhaps hoping to avoid further discussion) Glen had endeavoured to stay on 
message:   
On this whole question, I find so many opinions expressed throughout the country that I feel we 
ought not to make hurried proposals.… There are as many opinions on the subject as there are 
writers and commentators, but all do not seem to realize the responsibility involved…. 
[T]he whole matter of immigration is under review daily at all times.55      
 
Domestic political concerns, whether they emanated from the Commons, the Senate, or 
elsewhere, might be irritating and even embarrassing, but they were manageable.  International pressures, 
however, were another matter entirely.  There is substantial evidence to show that the primary catalysts 
for change in the King government’s postwar approach to immigration were international in character.  
Canada emerged from the war into a new and elevated ‘middle-power’ status among nations.  As 
historian Roger Sarty explains, that status would prove temporary, arising “by default because of the war-
exhaustion of the traditional great powers,”56 but with it came expectations and responsibilities.  
  Mackenzie King, aging and ailing after the war, most certainly did not welcome the 
responsibilities presented by middle-power status.  James Eayrs explains that the prime minister was 
slipping badly even before 1945, and by 1947 “had reverted to the isolationism of his pre-war years.”57  
As Eayrs and others have documented, King was distressed by the fast-moving pace of postwar 
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international affairs.  He could accept the idea of an effective “assembly of nations” but he recoiled at the 
potential military commitments which collective security might bring.58   
Among the international issues that could not be indefinitely avoided was the European refugee 
crisis.  King understood and reluctantly accepted “that it was important for Canada to make a sufficient 
contribution to the new international community”59 by, among other things, responding to the crisis.  
More broadly, he worried about UN interference in matters of domestic policy: “There is going to be a 
great danger of the U.N. refusing the idea of justifiable rights of selected immigration with racial and 
other discriminations.”60  The pressure to contribute prevailed over King’s reservations, and Canada’s 
postwar “Displaced Persons” program was launched in 1947.  Pursuant to special orders-in-council, 
admission was granted to refugees under new criteria set out in two programs: a “Close Relatives Plan” 
and a “Group Movement Plan.”61  Over the next six years, some 165,000 immigrants would arrive under 
this initiative.62  
Canada’s response to the crisis involving European displaced persons has come to be seen as a 
transformative first step toward a modernized postwar immigration policy.  Historian Julie Gilmour 
describes the program as “an exercise in governmental action in the face of perceived negative public 
opinion.”63  So it was, although as we have seen, the impetus behind it was not exclusively altruistic.  
Earlier analyses – of which Gerald Dirks’ 1977 study was most prominent64 – were generally less 
complimentary, arguing that much more should have been done.  External Affairs officer John Holmes, 
who was stationed in London during the war, recalled in his memoirs the frustration within External 
Affairs caused by the cabinet and other elements of the civil service, particularly the Immigration Branch, 
through their relentlessly conservative “population policies” and “insensitivity to the plight of refugees.”65  
Increasingly, Holmes recalled, others within the public service were sharing this frustration.   
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Ultimately, Gilmour attributes change in both public discourse and policy to the influence of key 
“individuals working within a larger international community of interests.”66  In particular, as Holmes 
explained, 
External Affairs battered vigorously against what they regarded as the defensive mentality 
entrenched in the Immigration Branch, sought to warn the cabinet of the desperate realities they 
saw in Europe, and to encourage an imaginative approach to a population policy for Canada.67 
 
The ‘battering’ was effective.  Canada became an original signatory to the agreement creating the 
United Nations’ International Refugee Organization (IRO), and also signed an interim agreement on 
measures concerning refugees and displaced persons in December 1946.  The interim agreement required 
no immediate commitments beyond placing a representative on the IRO’s “preparatory commission.”68  
Its implications, however, were undoubtedly clear to the government, and fulfilling them would entail 
much more than the vague reassurances hitherto provided to Parliament.  
Gerald Dirks attributes Mackenzie King’s 1947 policy statement to recommendations generated 
by the interdepartmental committee on immigration.69  As we have seen, however, there were other 
influences upon the government, and the committee was neither the sole impetus for the statement nor its 
author.  Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence of the Interdepartmental Committee’s active role in the 
development of postwar policy options, and the government’s growing interest in the subject.  Minutes of 
the Interdepartmental Committee’s February 24, 1947 meeting reveal both the range of items under 
review and the extent to which the cabinet was now actively directing the policy review process.  The 
meeting was chaired by External Affairs undersecretary Lester Pearson and included deputy ministers or 
directors from the Departments of Agriculture, Labour, Trade and Commerce, and National Health and 
Welfare.  The ubiquitous Arthur Joliffe represented Mines and Resources.  Officials from the Privy 
Council and Prime Minister’s offices also attended.  Among the items discussed were proposed rules and 
procedures to administer Order in Council P.C. 371,70 and potential strategies to address labour market 
requirements for domestic ‘servants’ and professionally trained engineers in the postwar workforce.  The 
main issue, however, was the recent direction from Cabinet: 
The Chairman reported that Cabinet on February 13, 1947 directed this Committee to complete 
and submit, at the earliest possible date, their report on a general immigration policy which, 
within prescribed limits, would avoid discrimination on racial grounds. In this connection, 
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consideration might be given to the establishment of an appropriate overall maximum figure to be 
apportioned on quotas based upon the related numbers of the racial groups in Canada at the last 
census.  In view of the urgency of the matter, it had been necessary for Mr. Robertson (member 
of the working sub-committee [of Cabinet]) to prepare, at very short notice, a draft report, (copies 
of which have been circulated).71 
 
These were remarkable instructions.  Their contradictions were self-evident – simultaneously 
forbidding racial discrimination but suggesting the possibility of race-based quotas – and they almost 
appear designed not to be followed.  But they also show a government urgently seeking a viable 
immigration policy, one that would avoid discrimination on the basis of race, “at the earliest possible 
date.”  Despite the vague obfuscations in its public pronouncements, the Liberal government recognized 
the forces of change at work in the world and the inevitable influence they would assert on this policy 
area, and was seeking a response.     
The ‘draft’ proposals, prepared by Gordon Robertson of the Prime Minister’s Office, attempted to 
square the contradictory circle.  There were multiple factors and preferences to be considered.  Canada 
appeared to require “a fairly large number of immigrants,” but an “open door” approach could not be 
contemplated.  A preponderance of British, American and European immigrants should be sought, but 
selection should be based upon “personal qualifications” rather than race.  The resulting recommendation 
was for an elaborate quota system whereby admissions would be related to the “national origins” of the 
country’s population according to the 1941 census.  Immigrants from preferred sources such as Britain 
and America could be conveniently omitted from any quota system, while undesired racial groups – even 
if coming from those countries – could be controlled by quotas imposed upon persons adjudged not to be 
of “British descent.”  Administrative challenges might also arise, particularly if the government attempted 
to set figures in advance or publicize any quota numbers.  Robertson therefore recommended avoiding 
any public commitment to numbers: “It seems probable that a larger total of immigrants could be 
admitted if they were simply brought in on a piece meal basis than if over all figures … were stated in 
advance.”72   All of this represented a proposed long-term policy approach.  For the “immediate future,” 
the draft proposals recommended that “special provision [should] be made for the admission of displaced 
persons on a non-quota basis.”73   
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Although the proposals were cautious and qualified, Arthur Joliffe reacted to them with alarm, 
arguing as usual against substantive policy change.  There were studies underway in various departments, 
Joliffe cautioned.  These would need to be examined, and data analysed, before any precipitous decisions 
could be contemplated.  Administering a quota system of any kind “would require a consular service 
spread over the countries of the world from which immigrants would come, and this machinery is not yet 
available.”  The whole idea of a quota system, Joliffe warned, was just too “problematical at the moment” 
and in any case, the existing system was entirely adequate.  Under the current regulations, “admissible 
classes can be expanded or restricted as the economy and other considerations in the country 
necessitate.”74 
An evidently impatient Lester Pearson, the committee chair, reminded members of their mandate 
to remove racial discrimination.  He “questioned how this could be done except under a quota system.”  
At the very least, if the committee was not prepared to recommend a quota system, “some 
recommendation should be made.”75  Caution, however, won the day.  The committee adjourned, having 
agreed only to study the matter further and seek further guidance from Cabinet.   
Despite the uninspiring contributions from the interdepartmental committee, the government 
persevered in its efforts to formulate a policy.  The Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy, chaired by 
Mines and Resource minister Glen, convened on January 8, 1947.  Several issues were reviewed.  First, in 
response to complaints from the Chinese government and “having noted Canada’s obligation under the 
United Nations Charter to avoid racial discrimination,” the committee recommended repeal of the 
Chinese Immigration Act.   Regulations would also be broadened to permit entry of wives and unmarried 
children of Canadian citizens of Chinese origin (who had previously been excluded). Other 
recommendations sought to address postwar shortages of agricultural labour, and to broaden regulations 
governing the admission of relatives, to include widowed and orphaned family members (also previously 
excluded).76  
On March 3 (one week after the unproductive February 24 interdepartmental committee meeting), 
the Cabinet committee met again. On this occasion, it reviewed a summary – helpfully prepared by Joliffe 
– which reminded members that there were, at present, only three general ‘classes’ of immigrants eligible 
for admission, namely: ‘Class A’ –  relatives of Canadian residents; ‘Class B’ – agriculturalists; and 
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‘Class C’ – farm labourers and persons experienced in mining, logging, and lumbering.77  For immigrants 
within Class C, no procedural guidelines had yet been established.  The Department of Labour was 
recommending that all immigrants except wives and children under eighteen should be required to sign a 
definite contract or undertaking” with their employer of at least two years’ duration, as a condition of 
admission.  After discussion, the committee agreed to recommend that such contracts not be required in 
all cases.78 
By early 1947, nearly two years after the end of the war, the government had implemented only 
minor changes to its restrictive immigration regulations.  Public statements continued to be sporadic and 
non-committal.  It is apparent, however, that the combined pressures of public, parliamentary, and 
international interest in the issue persuaded the prime minister that some definite pronouncement must be 
made.  As we have seen, his May 1 statement to the House followed prolonged strain and deliberation.79  
When it did come on May 1, the statement was typical of Mackenzie King.  It seemed to promise much, 
announcing the government’s commitment “to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the 
encouragement of immigration.”  But many qualifications followed, all carefully crafted to reassure 
Canadians that no fundamental alteration in the “character” of the nation’s population would be 
permitted.  King promised a “careful selection” process to ensure the admission only of “such numbers … 
as can advantageously be absorbed.”  Administratively, immigration “services” would be expanded and 
strengthened, but there were no plans to disturb existing admission criteria, either those favouring certain 
groups or those which prevented others. “Canada,” King affirmed, “is perfectly within her rights in 
selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens.”  Moreover, “[i]t is not a ‘fundamental 
right’ of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy. Immigration is 
subject to the control of the parliament of Canada.”80 
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Despite its cautious ambiguity, historians have frequently acknowledged King’s statement as the 
foundation for Canada’s postwar immigration policy.  So it was, but significant aspects of the statement 
have been overlooked.  The first, (and perhaps least surprising) is that King offered no hint as to the 
number of immigrants that might be admitted in the coming weeks, months or years.  Citing the usual 
reasons – transportation shortages, conditions in postwar Europe – King pronounced himself unable to 
say “what may prove feasible.”  ‘Absorptive capacity’ would remain a conveniently imprecise concept, 
allowing the government to avoid public commitment to any specific number of immigrants, even as 
decisions about those number were taken. 
Second, and more noteworthy, was the brevity of the prime minister’s reference to the European 
refugee crisis.  The May 1 statement was delivered just days before the government launched its massive 
initiative in respect of European displaced persons, the largest refugee initiative in Canadian history.81  As 
Julie Gilmour and others have shown, planning for the initiative had been underway from at least 1946, 
and was all but complete by this time.  Yet King revealed almost nothing about the project.  “The 
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons,” he intoned, constituted “a special problem.”  King 
acknowledged that there were plans to send immigration staff “to examine the situation … and to take 
steps looking towards” a group movement, but otherwise confined himself to reassurances of an orderly 
and careful selection process, promising that any refugees admitted would be “of a type likely to make 
good citizens.”82  Overall, King’s description seemed to imply that the refugee initiative remained safely 
in the future.    
As John Holmes acknowledged, for all its cautious, equivocal phraseology, King’s statement 
recognized a “new factor” in Canadian policy.83  International expectations, often in the form of moral 
pressures, may have been avoidable in earlier times, but would be increasingly important to future 
immigration policy.  For all of Holmes’ frustrations (noted above) it is reasonable to conclude that the 
King government understood these new influences even if the Canadian public still did not.  Thus, as 
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Gilmour notes, “great efforts were made to assure Canadians that DPs were coming to Canada to work … 
at jobs that no Canadians desired in remote locations, and that they would not cause labour conflicts.”84      
As the Displaced Persons program was launched in the summer of 1947, there were few outward 
indications of impending changes to longstanding immigration policies.  Special regulations were 
implemented for “DPs” but otherwise, existing rules setting admissibility criteria remained, as before, 
restrictive in scope and intent.  But postwar conditions had created new priorities, some of which seemed 
incompatible, and the challenge now confronting the government was how to achieve a “rapid increase in 
foreign labour supply without the ‘upset’ which a substantial change in ethnic balance would cause.”85  
Once again, a low-key approach seemed the prudent course.  The easiest solution, as Green explains, was 
to expand the categories of relatives who could be sponsored by other landed immigrants or Canadian 
residents.  Other revisions followed, relaxing restrictions on “unskilled or general labour” and – beginning 
in 1948 – broadening admissibility criteria to include immigrants from countries not previously 
included.86   
The immediate postwar period produced only these minor regulatory revisions.  The 
government’s continuing incremental and cautious approach is attributable to several factors, all of which 
seem familiar or at least unsurprising.  First, the Canadian public remained divided on the issue of 
immigration, a reality confirmed by numerous published polls and in postwar correspondence directed to 
the government.87  A second factor was bureaucratic inertia.  When Hugh Keenleyside became deputy 
minister of Mines and Resources in March 1947, he discovered a department in desperate need of an 
overhaul.  “It might have served,” he recalled, “as a horror story in a textbook on public or business 
administration.”  Ever the diplomat, Keenleyside attributed the problems not to the various branch 
directors, but to the department’s dispersion across multiple locations and other administrative 
inefficiencies.88  But the Immigration Branch, under Joliffe and his predecessor Frederick Blair, had 
controlled immigration policy for decades.  As we have seen, the impetus that drove the DP initiative 
came from international factors and influences from within other areas of the federal bureaucracy.  Those 
‘forces’ however, had not penetrated the Immigration Branch’s hold over ‘general’ immigration policy. 
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Thirdly, there were (as always) other legislative priorities, including one whose implications for 
immigration policy would only later become evident.  For too long, Canadian citizenship had remained an 
imprecise and contested concept, with a rather sordid history.89  After the war, the government turned its 
attention to the subject. Various aspects of citizenship were defined, inconsistently, in a patchwork of 
legislative provisions including the 1910 Immigration Act, which still remained in force.90   In late 1945, 
secretary of state Paul Martin introduced legislation to create the first Canadian Citizenship Act.  
Although Martin’s own biographer disputes his claim that the inspiration for the Act was his, Martin’s 
important role in its 1946 passage is beyond dispute.91  
Martin’s act created and defined, for the first time, a distinctly Canadian citizenship to be 
conveyed by birth in Canada, to children born to Canadian parents living abroad, or by naturalization.  To 
Martin’s disappointment (and to the dismay of many critics) the traditional criteria of British subject-hood 
remained as part of the new definition.  However, other provisions modernized rules by which foreign 
nationals could acquire citizenship, set criteria for revocation, and created ceremonial procedures 
designed to emphasize the privileges and responsibilities which citizenship conveyed.92  Gilmour 
perceptively situates the Act in a postwar context of broad “public debate on the nature and 
responsibilities of Canadian citizenship,” especially in relation to newcomers.93    
In 1949, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State would be 
incorporated with Immigration into a new federal ministry.  In light of that later development, it is 
tempting to view the Citizenship Act as an initial step in a broader immigration strategy.  However, there 
is little evidence to demonstrate a deliberate connection, at least initially, and contemporary policy-
makers said little to suggest otherwise.94  For the time being at least, immigration policy initiatives would 
be confined to less inspirational tasks, such as departmental reorganization. 
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Mackenzie King’s famous 1947 policy statement drew only muted response in the House of 
Commons and generated little subsequent debate.  Conservative Davie Fulton responded first, 
complaining that the prime minister’s remarks offered many generalities but few specifics.  Notably, 
however, Fulton wholeheartedly agreed with the statement’s general principles: that Canada was “not 
obliged” to accept immigrants in numbers dictated elsewhere, and “perfectly within her rights” to 
establish selection criteria. In fact, Fulton concluded, given the possibility “through some other 
interpretation of the united nations (sic) charter, of our being called upon to accept large numbers of 
immigrants from any country … I am certainly glad to have the statement from the Prime Minister that no 
such attitude will be adopted.”  If anything, Fulton continued, the proposed policy appeared too liberal.  
He decried the lack of “effective control” over Asiatic immigration which would follow repeal of the 
Chinese Immigration Act, urging in the alternative, a treaty with China to control the ‘problem’ 
effectively.95  
The opposition had nothing more to say.  Only David Croll (a Liberal) attempted to prolong the 
debate.  On July 10 Croll raised his own concerns about the generalities in King’s statement, articulating a 
policy which, though “commendable” was “not bringing about results.”  What was needed, Croll argued, 
was a “full-time” Immigration Branch that was allowed to “stand on its own two feet.”96  As other MPs 
voiced support for Croll’s remarks, backbench criticism seemed once again to be mounting.  This time the 
task of responding fell to the government’s ‘Minister of Everything,’ C.D. Howe.   
Howe – temporarily acting as Mines and Resources minister after J.A. Glen had taken ill – was in 
no mood for debate.  Directing his comments to an unnamed member who “has repeated the cry that the 
government has no immigration policy,” Howe proceeded to set the record straight.  In fact, he declared, 
“the government has a specific, well-rounded and coordinated policy of immigration. It is being applied 
actively and energetically by an expanded and competent branch of the department.”  The monologue 
continued as Howe summarized in detail the current rules: free entry for immigrants from Britain and the 
US; admission for Displaced Persons who were either sponsored by relatives or qualified by special 
quotas established under that program; admission for people with agricultural, mining or lumbering skills, 
and the fiancés, spouses or other close relatives of Canadian residents.  He noted that there were twenty- 
six offices in operation to “carry this policy into effective operation,” naming them one by one.  And 
finally, Howe unabashedly explained the current policy in respect of Asian immigration: “”Except for the 
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wives and minor families (sic) of Canadian citizens of Chinese …or … East Indian origin, there is at 
present no provision for oriental immigration to Canada.”97   
Howe was well-known to favour immigration.  He was optimistic about the postwar economy, 
and viewed labour shortages as a more likely problem than unemployment.  It was therefore ironic that 
his remarks foreclosed debate by MPs who also sought a more open policy.  Hansard recorded no further 
discussion of immigration policy during the immediate postwar years.  
On November 26, 1949, Louis St. Laurent announced plans to reorganize several departments 
within the federal government.  (St. Laurent succeeded Mackenzie King as Liberal leader and prime 
minister in 1948, and was returned to office with an overwhelming electoral majority the following June.)  
The legislation he now introduced would create three new federal ministries: Resources and 
Development, Mines and Technical Surveys, and Citizenship and Immigration.  Two departments – 
Reconstruction and Supply, and Mines and Resources – were to be abolished.  The source of these 
administrative changes is not entirely clear, but the idea for a Department of Citizenship and Immigration 
may have originated with J.W. Pickersgill, the prime minister’s principal secretary.  (In his memoirs, 
Pickersgill modestly recalled that the prime minister “left the task of devising a new structure largely to 
me.”98)                         
The prime minister explained in detail the rationale for a new administrative structure, 
acknowledging a “growing feeling” among parliamentarians that “the Immigration Branch had very little 
relationship to the other activities of the Department of Mines and Resources.”  Moreover, “the increasing 
importance and complexity of immigration required more attention from both the Minister and the Deputy 
Minister.”  In addition, the changes recognized the need for a coordinated relationship between the 
Citizenship Branch (formerly of the Department of the Secretary of State) and the immigration program:  
The Citizenship Branch is designed to bring to full citizenship as many as possible of those who 
immigrate to this country. The scope of the Citizenship Branch has been expanded since the 
passing of the Citizenship Act. It was felt that uniformity of policy and treatment was more likely 
to be achieved if one Minister had the responsibility for both immigration activities and the 
activities pursued by … the Government to bring those immigrants as quickly as could reasonably 
be expected to full citizenship.99 
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Lastly, the Indian Affairs Branch (already within Mines and Resources) would remain with the 
new department, ensuring that the country’s “original inhabitants” were also included in the department’s 
mandate to convey citizenship to all, whether they were born in Canada or immigrants.   
A bill creating the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was introduced and quickly passed 
and the new department began operation in January 1950.  On January 18, Order in Council P.C. 264 
appointed Ontario MP Walter Edward Harris to be Canada’s first Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration.100  Long afterwards, Harris described the circumstances of his appointment in an interview 
with journalist Peter Stursburg.  There was no prior discussion with the prime minister, Harris recalled, 
and he had been given no inkling of the appointment: 
Jack [Pickersgill] called me up on the phone one day and said get your wife and come on the train 
to Ottawa tonight which I did. The next morning, [we] walked in on Mr. St. Laurent and said, oh 
yes, we’re going out to see the Governor General and got out there and found out that I’d be 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.101   
 
For Walter Harris, it was an inauspicious beginning to an eventful ministerial career. 
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The St. Laurent Years, 1950-1953:   
Old Wine in New Bottles 
 
The cabinet portfolio to which Walter Harris was appointed in 1950 was new in name but little 
else.  Its component parts, as we have seen, were established organizations – the Immigration and Indian 
Affairs Branches of the Department of Mines and Resources, and the Citizenship Branch of the 
Department of the Secretary of State.  The new minister was thus spared the administrative challenges 
that might otherwise have accompanied the creation of a new federal department.  A new deputy minister, 
Laval Fortier, was appointed to replace Hugh Keenleyside who had returned to the foreign service.1  
Harris later explained to journalist Peter Stursburg that Fortier attended to the administrative details.  The 
only substantial change, he recalled, was that “the immigration side of [the Department] was greatly 
expanded.”  Unfortunately, Harris did not elaborate on the extent of this expansion.  However, in a brief 
description of the period that this chapter will explore, he continued: 
[U]p to that time while we’d been taking in a large number of immigrants, they were, to a 
considerable extent, the post-war DP type.… [W]e were still doing our best to help clear out the 
camps in Europe and there was no organized immigration scheme as such. The DP camps and 
quite a bit of the British Isles were coming under existing rules that hadn’t been changed so we 
set about changing the Immigration Act in due course.2  
 
This succinct summary implied that few substantive policy changes were contemplated for the 
new department.  At the time of its creation in 1950, Harris was also careful to announce that the 
“organization of the new department has not resulted in any substantial increase in personnel.”  A new 
“departmental administration branch” was formed, but otherwise all required personnel had been 
seconded from elsewhere, namely the former departments of Mines and Resources, and Reconstruction 
and Supply.3   
Administratively, however, Harris now led a substantial bureaucracy.  By 1949, the year prior to 
the reorganization, the Immigration Branch had evolved into several units, two of which were a 
“Canadian Service” and an “Overseas Service.”  The former maintained staff “at each of the 269 ports of 
entry along the Canada – United States border and on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards” to verify the 
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admissibility of every person seeking entry to Canada.  The overseas division maintained four offices in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland and managed “a roster of over 500 … British doctors” retained to 
conduct medical examinations on prospective immigrants.  In other Commonwealth countries where the 
Immigration Branch did not maintain offices, “intending immigrants are dealt with by officials … of the 
Canadian High Commissioners.”4  Relationships, such as this, with other branches of government were 
becoming integral to the work of the Department, especially following the immigrants’ arrival in Canada.  
Coordination between the Immigration Branch’s “Settlement Service”, the National Employment Service 
of the Department of Labour (NES), and the Citizenship Branch was important to the settlement process, 
as were the expanding connections with provincial authorities and private organizations.”5  These 
relationships would also create interdepartmental friction, at times, and impede the development of clear 
policy direction.  In June 1950, during the debate on supply for the new department, Harris provided 
details about its size and operating requirements.  There were now 3,100 employees in total, of whom 
2,200 were temporary, 839 permanent, and 100 classified as ‘casual.’  A budget of $20,555,166 was 
presented to Parliament for approval for the department’s first year of operation.6 
 
Despite Harris’ recollection that there was “no organized immigration scheme”, there is evidence 
to suggest that the government was contemplating a major initiative immediately following the formation 
of the new department.  Another of Grant Dexter’s Liberal contacts, Winnipeg MP Ralph Maybank, 
confided to Dexter that the subject of immigration was once again under consideration, as it had been in 
1946-7.  The concern, Maybank reported, continued to be potential reaction in Quebec, where many 
assumed that opposition would be intransigent.  However, a recent conversation with the new 
immigration minister had surprised him.  Walter Harris, Maybank explained, “has come to change his 
mind” after discussions with his deputy minister Laval Fortier: 
[Harris] says that Fortier assures him that Quebec will not raise any so great opposition as we 
fear. So long as we do not go out after anti-Catholics, Quebec will accept a reasonable policy on 
immigration. This would not mean letting the bars down a la Sir Clifford Sifton but Quebec will 
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Christian Council for Resettlement of Refugees, formed in June 1947, and “consisting of the following members: 
the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society, the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, the German Baptist 
Colonization and Immigration Society, the Canadian Lutheran World Relief, the Sudeten Committee and the 
Latvian Relief Fund of Canada.” 
6 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1950: IV, 3690. These figures include all branches of the new department, 
of which the Immigration Branch was the largest. Only four years earlier, in 1946, total expenditures on 
immigration services were $2.2 million, and there were fewer than 1000 employees in that area: Hawkins, Canada 
and Immigration, 81.  Curiously, there was no discussion about the Department’s large percentage of “temporary” 
employees. Later, however, the minister explained that it was customary to hire extra summer help at border 
points to cope with tourist traffic; Ibid., 3699.  It is also possible that the transfers of some employees who had 
been with other departments prior to 1950 were not yet formalized. 
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take a great many. One reason for this is the fact that most immigrants must in the nature of the 
case be Catholic. 
 
“I think,” Maybank surmised, “Walter is getting ready to try to put over a more active immigration 
policy…. It could be that the doors might be widened a bit after Parliament rises. This may not be the 
right thing to do but it is something that the Immigration Act permits so there is a possibility in that 
respect.”7 
Maybank’s information was not conclusive, and it is unlikely that Harris had expected the details 
of his conversation with a fellow MP to be shared with Dexter (especially its pragmatic assessment 
concerning the religious background of prospective immigrants).  However, a June 1950 statement on 
immigration policy during the estimates debate offered further insight into the minister’s current thinking.  
Harris began by reaffirming the government’s commitment to the “principles” set out by Mackenzie King 
in his 1947 policy statement.  There was, he explained, a new problem.  A “serious decline” in 
immigration to Canada had recently developed, and the government was examining the “complex external 
factors” that had caused it.  Harris did not elaborate on those “factors,” mentioning only the restrictions 
on the export of capital which some European countries had imposed in response to postwar exchange 
problems.8  But he assured the House that negotiations were underway with several countries regarding 
the exchange issue, and that “every effort” was being made to negotiate a resolution of this and other 
impediments.9   
As a further demonstration of the government’s desire to promote immigration, Harris tabled a 
new order in council, to take effect on July 1, 1950.  Reflecting the government’s longstanding approach 
(and Harris’ own view) that immigration regulations “must necessarily be flexible,” P.C. 2856 would 
supersede a patchwork of existing regulations and broaden the eligibility criteria for immigration to 
Canada.  As before, British, American, and French immigrants would continue to be almost automatically 
admissible so long as they met “civil and medical requirements” and could support themselves.  But the 
new regulation would add “all other immigrants” who could meet two general criteria: 
(a) That they are suitable immigrants having regard to the climatic, social, educational, 
industrial, labour and other conditions or requirements of Canada; and 
                                                          
7 QUA Grant Dexter Papers, Series I – Correspondence 1930-1961, Vol. 5, File 37 “Correspondence – General 1950 
Jan. – June.” R.M. to Dexter, April 22, 1950.  Maybank’s criticism – that this was not the “right thing to do” – 
appears to refer to the proposal to wait until after Parliament had risen, rather than to the actual plan to increase 
immigration.    
8 In a 1952 Cabinet memorandum Harris again attributed the decline during 1949-50 to stagnant economic 
conditions in Europe, particularly the UK, noting that “in 1948 the amount of dollars available to an immigrant was 
reduced and in 1949 … the pound was devalued.” LAC Privy Council Office Records, RG 2 Vol. 212, File C-20-5 1952, 
No. 51-100, “Confidential Minister’s Memorandum to Cabinet,” February 21, 1952, 2.  
9 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1950: IV, 4448-9. 
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(b) They are not undesirable owing to their peculiar customs, habits, mode of life, methods of 
holding property or because of their probable inability to become readily adapted to or 
integrated into the life of the Canadian community and to assume the duties of Canadian 
citizenship within a reasonable time after their entry.10         
 
As these references to “climatic” and “social” suitability and “peculiar customs” inferred, the new 
regulation was not, in fact, designed to extend admissibility to “all other immigrants.”  Order in council 
P.C. 2115 – promulgated in 1930 – remained in place, ensuring the continued exclusion of “Asiatics.”  In 
reality, the new rules would extend admissibility only for European immigrants.  As usual, the 
government emphasized that immigration from preferred sources such as Britain and France would 
continue to be “encouraged by every means possible.”  A program of special training on selection 
procedures would be delivered to overseas officers, and administrative delays and inefficiencies would be 
addressed through “directives from the minister … issued from time to time to senior immigration 
officers in the field defining classes of persons who are admissible.”11  
These ‘new’ criteria set out in P.C. 2856 perpetuated long-entrenched biases, but despite their 
limitations they represented an effort to promote increased immigration (and an immediate increase did 
indeed occur beginning in late 195012).  Harris concluded by summarizing how the new regulation would 
be administered.  Some classes of immigrants would be granted admission without reference to the 
minister.  These would include British, French, and American applicants, the fiancés and relatives of 
Canadian residents, agriculturalists, domestics and nurses’ aides, and persons sponsored by employers or 
specifically recommended by immigration branch officers.    
Perhaps the most significant component to P.C. 2856 was the absolute discretion which it placed 
directly on the minister.  The new regulation stipulated that “all other immigrants” (i.e. the now-
admissible European groups) “must satisfy the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, whose decision 
shall be final” of their compliance with the new admission criteria.  For a government professing a desire 
to reduce inefficiency and delay, this was an extraordinarily retrograde measure; the minister alone would 
now be the final arbiter for virtually every application under this category.  The workload created by this 
measure would torment ministers and create legal and political problems for successive governments over 
the ensuing years.  In 1950, however, Harris believed the changes would facilitate an increase in numbers.  
                                                          
10 Ibid., 4449.   
11 Ibid., 4449. 
12 LAC Privy Council Office Records, RG 2 Vol. 212, File C-20-5 1952, No. 51-100, “Confidential Minister’s 
Memorandum to Cabinet,” February 21, 1952, 2.  This later report also credited other factors for the increase. The 
government’s decision to embark on a rearmament program created an immediate requirement for skilled 
workers, while demands for skilled and unskilled workers generally remained “so urgent that we could ignore the 
usual seasonal unemployment during the winter months of 1950-1.” 
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He noted that the “relatives” category, previously limited to immediate family members of Canadian 
residents, was now “widened to include all bona fide relatives.”  Ministerial discretion would be exercised 
“to make prompt decisions” in respect of immigrants bringing capital to establish a business, 
professionals, or special group-movement applications.”13   
The series of “directives from the minister” to which Harris referred also began to appear, 
continuing the modernization process initiated by Hugh Keenleyside.  Archival records for the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration files contain ministerial directives on a broad range of 
administrative and policy issues.  Many demonstrated the continuing influence of ‘traditional’ priorities: a 
May 1950 directive instructed staff to ensure that a pamphlet extoling the benefits of living and working 
in Canada was included with all responses to enquiries from Britain.14  Other directives addressed more 
routine but nevertheless politically sensitive issues, reminding officers to avoid being photographed or 
identified in media reports, and addressing concerns raised by “unnecessarily long” correspondence.15  
The avoidance of publicity was a particular priority: a 1951 directive cautioned against “public 
statements” by branch officers “relating to policy and internal problems,” and especially forbade any 
acknowledgment of the existence of immigration “quotas.”16  One particularly substantive directive, 
issued on December 15, 1950, set forth ten pages of “Procedures Relative to Selection of Immigrants.”  
The document’s dry language did not hide the fact that traditional selection criteria still prevailed, as it 
focused on prospective UK immigrants, and on “capital cases … with sufficient transferable capital to 
establish an industry, business or service.”  (A minimum capital amount of $3000 was stipulated.)  Other 
guidelines similarly reinforced established principles.  Officers were reminded when discussing “areas of 
settlement” of the importance of “an equitable distribution across Canada.”  They were also reminded of 
their responsibility to report on such items as applicants’ education, experience, and “personal effects”, 
and to assess personal characteristics such as physical appearance and “degree of mental alertness.”  
                                                          
13 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1950: IV, 4450.   
14 LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, vol. 940/41, Binder 28, “H.Q. Directives Series C – 1950-52” Immigration 
Branch Directive No. 19, May 3, 1950.  “Subject: Pamphlet “Canada – A Chance to Work, to Live, etc.”  
15 See LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, vol. 940/41, “H.Q. Directives Series C – 1950-52” Directive No. 28 
(untitled) June 20, 1950 and Directive No. 107, “Subject: Correspondence” (undated). These items demonstrate 
the government’s determination to avoid any unwanted publicity.  Officers were cautioned that their role, 
particularly in cases having “sensational appeal to the press,” might be open to “equivocal interpretation.”  All 
“publicity of dubious taste” was to be strictly avoided.  Correspondence, moreover, must be “brief and to the 
point.”  (In Directive No. 107, the Department also found it necessary to remind officers that “Good manners and 
courtesy are to be observed at all times.”)    
16 LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, vol. 940/41, Binder 28, “H.Q. Directives Series C – 1950-52” Immigration 
Branch Directive No. 76 (Revised), February 9, 1951. 
79 
 
Significantly, the directive’s concluding provisions stated: “There will be no change in procedure with 
respect to applications arising in the British West Indies.”17   
Ranging in scope from mundane administrative and personnel issues to detailed policy 
explanations, these directives soon became a foundational component of program delivery for the new 
department.  By January 1952, they were consolidated into a loose-leaf manual of “Instructions for the 
Guidance of Immigration and Visa Officers.”  Officers were notified that the manual would serve as the 
“official reference book of headquarters instructions” in future.18   
Policy initiatives of a more substantive nature also followed the minister’s June 1950 
announcement, as the government continued to seek policies that would increase immigration levels.  A 
September order in council revoked earlier restrictions applicable to wartime ‘enemy aliens’: now, under 
P.C. 4364 “Germans were placed on the same basis as other Europeans.”19  And there was more.  A 1951 
departmental memorandum, summarizing recent policy developments, explained that a “thorough 
revision of admission procedures” had been implemented under P.C. 2856, to “reduce formalities to a 
minimum and to expedite the arrival of immigrants sponsored by residents … or selected by immigration 
and settlement officials.”  The Department’s “Settlement Service” had also been strengthened, resulting in 
the development of “thousands of opportunities for the placement of immigrants.”20 
Two additional initiatives emerged during the Department’s first year of operation.  The first 
involved a series of measures to provide financial assistance to prospective immigrants.  An October 1950 
Cabinet memorandum summarized a disturbing decline in intake from 125,414 in 1948 to a projected 
total of 75,000 for 1950.  The cost of passage to Canada was identified as a major factor in the decline, 
and it did not help that Australia – a country also in need of immigrants – had implemented a generous 
assisted-passage program.  Traditionally, the memorandum noted, the government did not offer financial 
incentives to prospective immigrants, but under the current circumstances, “it appears that the principle of 
providing no financial assistance has to be departed from to some extent at least.”21   
                                                          
17 LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, vol. 940/41, Binder 28, “H.Q. Directives Series C – 1950-52” Immigration 
Branch Directive No. 69, December 15, 1950. 
18 LAC Immigration Branch Files, RG 76, vol. 940/41, “H.Q. Directives Series C – 1950-52” Directive No. 120 
(Untitled) January 15, 1952.  A list appended to this directive identified 900 Immigration Branch employees to 
whom a copy of the manual would be issued.   
19 Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 99. (Hawkins notes that the classification of Japanese nationals as “enemy 
aliens” would continue until 1952.) 
20 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Files, RG 26, vol. 75, File 1-1-1 part 1, “The Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration,” March 1951, 3. 
21 LAC Department of Agriculture Fonds, RG17, vol. 3091, file 49-1, “Draft – Memorandum To The Cabinet”, 
October 30, 1950, 1.  
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On October 31, 1950, an Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Immigration held its first 
meeting, to consider the possible components of an assistance program.22  Chaired by Laval Fortier, the 
list of attendees demonstrated the committee’s importance.  John Holmes of External Affairs 
accompanied his department’s deputy under-secretary, Escott Reid.  Also present were Cabinet Secretary 
Norman Robertson, and the deputy ministers or senior officials from Finance, Agriculture, Labour, and 
National Health and Welfare.  Among the measures considered were proposals to charter transatlantic 
vessels from Britain and airplanes from Trans-Canada Airlines.  An IRO request to accept 1,000 ‘hard-
core’ tubercular refugees – to be funded through a reduction of Canada’s contributions to that 
organization – was debated at length with little enthusiasm and with no recommendation being reached.  
The most significant initiative appeared to originate with the Department of Labour, whose officials 
proposed a scheme whereby “advances on passages would be made by the two Canadian railway 
companies provided the Government were prepared to make funds available for this purpose at low 
rates.”23   
The Department of Labour, committee members learned, had determined that projected domestic 
employment figures for 1950-51 were exceptionally promising.  In fact, shortages were now anticipated 
in requirements for “skilled tradesmen and certain other types of workers,” which meant that for this year 
“the usual restriction on winter entry of immigrants could be relaxed.”  The department also outlined a 
proposal whereby low-rate fares would be made available to immigrants coming to fill particular labour-
market needs, as “skilled tradesmen” or as “girls for domestic service.”  Continuing shortages in northern 
lumber camps could be addressed by securing men still residing in European displaced persons camps “to 
provide a reserve pool of manpower for general labour.”24    
Canada’s first postwar assisted-passage program was implemented with remarkable speed.  Harris 
explained the plan to Parliament on March 19, 1951, noting that it had begun to operate the previous 
December.  Under a modest fare-subsidy program, offered to 1,750 people for 1951-2, the government 
would contribute the difference between a standard tourist-class ticket by ship and the current air-fare 
price, a difference of $215.  Trans-Canada Airlines, Harris explained, was now operating regular overseas 
                                                          
22 LAC Department of Agriculture Fonds, RG17, vol. 3091, file 49-1, “Secret – Interdepartmental Advisory 
Committee on Immigration”, October, 31, 1950, 1. According to these minutes, the government’s 
“Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy” had identified a need for this new committee, to be 
tasked with “recommending to Cabinet a plan to bring about a reduction in … cost … for immigrants moving from 
Europe to Canada.”  
23 Ibid., 2.   
24 LAC Department of Agriculture Fonds, RG17, vol. 3091, file 49-1, “Draft – Memorandum To The Cabinet”, 
October 30, 1950, 3. A fourth recommendation proposed the importation of 50 immigrants per month from Malta 
during the winter. No explanation was provided for this particular recommendation except that “the Maltese 
government pays transportation costs to hostels in Canada.” Ibid., 3.   
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flights, and unsold seats presented an opportunity to try out the idea.25  Later, the minister introduced a 
supply item to establish an account in the government’s consolidated revenue fund from which loans 
could be advanced for passage money.  This too was a modest scheme (even though the minister 
requested approval of $3,000,000 to establish its operating account).  Prospective immigrants would 
contribute the first $30 toward their fare, with the balance – approximately $200 – to be received as a loan 
from the government: “The loan of passage money will be repayable by arrangement with the immigrant 
and his employer by deduction from his wages over a period of twelve months in some cases but in no 
case to exceed twenty-four months.”   
There were additional limits to the program’s largesse.  Loans were available to single workers or 
the “head” of a family but not to other family members.  The assisted passage loan plan was approved 
without debate.  In December 1951, Harris advised the House that 6202 immigrants had received assisted 
passage loans during the year.26  
The other first-year initiative under the new department appeared even more modest in scope.  
Agreements negotiated with the governments of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon allowed for the admission of 
150, 100, and 50 citizens annually from each of those countries.  Here again, international concerns 
factored prominently in the initiative, which had percolated for years before any action was taken.  The 
idea originated with Indian representatives to the 1945 Commonwealth Relations Conference in London.  
Long resentful of discriminatory Canadian immigration practices, Indian delegates suggested to their 
Canadian counterparts a treaty agreement “which would incorporate the principle of mutuality, on the 
clear understanding that it really wouldn’t extend at all [the] present restriction or prohibition of 
immigration by indirect means.”27   
The precise meaning of this obtuse rationale is unclear, but it seemed to affirm that the 
arrangement represented a goodwill gesture which the government and people of India would 
nevertheless “tremendously appreciate.”  Years later, the always candid J. W. Pickersgill described the 
arrangement as simply “a gesture for the improvement of commonwealth relations”28.  So it was, and the 
miniscule numbers negotiated for each of the countries seem almost farcical in retrospect.  Corbett’s 
contemporary appraisal of the program remains the most generous and – perhaps – balanced, in its 
                                                          
25 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1951: II, 1413. 
26 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1951, 2nd Session: II, 1509. 
27 This passage is excerpted from a letter from E.J. Tarr of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, a 
delegate to the Commonwealth Conference, to Norman Robertson, 26 March, 1945; see Eayrs, In Defence of 
Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, 242. 
28 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 11, 
March 14, 1955, 301. (Quoted in Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 101.) 
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assessment.  “The quotas,” Corbett wrote, were “obviously small” but they represented “a privilege which 
these countries had not previously had, namely the ability to have accepted … certain small numbers of 
persons who do not fall within the category of spouses, or unmarried sons or daughters under twenty one 
years, of Canadian citizens.”29 
By early 1952, nearly seven years had passed since the end of the war, and five years since 
Mackenzie King had articulated a new approach to immigration policy.  As we have seen, two major 
initiatives had been contemplated but not pursued.  Only a limited assisted-passage program and small 
admission quotas for non-white Commonwealth member states had been implemented.  These were 
modest accomplishments indeed for a new department with a young, vigorous minister, and a government 
which now understood fully the country’s need for immigrants.  Neither the decline in intake in 1949-50, 
nor the Labour Department’s projected employment figures for the following year had provoked dramatic 
action.  Economic analyses now frequently advocated for increased immigration.  As early as 1939, 
deputy finance minister Clifford Clark confided to Dexter that “he would throw open the door to refugees, 
particularly those with a bit of money.”30  Writing in 1944, University of Manitoba economist W.J. 
Waines acknowledged that “there is already evidence of a considerable body of opinion in Canada 
favourable to a policy of large-scale immigration after the war.”31  And by 1950, K.W. Taylor seemed to 
have evolved from his earlier, unfavourable views, writing: “If the world can escape a cataclysmic war, 
the prospects for a great increase in productivity of human labour for the next fifty years seem assured.”  
Among the available options for realizing this potential capacity, Taylor acknowledged, was “more 
people.”32  Clearly, economic thinking was moving beyond the restrictive views of earlier times 
championed by Arthur Lower and others.  Proponents of a more imaginative policy were prominent and 
influential, yet the government was still not roused to decisive action.  
Explanations for this postwar torpor may begin with the immigration department’s first minister.  
Young, capable, and ambitious, Walter Harris was a rising star in the Liberal party.  He was one of only 
two sitting MPs to see wartime service overseas, and the only one wounded in action.  In 1947 Harris 
became parliamentary secretary to External Affairs minister Louis St. Laurent, and continued in that 
capacity after St. Laurent became prime minister.  Previously, he chaired a parliamentary committee 
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30 QUA Grant Dexter Papers, Series I – Correspondence 1930-1961, Vol. 2, File 16, “Correspondence – General, 
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tasked with designing a suitable Canadian flag, (which Mackenzie King had promised during the 1945 
election.)33  The committee’s failure to reach a decision seems not to have damaged him politically. 
Harris was an upright Ontario Baptist.  Born at Kimberley in 1904, he was raised and educated in 
Toronto, graduating from Osgoode Hall in 1926.  An interest in politics developed early when as a youth 
he attended political meetings and heard campaign speeches by Ontario Liberal leader Hartley Dewart 
and federal leader Mackenzie King.34  As a young lawyer, he returned to Grey County to establish a base 
for both a legal and political career.  He was elected to the House of Commons in 1940, defeating Agnes 
Macphail, the first woman elected to Parliament, in the riding of Grey-Bruce.  After his return from 
overseas, Harris became something of a protégé of Mackenzie King, whom he greatly admired.  (His 
early parliamentary statements as immigration minister reiterated the policy principles set forth by King 
in 1947.35)  Following his appointment to Cabinet, Harris emerged as a potential party leader and prime 
minister.  “Harris,” observed journalist Bruce Hutchison, “is a very tough guy, and utterly realistic.”  At 
forty-six, he thought himself too young for the party leadership in 1952 but “sees a chance if he has a few 
more years to ripen,” (and if St. Laurent could be persuaded to stay on beyond another election). “I see no 
big mind in him,” Hutchison summarized rather condescendingly, “but a very keen mind which explores 
all details and dredges to the bottom of all subjects.”36  
Walter Harris’ legal training – as much as his background and temperament – would have 
instilled respect for and adherence to rules.  When combined with his evident political ambition, these 
traits mitigated against bold initiatives that might bring political risk at this early stage of his career.   
Despite his relative youth, however, Harris lacked neither confidence nor self-assurance.  After a May 
1950 trip to Bermuda, the prime minister forwarded correspondence from a taxi driver he had met who 
enquired about coming to Canada.  “I promised him,” St. Laurent explained, “that if he wrote to me … I 
would pass on to you the information he had given me.”37  The immigration minister’s response was brief 
and unequivocal.  The driver and his family were “not admissible under the present regulations…. I am 
sorry that I cannot at this time transmit a more favourable reply.”38  An apologetic prime minister was left 
                                                          
33 LAC Peter Stursburg Fonds, R5637, Vol. 51, Stursburg/Harris Interview, July 25, 1979, 58-9. 
34 Harris interview with the author, July 17, 1980. 
35 See Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1950: II, 1763: “The aim of the immigration branch is to promote an 
increase in the population of Canada of carefully selected, readily assimilated immigrants within the absorptive 
capacity of the country.” 
36 QUA Grant Dexter Papers, Series I – Correspondence 1930-61, Vol. 6, File 41, “Correspondence – General 1952 
Jan. – May” Hutchison to Dexter, January 30, 1952. 
37 LAC Louis St. Laurent Papers, MG 26L, Volume 96, FileD-55-S, “Department of Citizenship and Immigration – Mr. 
St. Laurent’s Signature.” St. Laurent to Harris, May 1, 1950.  
38 Ibid., Harris to St. Laurent, August 4, 1950. 
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to convey the disappointing news to the “coloured” taxi driver.39  Rules were to be followed, without 
exception. 
A mixture of economic and political concerns also presented impediments to bold policy 
initiative.  An expanding economy and positive employment numbers were conditions favourable to 
immigration. But the possibility of a recession was also a concern, and would cause difficulty if a 
substantial commitment to immigration had been made publicly, or if unemployment increased at a time 
when immigration levels were high.  Moreover, there were no assurances that any target numbers could 
actually be achieved.  Harris was aware by early 1952 that immigration levels from Europe were once 
again declining.  “The reason is not Canadian,” Bruce Hutchison reported, “but lack of immigrants. 
Germany has got rid of most of its available immigrants and there seems to be less enthusiasm for 
immigration in Europe anyway.”40   A renewed commitment to recruitment in Britain seemed the safest 
response.  
A third obstacle was purely political.  “Pickersgill came here yesterday,” Hutchison confided to 
Grant Dexter in April 1952, “and we had a long and private talk.”  (Pickersgill was now Clerk of the 
Privy Council and cabinet secretary, supposedly a less political position than his previous role in the 
prime minister’s office.  He may have considered this conversation private; Hutchison evidently did not!)  
“The government,” Hutchison reported, “will very likely go to the country in October, 1952.”  Only three 
years had passed since the last election, but several of the government’s key ministers had been 
discussing an “early leap…. Jack is confident that this decision will be made within the next few weeks.” 
Hutchison then summarized the strategic reasons for this “surprising decision”: 
(1) The Liberal Party can certainly win this year. The latest Gallup Poll shows its popularity up 
to 48 per cent only two points below the 1949 high and two points up from last fall. This is 
due mainly to the old age pension. 
(2) Prosperity is guaranteed for this summer anyway but is not guaranteed for 1953. The 
government today is finding its economists split clearly in their opinion of the future. One 
school holds that high government spending in the U.S. will assure a boom condition 
indefinitely. The other school replies that … the economy of North America, with its huge 
productive capacity, will soon find itself in a surplus, with consequent price falls and perhaps 
unemployment and substantial recession. Even if these predictions are too pessimistic, the 
politicians reason that they had better take the bird in hand and win this year when they can 
be assured of winning rather than take a chance on a changed economic climate in 1953. 
(3) The over-riding reason, however, relates solely to Mr. St. Laurent. His problem, as they put it 
in a charming phrase, is to “dis-engage.” In other words, he is determined to get out as soon 
as possible…. If he is re-elected in October he could quit in 18 months or less and thus give 
himself more time at the end of his life for himself.  
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… In short, the big job is to hold Mr. St. Laurent for another election and to hold it quick to 
make sure he does not escape before the polls open.41 
 
So there it was.  Enlightened economic analysis might posit that population growth through 
immigration stimulated economic expansion and increased employment,42 but political considerations still 
mattered most.  All politicians, one journalist concluded, “thought, and had good reason to think, that 
immigration was unpopular with the voters.”43  Gallup polls in the early 1950s revealed the same public 
antipathy toward immigration as they had demonstrated after the war.44  Polling data on this topic may not 
have been mentioned during Pickersgill’s conversation with Hutchison, but surely would have been 
known to the government.   
Hutchison’s account of his conversation with the Clerk of the Privy Council continued.  What 
about an election issue, he asked.  The opposition’s recent behaviour would provide one, Pickersgill 
assured him.  The Conservatives’ “blockading in Parliament” would be seized upon to create “an 
emergency of convenience”: 
If they are left alone they will increase their obstruction, little business will be done in Parliament 
and by July the public business will be in a shambles. At that point the government can virtuously 
rise in its place and announce that this disaster to the public’s business cannot be allowed to 
continue. 
 
Some “extra gimmicks,” Pickersgill continued, might also be included in the clever plan: 
[The Liberals] are thinking of introducing into the election a final drive to tidy up the constitution 
along the lines on which Garson has been working – division of powers, etc. … St. Laurent being 
French is the only P.M. who can hope to sell this to Quebec in the next thirty years. …It would be 
the apex of his career. 
 
Hutchison concluded his remarkable summary by noting that although “dry” constitutional matters might 
not excite many voters, they “would at least make the election look respectable.”45  
Whether Pickersgill was discussing serious plans, testing ideas, or simply musing hypothetically 
with a friendly journalist, there was no early election call in 1952, and perhaps not too much should be 
                                                          
41 Ibid., Hutchison to Dexter, April 21, 1952. 
42 See, for example, Timlin, Does Canada Need More People?  Timlin’s analysis is discussed above in Ch. 1, 12-3. 
43 Fraser, The Search for Identity, 114-5. “The fear of unemployment,” Fraser noted, “was almost obsessive….. Even 
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44 For discussions of earlier postwar polling data see Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, 97-8 and Gilmour, “The Kind of 
People Canada Wants,” 107-8.  
45 QUA Grant Dexter Papers, Series I – Correspondence 1930-61, Vol. 6, File 41, “Correspondence – General 1952 
Jan. – May” Hutchison to Dexter, January 30, 1952. 
86 
 
made of the cynical political strategy he divulged.  An election would soon come, in 1953.  Meanwhile, 
however, the combination of increasingly uncertain economic conditions, and divided public opinion on 
immigration, decreed that this was no time to risk the political embarrassment which bold or publicized 
immigration initiatives could cause.  Saturday Night editor B.K. Sandwell sardonically summarized the 
government’s immigration strategy as of 1952:  
An official can always get into trouble for letting someone into – or out of – his country when he 
could have refused to let him in. He never gets into trouble for refusing to let him in or out when 
he could have let him in.   
 
Immigration rules, Sandwell concluded, were usually applied in “the most restrictive possible sense.”46  
For these reasons, the government’s immigration strategy during the early 1950s studiously 
avoided publicizing its activities in this policy area.  Gradually, however, opposition questions grew more 
focused, and criticism began to strike targets.  In one 1949 exchange, the prime minister responded to 
questions tabled by John Diefenbaker: How many orders in council had the government issued under the 
Immigration Act since July 1947, and of the total, how many had not been published or tabled?  There had 
been 121 in total, St. Laurent replied, of which ten were published in the Canada Gazette and none were 
tabled.  He proceeded to table all 121 orders.  Then, perhaps sensing that these statistics did not look 
good, St. Laurent presented a detailed overview of the Act and its policy history.  It was important to 
understand how Canada’s immigration laws were administered “not only [by] this government but all 
proceeding governments.”47  
The prime minister explained that the Immigration Act identified certain “prohibited classes” but 
did not specifically define admissible immigrants by category or class.  Among those prohibited from 
entering Canada were categories of people enumerated in the legislation since 1910: the physically or 
mentally defective, criminals, persons ‘opposed’ to organized government, spies, and so on.  By contrast, 
the classes of “persons who are from time to time deemed admissible” were ordinarily identified by order-
in-council.  The reason for this “arrangement,” St. Laurent explained, was simple.  It was designed “to 
provide a certain flexibility which would not be possible if every changing circumstance had to be met by 
an amendment to the act.”  The ability to revise the regulations by way of order-in-council provided the 
flexibility “without which the whole administration of the Immigration Act would be so rigid as to be 
practically unworkable.”48   
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The prime minister directly addressed the large number of orders-in-council that had not been 
published.  Diefenbaker, he noted, had accused the government of using secret orders to create “an 
underground railway by which thousands of aliens are entering the country, completely by-passing the 
Immigration Act.”  Nothing could be further from the truth.  In fact, St. Laurent explained, 
When an order in council is of a general character, changing the regulations or affecting 
categories of persons, that order is published in the Canada Gazette. On the other hand, when the 
order in council deals with groups … or specific individuals, it is normally considered to be of 
interest only to the persons immediately concerned and it is not published. Information about it, 
however, can be obtained by application to the immigration branch.49 
 
There was a hint of exasperation in St. Laurent’s remarks on this occasion, but for the most part 
he was precise and diplomatic in describing his government’s approach to immigration policy. There was, 
he insisted, nothing new or mysterious about it.  He refuted any suggestion of ‘secrecy’ in the 
immigration program (although as we have seen, the avoidance of publicity was becoming apparent).  
The current system had been in place for decades, setting the procedures by which “the government – not 
only this government but all preceding governments – have administered the exceptions under the 
regulations for the admission of immigrants.”50  Most recently, the initiative bringing thousands of 
displaced persons to Canada was authorized by orders in council.  Allegations of nefarious under-currents 
to the program were simply unfounded – “a complete distortion of the facts.” 
Diefenbaker, however, showed no interest in the prime minister’s response to his questions.  His 
point had been made.  “An order in council is secret,” he insisted, “when members of parliament have no 
knowledge of it unless they get in touch with the proper office and ask for its production.”51  He 
concluded grandiosely: 
The tabling of these orders by the Prime Minister and the attitude he has shown in the last two or 
three days is a victory for the cause of the restoration to parliament of its right to know what is 
being done.52  
 
Alleged Liberal abuse of the rights of Parliament would become a prominent and effective theme in later 
opposition attacks on the government, particularly during the years prior to the 1957 election.  This early 
reference to the issue in 1949 demonstrates that Diefenbaker was beginning to formulate that strategy. 
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In December 1949, Conservative leader George Drew raised a new issue when he decried a lack 
of “adequate assistance” provided to newcomers.  Improvements were needed in the procedures and 
information provided to prospective immigrants at overseas offices.  Even more importantly, 
When they arrive here it is not enough that they simply be handed booklets telling of our currency 
provisions, giving a map of the country, and certain explanations of our habits and customs. It is 
essential that we set up an effective mechanism to really help these people find themselves in 
places where they can get the kind of work for which they are suited.53 
 
In support of this criticism, Drew cited examples of near-disastrous incidents where immigrants had been 
left to their own devices in remote lumbering and mining camps in extreme weather conditions.  More 
attention to these issues, Drew concluded, would improve the transition process.  It would also prevent 
any “poisoning” of immigrants by “communist doctrines” (another concern frequently raised by the 
Conservative leader54).  
Drew’s remarks, unlike Diefenbaker’s, seemed at least somewhat constructive in their intent.  
Hansard recorded no response to them by the government – an indication, perhaps, of a degree of 
complacency entering into the government’s attitude toward this policy area.   
Meanwhile, opposition members (and some from the government backbench) continued to 
criticize.  Immigration, it seemed, was becoming a topic from which good news, and good press coverage, 
were increasingly difficult to extract.  In his April 1950 summary to Parliament, Harris noted that some 
379,000 immigrants had arrived between 1945 and 1949, of whom 173,000 came from Britain and 42,000 
from the US.  Canada’s response to the refugee crisis had brought a further 98,000 ‘displaced persons’ 
from Europe.  These were significant achievements, Harris affirmed, and “with few exceptions, the 
encouragement of immigration to Canada has public support.”55  He acknowledged differing opinions 
regarding the impact of immigration on employment levels, but concluded that recent experience “would 
seem to indicate that employment has been aided by immigration.”56  Still, parliamentarians complained.  
Thatcher of the CCF decried the “maddeningly slow” development of a coherent policy since the war.57  
Liberal David Croll found no new policy, but instead a government that “hesitates, falters and 
stumbles.”58  Knowles demanded an explanation for the continued restrictions on Chinese immigration, 
whose levels remained conspicuously low despite the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act several years 
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earlier.59  Conservatives Diefenbaker and Davie Fulton also persisted, but offered little in the way of new 
insight or constructive advice.  What was the government doing, Fulton asked, to encourage more 
immigration from Britain?60  Increasingly, some aspects of immigration policy were causing 
embarrassment. 
On June 2, 1952 Walter Harris presented an innocuous motion that Parliament “go into 
committee” to consider “a measure respecting immigration to amend, consolidate, and clarify the 
Immigration Act.”61  Vaguely, almost in passing, he alluded to some of the proposed revisions, including 
loans for immigrant transportation costs and living expenses while en route.  It was a strange tactical 
approach, and it provoked a torrent of comments and questions as irritated MPs sought to understand 
what exactly they were being asked to discuss in committee.  Was there to be a new Act?  Did the 
minister have a statement to make?   Having endured the barrage, Harris introduced Bill 305 “respecting 
immigration” for first reading.  It was still not clear whether the draft legislation proposed minor 
amendments to the existing (1910) Immigration Act, or a new statute.  The minister promised more 
information in committee, and his motion was finally passed.62 
Eight days later on June 10, Harris presented the bill for second reading, now identifying it as “an 
act respecting immigration.”  This time he offered a detailed statement, describing the bill as “the first 
revision since 1910 of the Immigration Act.”63  The new version, he explained, “retains the principles of 
the present act and modernizes those principles.”  If implemented, the new statute “would enable this 
department to function more efficiently and effectively in the light of present-day conditions.”64  Harris 
then summarized the proposed legislation. 
The basic structure of the act would be unchanged.  As before, there would be provisions to 
define prohibited ‘classes’ of persons, and authorizing the governor-in-council to control via regulation 
the admission of all others.  The new act would also identify persons “by law entitled to enter Canada,” 
such as Canadian citizens and those with Canadian domicile.65  The sections dealing with prohibited 
classes, however, would be revised to more comprehensively define those excluded by reason of their 
engagement in subversive activities.  The 1919 language aimed at post-World War I ‘subversives’ would 
be updated to exclude any immigrant “who engages in activities prejudicial” to Canada’s duties under the 
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United Nations charter, or NATO, or any other “instruments for collective defence.”66  A second 
amendment in this area sought to relax (rather than tighten) restrictions imposed on prospective 
immigrants with past criminal convictions.  Harris noted that there had been cases involving the exclusion 
of persons who had made ‘mistakes,’ paid their penalty, and been rehabilitated, but were nevertheless 
denied admission.  This had led to less-than-desirable outcomes in some instances, including the 
separation of families.  The government had decided that “the absolute prohibition against admissibility 
under these circumstances should be modified.”67    
Other changes also reflected humanitarian motives.  There was clarification regarding the 
acquisition and loss of Canadian domicile, a distinct but important status because of its relationship to 
qualification for citizenship.  New rules in this area would permit ‘landed’ status to be granted to persons 
who had been in Canada ‘temporarily’ and without formal legal status, after a period of at least ten 
years.68   
Modifications to the statute’s appeal provisions were among the most substantive changes.  
Current procedures to appeal a deportation order provided for a board of inquiry consisting of three 
officers, following which a further appeal could be taken to the minister.  Convening the three-person 
boards of inquiry, however, had frequently caused costly delays.  New provisions would allow for such 
inquiries to be conducted by a single board member, retaining the three-member format at “busier ports of 
entry.”  In some cases, the minister’s ‘final’ appeal authority would also be delegated to the panel.  Harris 
explained the government’s belief that these changes would reduce delay and ensure swifter decisions – 
an administrative improvement, perhaps, although hardly an enhancement to the process of natural 
justice.   A related revision applied to the detention of immigrants pending the outcome of their appeal 
from an order of deportation.  Former rules had required detention at a Canadian facility; now, the Act 
would allow for the immigrant to be returned “to the place whence he came pending a decision on his 
appeal.”69  This, too, was clearly designed as an administrative improvement, reducing ‘accommodation’ 
costs to the government. The minister did not point out the other obvious benefit to this amendment, at 
least from his perspective: an immigrant who had been removed from Canada could still be denied re-
entry on any number of grounds, even if his or her appeal was successful!)    
One significant provision which Harris did not mention in his overview was the new section 51.  
As with most enforcement statutes, the Immigration Act identified a series of offences subject to criminal 
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prosecution, and the range of penalties that could be imposed upon conviction.70  For example, section 50 
subjected to fine or imprisonment any immigrant or would-be immigrant convicted of entering the 
country fraudulently or with false documentation, or attempting to enter through bribery.  The new 
section 51, however, created a series of prosecutable offences specifically applicable to immigration 
officers and persons who dealt with them.  These new provisions identified the issuance of “any false 
document” or the acceptance of “any bribe or other improper remuneration or benefit” as offences for 
which officers were subject to prosecution.  The penalties, moreover, were substantial; any person 
convicted under this section could face a fine of $5000 and up to five years’ imprisonment.71   
This new section responded to a messy situation uncovered earlier in the year within the 
Department’s overseas operations. Several immigration officers operating in Germany and Italy were 
discovered to have accepted bribes to issue fraudulent visas.  An Ottawa newspaper broke the story in 
February 1952, and Maclean’s Magazine followed on March 15 with a sensational account by Blair 
Fraser, replete with allegations of “bribery, blackmail and a beautiful blonde seductress” who allegedly 
offered an immigration officer “her virtue” in return for false visas.72  Media reports exaggerated the 
extent of the problem; the number of false visas may have totaled in the “dozens, perhaps hundreds.”  
And as Fraser reluctantly acknowledged, government investigators determined that there had been no 
“gorgeous blonde;” the hapless officer had simply “issued visas on a commercial basis.”73  The story was 
nevertheless embarrassing, and it was evident that many would-be immigrants had also been defrauded by 
unscrupulous travel agents.    
The government moved to defuse the scandal before it became public, terminating the 
employment of four immigration officers.  Conservative Davie Fulton had raised the issue in Parliament 
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on April 23, and he raised it again now, as Harris presented the new act for second reading, demanding 
“disclosure … of the names of those who have taken part” in the racket.74  Harris responded curtly that an 
investigation into the matter was ongoing; further details would be released when it was complete, 
“particularly if prosecutions are launched.”75  The problem, however, was that the law currently provided 
no remedy for this scenario, either by criminal prosecution or otherwise.  As Fraser noted, terminating the 
employment of the offending officers was the only recourse currently available to the government.  The 
alleged improprieties had occurred outside Canada, “and the Criminal Code’s writ does not run in Italy. 
The Immigration Act carries no penalties for irregularities by immigration officers.”  Fraser predicted that 
this legislative deficiency would soon be addressed, as it was by inclusion of the new section 51.     
Like its predecessor, many of the 1952 Immigration Act’s key provisions were exclusionary in 
nature.  Section 5 catalogued the “prohibited classes” of immigrants.  While some terminology was 
updated from the 1910 Act, the list itself was longer and more detailed.  The old ‘subversive’ and ‘enemy 
alien’ categories were now described more exhaustively to include various forms of treason, espionage, 
and acts of sabotage toward Canada or its allies.76  The category of those excluded on various physical or 
‘moral’ grounds was also expanded.  Prostitutes, pimps, “chronic alcoholics” and “professional beggars or 
vagrants” all remained, of course, but now added to the list were suspected drug users and traffickers, and 
homosexuals.77  Further exclusionary powers appeared in section 61, which set out the government’s 
regulation-making powers under the Act.  Here the racist statutory devices of earlier times were still 
maintained, authorizing the government by regulation to impose “literacy” tests or “other examinations,” 
and to invoke the “continuous journey” criteria that had so effectively excluded immigrants from Asian 
countries in earlier decades.78  The section’s final and most important provision incorporated the language 
of Order in Council P.C. 2856, which Harris had introduced in 1950, into the statute.  Subsection 61(g) 
authorized the government to make regulations “prohibiting or limiting … admission” on any of the 
following grounds: 
(i) nationality, citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of origin, 
(ii) peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property, 
(iii) unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social, industrial, educational, 
labour, health or other conditions or requirements existing, temporarily or otherwise, in 
Canada or in the area or country from or through which such persons come to Canada, or 
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(iv) probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and 
responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their admission.79  
 
Those seeking assurance that the new act would introduce no significant change to immigration policy 
needed look no further than this section.  Over a year would pass before a regulation was promulgated 
under this new section.  In September 1954, Order-in-Council P.C. 1954 set out a series of preferential 
rules under the euphemistic heading “Norms of Admissibility.”80 
Bill 305 moved through the House of Commons and the Senate with remarkable speed.  When he 
introduced the bill, and at second reading on June 10, Harris asked members to confine their discussion to 
the administrative changes reflected in its provisions.  A general debate on immigration policy, he 
suggested, could wait until estimates for his department came before the house later in the session.  
Members agreed, especially after receiving Harris’ assurance in response to Toronto Conservative Donald 
Fleming’s caution that the estimates debate must allow for “the most complete expression of view on any 
section of the bill.”81  On June 13, the House approved a motion for the creation of a special committee to 
consider the bill.  Among its 35 members were long-time immigration advocates Ross Thatcher and 
David Croll, and emerging Conservative critics Fulton and Fleming.82  Ten days later, on June 23, the bill 
was before the House again.  After a brief debate to incorporate agreed-upon amendments, it was 
“reported, read the third time, and passed.”83  Passage through the Senate was even faster.  Presenting the 
bill for second reading on June 25, Senator J.G. Turgeon noted that the Senate’s Standing Committee in 
Immigration and Labour had been “able to discuss in detail the subject matter of the measure before the 
bill itself actually reached this chamber.”84  One day later, the Standing Committee’s report was tabled.  
The committee had “examined the bill, and now beg leave to report the same without any amendment.”  
Without further ado, Bill 305 was given third reading on June 26, 1952, and passed.85   
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The opportunity to debate immigration policy – which opposition members had so pointedly 
requested – arrived on July 4, as parliament considered the annual estimates for the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration.  It was the final day of the 1952 session, and any urgency the opposition 
had attached to the subject had evidently dissipated.  A few backbenchers raised old concerns; neither 
Fleming nor Fulton participated in the review.  As the proceedings concluded, an obviously satisfied 
immigration minister summarized recent developments.  Nineteen fifty-one, he began, had been “the 
largest and most successful immigrant year since the war.”  In addition, the postwar period had seen 
“almost unanimous approval” for the admission of displaced European refugees, as “everyone recognized 
that Canada could only grow substantially if it grew by taking immigrants.”  The celebration continued: 
Canadians had “generally agreed” with an expansive immigration policy to ensure the continued 
development of “our great resources.”  Parliamentarians, Harris concluded, had also been entirely 
supportive: “The debates of 1945-6-7-8 show clearly that parliament was almost unanimous in its belief 
that immigration as a policy was desirable.”  In particular, “everything which could have been done … to 
stimulate immigration” during the preceding year, had been done.86 
This was simply an astonishing series of assertions.  As we have seen, the evidence most certainly 
does not indicate unanimous postwar support for immigration either publicly or in the media. With so 
little publicity given to any initiatives, it is unlikely that the “general agreement” Harris described 
reflected much more than uninformed public silence.  (Even the DP initiative had been undertaken 
quietly, fearing backlash.)  Nor does the parliamentary record demonstrate any such unanimity as the 
minister now portrayed.  Walter Harris was not ordinarily given to effusion or exaggeration, and his 
remarks on this occasion seem out of character.  Perhaps the smooth passage of the new Immigration Act, 
or the pending summer recess explained his expansive mood.  More likely, however, the minister’s 
narrative on this occasion represented an attempt to frame the immigration debate in future by re-
interpreting its past.  
In retrospect, it is difficult to discern a precise rationale for the ‘new’ 1952 Immigration Act.  The 
minutes of Cabinet discussions on the issue offer little insight, recording only a brief consideration of the 
draft legislation on May 8 and again on May 30, when it was approved for introduction.87   
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Historians have paid little attention to the uninspiring 1952 statute, describing its changes as 
mainly administrative in nature, as indeed most were.88  Contemporary journalists seemed generally 
disinterested.  Newspaper accounts – of which there were few – focused on the new section 51, quickly 
connecting the revisions with “instances of racketeering uncovered earlier this year,” the issue which the 
government particularly hoped would not attract attention.89  A proclamation date of June 1, 1953,90 
almost a year after the Act’s date of passage, seemed to further demonstrate the lack of urgency with 
which the government regarded the entire subject. (Effusive coverage of the coronation of Elizabeth II on 
June 1, 1953 would also ensure that the coming into force of the new Act received scant media attention.)    
The minister’s only parliamentary explanation for this legislative initiative was his observation at 
second reading that the former Immigration Act had been in place since 1910.  Canada Year Book 
editions for 1952-3 and 1954 made no mention of the new legislation in their annual summaries of 
immigration developments.91  (The 1955 edition referred in passing to the “recently revised” statute.92)  In 
1958, fully five years after proclamation, the Year Book finally offered a bland rationale: “The 
Immigration Act of 1952 replaces the earlier Act which had become unwieldy because of accumulated 
amendments. Changes were required also because of new conditions such as travel by air.”93  The most 
informative explanation came from a most unlikely source – Conservative MP Donald Fleming.  
Ordinarily a caustic critic of the government, Fleming elaborated on Harris’ brief rationale: 
As the minister has indicated, there has been no effective revision of the Immigration Act for 
forty-two years, and any department of the government and any statute of parliament which have 
been in effect that length of time and have been submitted to the stresses that the Immigration Act 
and the department have been under in recent years are due for review by the house. I am sure the 
house will welcome the opportunity of reviewing the Immigration Act.94   
 
Fleming’s remarks presaged a remarkably non-combative debate over the new Act while offering the only 
evident rationale for the whole exercise: Quite simply, it was time for Canada’s immigration statute to be 
updated.   
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With the legislative initiative completed, the government sought to resume the low-key approach 
that characterized its management of postwar immigration policy.  Walter Harris continued as minister, 
having proven a capable administrator who could skilfully handle (and defuse) parliamentary criticism.  
With an eye on his political future, Harris also moved to consolidate his influence in Cabinet and the 
independence of his department in immigration matters.  As we have seen, other departments, particularly 
External Affairs and Labour, had exercised considerable influence on postwar immigration policy.  Now, 
however, Harris decided that the time had come for matters of departmental jurisdiction to be clarified.  A 
“personal” letter to labour minister Milton Gregg began the process.  Gregg had been in Cabinet since 
1947, but Harris’ instructions to his senior colleague were clear and direct.  Recent discussions over 
immigration estimates had demonstrated unnecessary “overlapping between the Department of Labour 
and this Department,” Harris admonished.  This was causing confusion not only for immigrants but “for 
the public, religious organizations and other groups.”95  He continued, documenting multiple 
inefficiencies created by Labour’s ongoing involvement in immigration matters.  He reminded Gregg that 
the placement and establishment of immigrants historically fell under the purview of the immigration 
department.  Only after World War II, “on the occasion of special group movements,” had Labour 
assumed a more direct role in this area.  Other departments, Harris explained, had representatives abroad 
involved in immigration work, but it was clearly understood that they were “under the jurisdiction of the 
head of the Immigration post abroad.”96  The status of Department of Labour officials involved in 
immigration matters must likewise be clarified. 
Harris concluded with a list of specific jurisdictional clarifications to which he was seeking 
agreement, also making it clear that further negotiation was not contemplated.  First, it must be 
acknowledged that the “placement and establishment” of immigrants was the responsibility of the 
Immigration Branch, “except in case of certain group movements where both Departments would agree 
that they be the responsibility of the Department of Labour and the National Employment Service 
[NES].”  Secondly, Labour officials were to discontinue their practice of sending applications and orders 
for immigrants to their own representatives abroad, and instead forward them to the Immigration Branch.  
In short, Labour and NES officials outside Canada must henceforth “be placed under the jurisdiction and 
supervision of the Immigration official in charge of the post for all immigration matters.”  Even the 
number of Labour representatives abroad would be subject to the approval of Harris’ department.  Lastly, 
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Citizenship and Immigration representatives were to be “recognized as the sole liaison officers on 
immigration matters with local governments, organizations, and individuals abroad.”97   
These instructions to the Labour minister seem particularly churlish in light of the important – 
and supportive – role of the Department of Labour in postwar immigration policy.98  Tension between the 
two departments appears to have been longstanding, as the innate caution of the Immigration Branch ran 
counter to Labour’s desire to meet labour-market requirements with immigrant workers.99  It seems clear, 
however, that after Milton Gregg became labour minister he had been diplomatic – even deferential – in 
his statements concerning his department’s relationship with Citizenship and Immigration.100  It is 
therefore unlikely that he appreciated these direct instructions from his cabinet colleague.  Harris 
forwarded a copy of his letter to the prime minister, and although the Immigration department records 
contain no response from Gregg (nor any comment from St. Laurent), it is evident that the labour minister 
fell into line.  In 1954, prior to his appointment as finance minister, Harris corresponded with Gregg 
again.  The government of Barbados, Harris advised, was seeking to place “seasonal workers” in Canada, 
and “the meeting of seasonal labour demand … comes under your jurisdiction.”  He continued, making 
clear to Gregg what the Canadian response would be: 
From an immigration standpoint … we are not at all anxious to have movements of this kind 
where temporary entry is sought for employment purposes, thereby reducing the possibilities of 
establishment of bona fide immigrants. … I am sure you will appreciate the difficulties and 
misunderstandings which can develop when attempts are made to have persons such as these 
honour the conditions of their entry by returning home upon the expiry of their temporary stay 
when they have decided that they wish to remain here.101 
 
                                                          
97 Ibid., 4. 
98 See above, page 79, and Chapter 3, pages 54; 63-4; and 65-6.   
99 In February 1947, several months before King’s May 1 statement, deputy labour minister Arthur McNamara 
proposed a “new approach” to immigration policy that would involve “a very close working relationship” between 
the departments of labour and immigration. The Immigration Branch, he acknowledged, was primarily responsible 
for immigrant “selection,” but Labour, through the National Employment Service, could assist by securing contracts 
for immigrant employment and monitoring placements after their arrival in Canada. Joliffe reacted immediately 
and negatively to the proposal, which became the opening salvo in a prolonged interdepartmental battle. See LAC 
MG 26L L.S. St. Laurent Papers, Vol. 225 file I-17, Immigration 1937-1954, McNamara to Joliffe, February 25, 1947, 
and “Memorandum Re. Immigration,” February 28, 1947. 
100 During the debate on estimates for his department in 1951, Gregg explained Labour’s “role” in the immigration 
process: “We act in association with, and under the policy set out by, the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, providing our facilities within the department, in the unemployment insurance commission and in 
the national employment services, to assist in placing immigrants who come in without any specified place to 
work.” Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1951: III, 2719. 
101 LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records, MG32 B34, Vol. 47, file 1 “British West Indies 1954-1957.” Harris to Gregg, July 13, 
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Gregg obligingly rejected the Barbadian request.102  
The immigration minister’s influence and independence were obviously growing.  Still, there 
were occasional embarrassments like the 1952 visa scandal, and other disquieting issues had also begun to 
appear.  In 1951, Harris reported to Cabinet that representatives of Canada’s small “negro” community 
were becoming increasingly vocal “about discrimination against negroes from the West Indies.”103  He 
reminded his colleagues that Black citizens of Commonwealth Caribbean countries remained 
inadmissible under a 1949 order in council.  (Some exceptions were made by way of “special 
arrangement” for those coming to study, but such cases had never exceeded 150 per year.)  Perhaps, 
Harris suggested, “some new provision” might be in order, similar to recent rule changes which admitted 
the close relatives of “Asiatic” residents of Canada.  The quota could be small – “possibly about 50 per 
year.”  But even this nominal proposal raised alarms, and two of the government’s most powerful 
ministers discouraged it.104  For the time being, there would be no change to the rules regarding 
immigration from the British West Indies. 
Procrastination, however, was no solution and the Liberals would soon have reason to regret their 
decision to avoid this issue.  As Blair Fraser recounted in Maclean’s, correspondence in early 1952 from 
the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (a union whose membership was predominantly Black) attacked 
the racism in the government’s policy toward Black immigration.105  The problem was compounded when 
a letter from Walter Harris to the “Toronto Negro Citizens’ Committee” came to light, “stating that it was 
impossible for Negroes, owing to climatic conditions, to adapt themselves to Canadian life.”  Efforts to 
explain this communications disaster only made things worse.  A “red-faced” immigration official 
announced that bureaucrats had drafted the letter for the minister’s signature.  Harris signed it, but had 
“suggested that it be held up” while the department reviewed its policy: “Somehow the letter got in the 
mail. Harris hurriedly issued a statement, denying that there was any prohibition against Negroes 
becoming citizens.”106 
                                                          
102 Ibid., Gregg to Harris, July 21, 1954.  (J.W. Pickersgill confirmed the policy to the Barbadian Governor upon 
succeeding Harris as immigration minister: Ibid., Pickersgill to Sir Robert Duncan Harris Arundel, Dec. 16, 1954.) 
103 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 11576, “Immigration from British West Indies” Dec. 20, 1951, LAC, RG2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2649, Microfilm Reel No. T-2368, 5-6. 
104 Ibid., 6.  External Affairs minister Lester Pearson pointed out the proposal’s inherent dilemma: any “quota” 
imposed on Black immigration might be criticised if made public, whereas keeping it secret would also ensure that 
no favourable publicity could be generated.  Minister of Trade and Commerce C.D. Howe recommended 
maintaining the status quo “as long as possible.”  Individual cases deserving of attention could always be dealt with 
“by means of special arrangements.” Ibid., 6.    
105 Fraser, “Will Walter Harris be our next Prime Minister?” 9. (The union’s letter attacked immigration policy 




This explanation, of course, was entirely disingenuous.  As a minister of the Crown, Harris was 
responsible for any correspondence bearing his signature.  Moreover, the fact that skin colour presented 
no legal impediment to citizenship offered no benefit to people who were denied admission to Canada in 
the first place.  This fumbled response to complaints that were undeniably factual was a low moment of 
Harris’ tenure in Immigration, and the episode was an ominous portent of further problems during the St. 
Laurent government’s final mandate.  
As Blair Fraser reported, Harris’ overall performance in the immigration portfolio had been 
widely acclaimed.  Other MPs admired his competence and enthusiasm, and appreciated his willingness 
to help with requests concerning “borderline cases” among their constituents.   In general, Fraser 
concluded, the record was an impressive one: “More than 600,000 of Canada’s million postwar 
immigrants have come during Harris’ regime; his second year of office saw the largest total since 1907, 
just under 195,000.”107  Walter Harris demurred when Fraser inquired about his future ambitions, but he 
was now seen a potential Liberal leader and prime minister.       
Early in 1952, University of Toronto law professor W.G. Friedmann succinctly appraised the 
country’s longstanding attitude to immigration.  “In Canada,” Friedmann wrote, “both the government 
and the people have so far preferred to let this immigration business develop with the least possible fuss 
and publicity.”108  After 1953, new domestic problems and international pressures, similar to those 
encountered after 1945, would again disturb the even tenor with which the government strove to 
administer its immigration policy. 
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The St. Laurent Years, 1953-1955:  
A New Minister and a Program under Attack 
 
      By the outset of the St. Laurent government’s final mandate, two discernable objectives animated 
its immigration policies.  The first – now well entrenched – was the desire to avoid scrutiny as it 
administered the program and pursued yearly immigration ‘targets.’ This was the approach that W.G. 
Friedmann perceptively described in 1952 as the deliberate avoidance of “fuss and publicity.”  The 
second objective had coalesced more recently and was only now coming into focus.  As it established 
those annual targets and otherwise refined administrative policy, the government increasingly sought to 
portray immigration policy as a matter of economics, rather than as a social or political issue. 
      The strategy for avoiding publicity and minimizing criticism was disingenuous at times.  
Emboldened by the smooth passage of the department’s estimates in 1951 and 1952, the government 
repeated the practice of withholding debate on estimates for the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration until the end of the 1953 and 1954 sessions.  This obvious tactic annoyed the opposition, but 
generally achieved its aim.  Conservative MP J.M. Macdonnell attributed the practice to Mackenzie King, 
who was well known to rely upon Ottawa’s early summer heat to “drive the opposition away” and ensure 
that the government “would get away without much debate” over controversial topics.1  Davie Fulton also 
criticized this “last minute” approach, attributing the government’s desire to avoid meaningful debate to 
the effectiveness of opposition criticism of immigration policy in earlier years.  This claim was over-
blown; but Fulton also announced that he had “looked up the record” of all parliamentary debate on 
immigration since 1950, calculating that the total had not exceeded “three days and one hour.”2  
      Walter Harris dismissed these complaints as little more than “quibbling over detail,”3 and 
suggested that nothing had prevented members from debating immigration policy if they were genuinely 
concerned about it.  They were not, however, and therein lay the explanation for the success of this ‘low-
profile’ approach and the motivation behind it.  Harris recognized that the opposition had no substantive 
quarrel with the basic tenets of the Liberal government’s immigration policy.  He also knew what they 
wanted to hear and he chose his words carefully.  Presenting his department’s estimates in April 1953, 
                                                          
1 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953-54: VI, 6823. 
2 Ibid., 6787-8. 
3 Ibid., 6824. 
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Harris reviewed the previous year’s immigration figures with a particular emphasis, noting that of the 
164,498 “new arrivals” in 1952, more than 64,000 were British: “This represents an increase of 36 per 
cent in the proportion of British immigrants over the previous year, and in actual numbers an increase of 
more than 11,000 over 1951.”  Harris also reported a twenty per cent increase in immigration from the US 
between 1951 and 1952.4   
      These reassurances undoubtedly made MPs more receptive – or at least less suspicious – toward 
the remarks that followed.  The government, Harris acknowledged, was “fully aware” that Canada still 
needed more people.  The nation’s current population (14.5 million) and current intake levels would not 
be enough to “fulfil our destiny and develop our resources.”  Nor would natural increase suffice.  
“Accordingly, the government will continue its program of immigration to stimulate Canadian growth 
and Canadian development.”  With this subtle shift to economic language, references to where 
immigrants might come from grew noticeably less precise.  Harris concluded, somewhat vaguely: “[W]e 
are now selecting immigrants on a very wide basis.”  He did not elaborate further on this point (although 
he noted modest recent increases in the number of immigrants “representing the Latin races” – French, 
Italians, and Belgians).  Instead, his closing remarks affirmed the connection between immigration and 
economic policy: 
The approach will continue to be a realistic one, with the development of our economy the 
guiding factor. We shall anticipate future developments as closely as we can and gear our 
immigration program to them.5 
 
      This was precisely the approach the government would pursue, and in articulating it, Harris had 
also accurately gauged opposition sensibilities.  Tory MPs might complain about the timing or the extent 
of immigration debate, but they offered little criticism of the substance of immigration policy.  The 
contributions of Conservative MP Davie Fulton to the 1954 debate were typical.  Fulton had meticulously 
tallied the time allotted to debate since 1950, but his only substantive policy concern was with the number 
of Italians – particularly those from “southern Italy” – currently being admitted to Canada.  Such people, 
Fulton generalized, were accustomed to rural village life, and did not “fit in” on Canadian farms.  In his 
view, northern Italians were to be preferred for their “background of industrial and technical training.”6  
The CCF, by contrast, had begun to advocate for an economic focus to immigration policy some time 
previously, as had various labour organizations.7  It is entirely possible, therefore, that the impetus to shift 
                                                          
4 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1952-53: IV, 4326-7. 
5 Ibid., 4328. 
6 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1953-54: VI, 6789. 
7 See, for example “Labour’s Views on Immigration, Submitted by the Canadian Congress of Labour to the Senate 
Committee on Immigration,” July 25, 1946 and “Comment on Immigration,” Vol. 2, No. 9, (CCF Publication) 
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from the vague postwar language of ‘absorptive capacity’ to more economic terminology came from the 
left side of the political spectrum.  Generally, however, the opposition’s preferences concerning ‘suitable’ 
immigrants remained obvious and unchanged, and it is unlikely that government confidence was greatly 
disturbed by their advice or criticism.  Harris understood his opponents, and he knew how to reassure 
them.   
      As he concluded the 1953 debate on his department’s estimates, Harris also acknowledged 
opposition advice “that we should not have too many immigrants entering the labour force during [the 
winter] months.”  The government had re-implemented that very approach the previous year (having 
briefly diverged from it in 1950-1) with positive results and “no surplus number of workers in any given 
community.”  Harris was satisfied that immigration policy was now being managed “to fit conditions as 
we see them, according to the information we receive.”  He candidly summarized the strategy: 
We never go beyond twelve months; and for that reason one may say that we do not plan for the 
distant future. ….We merely say that from month to month and, at the most, up to a year in 
advance, we have certain expectations of what can be done by way of migration.8 
 
      With this transition to an economic policy focus, administration of the immigration program 
began to resemble a financial exercise, similar in appearance to the government’s overall budgetary 
process.  The preparation of a federal budget began each year in the fall with the preparation of estimates 
by all departments of government, and with the forecasting of the government’s expenditures and 
revenues, and other economic trends.9  With the immigration program, the challenge was to estimate 
annual employment levels and labour-market requirements, and to match immigration targets to those 
projections.  A detailed report by the minister to cabinet in February 1952 demonstrated how this 
‘estimate’ process for immigration would work: 
The Departments of Labour and Trade and Commerce had been consulted with regard to 
prospects for 1952. In August 1951, the Department of Labour had placed requirements for 1952 
at 100,000 workers. On February 11th [1952] this figure had been reduced to 57,000 workers 
made up as follows: farm workers, 18,000; general labourers, including woods workers, miners, 
track workers, construction labourers, etc., 18,000; clerical and professional, 3,500; domestics, 
nurses’ aides, etc., 6,000; skilled and semi-skilled, 12,000. To this should be added 6,000 artisans 
or small businessmen, 60,000 as the normal number of dependents and a figure of about 7,000 to 
cover dependents in Europe of persons already here, also 7,000 Americans and about 2,500 
                                                          
September 1952: LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration MG28 I-103, vol. 121 “Canada. Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration. Part II 1952, 121–2.” 
8 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953-54: IV, 4383. 
9 W.E. Harris Interview, July 17, 1980. 
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Chinese. There might be about another 5,000 to cover special groups of dependents in Europe. 
This made a total for 1952 of about 145,000.10    
 
While these figures reflected the best current information, Harris also cautioned his colleagues 
that “some signs” were pointing toward a period of “lower employment.”  A reduction of these target 
numbers, if required, could be achieved in various ways: rejecting employer “orders” for immigrant 
workers, refusing visas to certain “classes or occupations,” discontinuing the assisted passage loan 
scheme, or restricting immigration from Italy (in view of recent “difficulties” with that country).  The 
cabinet accepted the minister’s recommendation of a target number of “about 145,000 persons” for 1952.  
The assisted passage program would be maintained, but immigrant workers would be discouraged from 
coming after the beginning of October.  Most importantly, “the program [could] be reconsidered in June 
1952 if conditions changed materially.”11  
      The reconsideration took place on June 17, 1952, precisely as anticipated, when Harris reported 
that conditions had indeed changed.  Some 62,000 immigrants had arrived during the first quarter of 
1952, a trend which would see the year’s target exceeded if it continued.  Accordingly, several 
adjustments had been made in order to reduce the intake.  The general guidelines set out in Order in 
Council P.C. 2856 of 1950 still applied, favouring British, French, and US applicants and (to a slightly 
lesser extent) others from northern Europe, and restricting immigration from other countries to 
agriculturalists with capital and other specified occupational groups.  Within those parameters, however, 
the department’s overseas offices had been instructed that “immigrants requiring assistance in finding 
employment after arrival must be qualified in specific occupations.”  In addition, “special instructions 
were issued to the Rome office to confine processing to certain close relatives, although special 
movements of workers previously authorized were completed.”  A final modification addressed a 
different concern: “As there had been a reduction in the number of U.K. and French nationals applying 
for visas, it was considered advisable to extend the assisted passage loan scheme to British subjects and 
French citizens with special qualifications.”  For the most part, however, the changes would reduce intake 
for the balance of the year.  Any applicants not meeting the reduced parameters would simply be 
informed that their application “would be held in abeyance.”12    
                                                          
10 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 11744, February 26, 1952, LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 2649, 
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11 Ibid., 3. 
12 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 12107, June 17, 1952, LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2680, 
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      The administrative options available to adjust intake, even slightly, were almost limitless, and the 
flexibility which characterized immigration policy would continue for the remainder of the government’s 
mandate.  And, like the parliamentary opposition, the media found little fault with the system.  “We’re all 
for immigration,” the Financial Post editorialized when the mid-1952 restrictions were imposed, “but we 
find it hard to quarrel with a temporary period of digestion.”13 
      Once the minister’s policy recommendations received cabinet approval, the process of 
implementation could begin.  Extensive and ongoing consultations with other departments and with 
employer organizations resulted in the creation of lists of “occupational selection criteria” for each year.  
These lists were detailed and lengthy, with columns identifying with an “x” the occupations required and 
the districts within Canada “in which opportunities were reported to be available.”  Occupations were 
identified with great precision; opportunities for engineers (civil, electrical, mechanical), “geophysicists,” 
surveyors, mechanical technicians, nurses, and teachers were all meticulously enumerated, along with the 
more traditional immigrant categories such as farmers, farm workers, general labourers, and cabinet 
makers.  These lists were then distributed to overseas offices of the Immigration Branch, who were 
expected to follow them carefully when selecting immigrants.  The lists were also modified for each 
country in which immigrant recruitment was being conducted.  Thus, for example, the 1954 list for Italy 
was comprised almost entirely of labour occupations such as carpenters, cabinet makers, upholsterers, 
plasterers, tile setters, painters, and masons.14  In this way, preference could still be given to applicants 
from certain countries even if racial criteria were becoming slightly less prominent in the selection 
process.  (The practice of preparing separate occupational selection lists for each country was 
discontinued in 1956.15)  
      The primary source of occupational selection data was of course the domestic employer 
community.  Requests from businesses for immigrants with specific skills were investigated as they were 
received, or referred to other departments for their input.  For example, a Nova Scotia timber producer’s 
1954 application sought approval for “300 experienced pulpwood cutters … preferably from 
Scandinavian countries.”  The application made its way up through the bureaucracy and was forwarded to 
the Immigration Branch director for approval, having first been referred to the Department of Labour for 
their recommendation.  (In this instance, Labour opposed the request, suggesting that there were enough 
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unemployed workers in the Maritime region to fulfil this and any future requirements.  Citizenship and 
Immigration nevertheless supported the application.)16  All such requests, no matter how small, appear to 
have received consideration and were factored in to the yearly estimate process.  One 1955 memorandum 
documented a request from the Melfort Nursing Home in Saskatchewan for precisely five “English-
speaking professional nurses.”17  This meticulous process would continue to the end of the St Laurent 
period.  Departmental memoranda in late 1956, for example, documented Immigration Branch 
consultations concerning requests to accept immigrants to fill such diverse occupational categories as 
trained “ship/marine inspectors” and “Greek domestics.”18 
      Walter Harris’ 1953 statement that the government was now recruiting immigrants on a “very 
wide basis” was vague and uninformative, and the evidence to support it is mixed at best.  At a June, 1952 
cabinet meeting, some restrictions had been reviewed and (in certain cases) even tightened, although 
Harris did make modest recommendations in respect of two long-excluded immigrant groups.  Old 
prejudices endured, of course, as he reminded his colleagues that certain groups were still considered 
“less adaptable to Canadian life.”  These included “Asians”, whose admission remained restricted under 
the 1930 Order in Council P.C. 2115 to the spouses and minor children of Canadian citizens, and persons 
of African descent covered by P.C 2856 of 1950.  A relaxation of the rules respecting Chinese immigrants 
had been implemented in 1951, to allow applications from children up to 25 years of age. The experiment 
proved unsuccessful, however, when cases of “substitute children” were discovered along with instances 
where “older children had been trained in subversive activities,” and Harris now recommended a return to 
the earlier restriction permitting only children under age twenty-one for the Chinese.  For other “Asian” 
groups, however, there would be some modification, as Harris recommended that Syrians, Armenians, 
Assyrians and Lebanese – heretofore all classified as Asian under P.C.2115 – be removed from its 
provisions.  Similarly for Black immigrants, still restricted to a few categories of close relatives, Harris 
suggested that in light of “representations received” the rules might be extended “somewhat.”19  Details of 
                                                          
16 LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records, MG 32 B34, Vol. 16, File E-1-1 “Estimates General 1954-1955.” Memorandum re: 
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this proposed ‘extension’ remained unspecified, and the increase in Black immigration over the ensuing 
years was miniscule.20 
      Cabinet nevertheless approved the minister’s other recommendations, leaving the department to 
work out the details.21  Elsewhere there were further indications of the relaxation of restrictive rules.  A 
March 1953 memorandum advised overseas staff that following “a re-assessment of the 1953 program it 
has been decided to stimulate the flow of immigration by allowing the posts abroad greater latitude in 
respect of the number of immigrant workers to be selected.”22  Program officers received precise direction 
as to how this “greater latitude” would be exercised: 
2.  You will now select, until further notice, all unsponsored immigrants –  
(a) who are suitable and desirable, 
(b) who have a trade, skill or occupation shown on the approved list … appended hereto, 
(c) who are nationals of the country in which you are located, refugees, or non-nationals who 
comply with the Residence rule.  
3.  Unsponsored immigrants must be willing and able to accept employment in an occupation 
other than that in which they are qualified. 
4.  … unsponsored immigrants who have trades, skills, or occupations for which early arrival 
dates have been specified, must be accorded priority over unsponsored immigrants in other 
occupations.23 
 
      District offices within Canada were also involved in the process of determining the number of 
immigrants that could be absorbed each year. An August 1953 memorandum to “All District 
Superintendents” suggested the emphasis now being placed on meeting the country’s full “absorptive 
capacity”: 
Taking into account all perceptible trends and potential developments will you … please let me 
have not later than September 15 as accurate an estimate as you can make, by authorizing port 
areas, of the number of immigrant workers whom you expect to be able to place in employment 
on arrival during 1954.24 
 
      Immigration statistics for the period of Harris’ tenure as immigration minister showed the results 
of the ‘wider’ selection process.  During the years 1951 through 1954, immigrants from Britain continued 
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23 Ibid. 
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to comprise the largest group by far, averaging more than 41,500 each year.  The only two countries to 
show sustained increase during the same period were Germany and Italy, which averaged approximately 
29,000 and 23,000 per year respectively.  In 1953-4, immigration rates from the British Isles and from the 
Netherlands (another preferred source) began to drop, which undoubtedly explains the broadened 
selection criteria implemented during this period and applied to other countries.  Immigration among the 
traditionally least-preferred groups, however, did not increase at all during these years.25 
      Walter Harris continued as minister of citizenship and immigration until June 1954.  His career 
then resumed its upward trajectory with his appointment as minister of finance following several high-
profile resignations from cabinet.  As Blair Fraser admiringly noted, Harris left the immigration portfolio 
having “brought real enthusiasm to his task” and having overseen the intake of more than 600,000 
postwar immigrants.26  The new department had been competently launched and administered with, as we 
have seen, few embarrassing problems, and the alarming decline in immigration during 1949-50 had been 
reversed.   
Harris’ successor as immigration minister was, in some respects, a curious choice.  J.W. (Jack) 
Pickersgill had entered the House of Commons in 1953 as an MP from Newfoundland after many years as 
principal secretary to Prime Ministers King and St. Laurent. (A brief tenure as secretary to the cabinet had 
proven a less comfortable experience for Pickersgill, who was accustomed to a more partisan ‘advisory’ 
role.)  His appointment to cabinet as secretary of state in 1953 placed him in a portfolio whose 
administrative duties were “relatively light,” leaving time to continue his advisory role to the prime 
minister and to serve as Newfoundland’s representative in cabinet.  The Ontario-born, Manitoba-reared 
“Sailor Jack” quickly became a favourite target among opposition members.   
      Pickersgill brought to the immigration portfolio a prodigious capacity for hard work (which he 
was going to need) but also a tendency toward sarcastic humour in his public comments which would 
occasionally prove problematic.  From his co-authorship of Mackenzie King’s famous 1947 policy 
statement and his role in creating the new immigration department in 1950, Pickersgill was certainly 
familiar with immigration policy since the war.  Throughout his time as head of the prime minister’s 
office, immigration was just one policy area that fell within his purview; all ministers knew that any issue 
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they wanted brought to St. Laurent’s attention must start at Pickersgill’s desk.27  Hugh Keenleyside’s 
sardonic recollection that Mackenzie King and Pickersgill had “run the country undisturbed”28 from the 
prime minister’s office during the 1940s was probably equally true during St. Laurent’s first mandate. 
      Still, Pickersgill may not have initially anticipated the administrative workload which his new 
role would entail.  “I am very happy with whatever I can do in government,” he told one reporter after his 
appointment, “where my main aim is to do the best I can for Newfoundland.”29  As the Financial Post 
observed: “There is no question now of sparing Pickersgill routine departmental duties.”  His new 
portfolio, moreover, was known to require “the most delicate political handling” and could be a “pitfall 
for an unwary government.”  Fortunately, the Financial Post concluded, “Pickersgill has never been 
accused of being unwary.”30  Nor was he particularly self-aware.  Even years later in his memoirs, 
Pickersgill’s account of incidents compounded by his admittedly “flippant” remarks demonstrated only 
limited introspection.31 
      The new minister was firmly committed to principles that had animated postwar immigration 
policy – careful selection, flexibility, and meeting both labour market requirements and the country’s 
‘absorptive capacity’.  Addressing delegates to a Newfoundland labour convention after his appointment, 
Pickersgill affirmed that he intended “no change in Canada’s immigration policy while he was minister of 
citizenship and immigration.”  The basic premise was unchanged, although Pickersgill introduced a note 
of defiance to it.  “I do not think it will strengthen this country to bring people who can’t absorb quickly 
into remunerative employment. Immigration properly conducted can add to the productive resources of 
the country.”32  Overall the approach sounded entirely familiar. 
      Although he planned no major changes, Pickersgill embraced his role with enthusiasm.  Periodic 
consultations with railway companies and other organizations had long been part of the immigration 
policy process.  Traditionally, such consultations had been conducted quietly and on a limited basis, with 
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businesses and employer representatives and the government’s transportation partners receiving most of 
the attention.  Generally, the ritual accomplished little.33  In October 1954, however, Pickersgill convened 
a much larger consultation session in a meeting room of the Senate chambers.  Four federal departments 
were represented, along with officials from the railways, major labour organizations, the Canadian 
Manufacturers’ Association, Canadian Construction Association, Canadian Chamber of Commerce and 
the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.  From the Department of Citizenship and Immigration alone, no 
fewer than eleven Immigration Branch representatives accompanied Pickersgill and deputy minister Laval 
Fortier.  The gathering was unprecedented in both scope and scale, and an important consultation 
initiative by the government. 
      A cautious Fortier sought to prepare the minister for the atmosphere he might encounter, 
particularly from parties not accustomed to being consulted.  Regular meetings with business groups had 
been commonplace, Fortier noted, but not with unions; therefore, “I do not feel that any mention needs to 
be made of this fact.”  Instead, the minister should emphasize that this was the first time all groups had 
been invited at one time to present their views.  Particular criticisms might also be anticipated and 
addressed at the outset:  
As you are aware, the press and certain national organizations sometimes contend that we have no 
planned immigration policy. Such a statement has been made recently at the Convention of the 
Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress. I wonder if in your remarks 
you should not be provocative and mention that the Department will appreciate knowing what is 
understood by [those organizations] by “planned immigration” and what suggestions they have to 
make. The purpose of the meeting as planned is to learn as much as possible from organizations 
outside the Government, what these national organizations think the national economy will be in 
1955, so that those who have to plan the programme could utilize the information given by these 
national organizations as a guide.34 
 
      Pickersgill wisely opted not to be “provocative” with his guests.  Official minutes of the 
conference recorded that he welcomed participants by asking them to adopt a “long-range view” of 
immigration policy rather than worrying about immediate “day-to day” impacts.  In particular, attendees 
were being asked for their expertise – their “best judgment” – as to what Canada’s 1955 immigration 
targets should be.  The principal goal was meeting the country’s labour requirements “without saturating 
                                                          
33 One report explained: “We have been inviting annually representatives of the Provinces [and employer 
organizations] to discuss the immigration program. We have even attempted to get an opinion from our guests as 
to what might be in the immigration program, but we have not been too successful in our efforts.” LAC J.W. 
Pickersgill Records MG 32 B34 Vol. 45, File 3, I-2-428P, Immigration Programme 1954-55, “Memorandum For The 
Minister,” July 6, 1955.   
34 LAC J.W.Pickersgill Records, MG32 B34, Vol. 45, File 3-I-2-428P, Immigration Programme, 1954-55, 
“Memorandum to: The Minister,” October 15, 1954. 
110 
 
the labour market, or doing worse than that.”35  Within the minister’s remarks, which generally 
emphasized economic factors, there appeared one exceptionally candid acknowledgment.  Since 1947, 
Pickersgill noted, it had been “a matter of conscious policy to increase the population of this country by 
bringing people into it who were not born here but who we think will become good citizens, the primary 
purpose being social rather than economic”36 [emphasis added].  This remark seems to have gone 
unnoticed at the time, but the reference to immigration as a “social” issue suggested that despite all efforts 
to frame policy in economic terms, it was the political concerns presented by immigration which 
remained most important.        
      Immigration Branch director C.E.S. Smith also offered candid insights to conference attendees.  
Smith reported greater delays in placing new immigrants into employment in 1954 than in previous years, 
and noted the mid-year deletions to the occupational selection lists that were made in response to 
tightening employment conditions.  In particular, criteria for agricultural immigrants had been “raised,” 
resulting in a substantial reduction in that category from 1953 admissions.37  Clearly, the government was 
taking stakeholders into its confidence by sharing this sensitive information and explaining how policy 
was administered.     
    Ultimately the conference appears to have provided little useful advice to the government.  Union 
executives remained generally non-committal, acknowledging the country’s need for “a larger home 
market” but also arguing that it was “not feasible to bring in immigrants when there are so many 
unemployed.”38  The Canadian Congress of Labour representative took refuge in ignorance: “He declared 
that it was completely impossible to evaluate what needs would exist in Canada for the coming year 
without having comprehensive information with respect to the economic situation.”39   Employer and 
business representatives offered views generally favourable to immigration, and identified some 
occupational groups for which workers were needed.  Most attendees seemed to appreciate being 
consulted, and agreed that the meeting had been worthwhile.  Even if it achieved little of substance, the 
session nevertheless represented an important early example of the type of government - ‘stakeholder’ 
consultation that would become commonplace in later decades. 
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      Pickersgill’s expanded consultation program continued as he prepared his recommendations for 
1955.  A November 1954 meeting gathered together representatives of every federal department with an 
interest in immigration policy.  The reliable Fortier summarized the proceedings.40  The Department of 
Trade and Commerce, Fortier recorded, was “very strongly in favour of a high rate of immigration … on 
the premise that immigration is in itself, a stimulus to the Canadian economy and an expansionary 
influence which does not add to unemployment difficulties.”  The Department of Labour agreed that the 
economy was improving, but added a note of caution that this trend had not necessarily resulted in 
increased “manpower” requirements.  Other departments – Finance, Public Works, and Defense 
Production – along with the Bank of Canada, all concurred that the country’s confident economic outlook 
would justify a high target number for immigrants in the year ahead.  The real challenge, Fortier 
predicted, would be in securing enough suitable immigrants, in light of improving economic conditions in 
Europe, and “the fact that the impression is rather widespread abroad that employment possibilities in 
Canada are not too good.”  As a strategy to address the anticipated shortfall, Fortier recommended the re-
establishment of Canadian immigration offices in the United States, a practice that had been discontinued 
in 1930.  
      The minister’s recommendations for 1955 were presented to Cabinet in December 1954.  They 
were ambitious, precise, and more detailed than his predecessor’s had generally been.  Noting the 
extensive consultations that he had conducted, Pickersgill reported a “general consensus of opinion that 
Canada could absorb approximately 150,000 immigrants” during the coming year, “comprising 77,570 
workers and 72,430 dependents.”  Fortier’s US proposal did not receive full endorsement, given that 
“employment opportunities were not now as good in Canada as they might be.”  However, Cabinet 
supported a more circumspect approach whereby an immigration official would be posted to the 
Consulate in New York, to “investigate possibilities … informally.”  The overall target of 150,000 for 
1955 was also approved.41      
      This energetic start to his term as minister might have been cause for confidence, but as 
Pickersgill later recalled, “I soon discovered that administering Citizenship and Immigration was a major 
task filled with opportunities to gain bad publicity.”42  Political problems arose almost immediately, 
beginning at an unexpected source.  The Canadian Bar Association – ordinarily a staid and non-
controversial organization – had formed a subcommittee on ‘civil liberties’ in 1952.  One issue on the 
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sub-committee’s agenda was the government’s administration of the Immigration Act’s admission 
provisions.  The principal concern was the absolute discretion vested in immigration officers to permit or 
deny admission to Canada, and to order the deportation of visitors seeking permission to remain.  The 
sub-committee examined some two hundred immigration cases “involving allegations of improper or 
arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic discretion.”43  A preliminary report of its findings was prepared in 
August 1954.  Among its criticisms, the report decried the government’s refusal to make public its 
procedural directives to staff regarding the interpretation of the legislation, and the absence of a procedure 
for immigrants to seek an impartial review of an officer’s decision outside the immigration bureaucracy.       
      Like its predecessors, the 1953 Immigration Act vested absolute discretion in the minister to 
permit or deny admission, and to delegate those discretionary powers to immigration officers.  As we 
have seen, the 1953 statute had only slightly modified the process for review of an immigration officer’s 
decision.44  The changes, however, were designed to make the appeal process faster rather than to enhance 
protection or improve fairness.  For example, the decision of an immigration officer to deny admission 
was subject to review by another officer who had been designated a ‘Special Inquiry Officer.’45  The new 
provisions also allowed for the panel of an appeal board under the Act to be reduced from three members 
to one, also in the interests of expediency.  Lastly, under the Act’s circuitous review process, an appeal 
from the decision of an Immigration Appeal Board went to the minister, whose decision would be final.46  
Even by 1950s legal standards, the administrative and procedural deficiencies in this process were 
glaring, and they should have been addressed in the 1953 statute.  The CBA’s interim report now exposed 
them in a most embarrassing manner.  Although it is clear that the CBA did not intend these 
“preliminary” findings to be made public, they nevertheless instigated a deluge of bad publicity for the 
government. 
      The CBA report elicited a response from Fortier in the form of a lengthy memorandum to his 
minister, suggesting “comments” that might be used when questioned about the matter.  Fortier 
undoubtedly recognized that his department’s long-entrenched practices were under fire, but the only 
arguments he could muster were weak and unconvincing.  The notion of releasing departmental materials 
appalled him: “I know of no company who would agree that its internal directives should be made 
public.”  Equally alarming was the report’s recommendation of an arm’s-length immigration appeal 
tribunal, similar to the Income Tax Appeal Board or the Tariff Appeal Board, and presided over by a 
federal court judge.  This, Fortier exclaimed, would lead to further appeals to the federal courts “on 
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questions of law,” over which the bureaucracy retained complete jurisdiction under the current system.  
Moreover, a tribunal system “would not … be practical as in cases of rejection on security grounds in 
most cases the evidence could not be made available to the court.”47  The reason such “evidence” would 
be unavailable, of course, was that the Immigration Act did not require officers to provide it in their 
decisions.  Fortier’s concern here was that the entire system might have to be overhauled.       
      Years later in his memoirs, Pickersgill disclosed that the CBA report had been orchestrated by 
two lawyers who were dissatisfied with Immigration Branch decisions regarding their clients.  He recalled 
how the two attempted to blackmail him, offering to “call off their campaign if I would reverse a number 
of specific decisions taken when Harris was minister,” and promising “trouble in Parliament” if he did not 
comply.  Pickersgill “indignantly” rejected the demand, but he did not seem to immediately sense the 
political trouble that was brewing.48  When news of the report became public, press reports initially 
described the minister as “studying”49 the CBA findings and, later, as “ignoring” them on the basis that 
the report was interim only and had not been formally presented to the government.50   
      An unrelated legal matter working its way through the Ontario courts at the same time would 
compound the government’s difficulties.  Shirley Brent, a young woman from Buffalo, New York entered 
Canada in 1952 and took up residence in Toronto.  After securing an annulment of a previous marriage, 
she married a Canadian citizen in early 1954 and applied under the Act for admission to Canada.  An 
immigration officer rejected the application and ordered her deported.  His decision simply informed 
Brent that she did not meet the requirements of a particular provision in the Immigration Act regulations.51  
No evidence was provided to support the decision (which was almost certainly based upon the applicant’s 
marital history).  The regulation in question offered no clarification either, referencing only an applicant’s 
“unsuitability, having regard to the economic, social … health or other conditions or requirements 
existing … in Canada” (emphasis added.)52  Mysteriously, a news photographer was on hand to 
document Mrs. Brent’s arrest for deportation, and the sensational photographs appearing in the press 
provided a distinctly police-state flavour to the episode.53     
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      Although the Immigration Act provided no right of appeal to the courts from a deportation order, 
Brent’s lawyers brought the matter forward by way of an application for injunctive relief, seeking to have 
the deportation order quashed.  When the Ontario Supreme Court upheld the deportation, her counsel 
appealed further to the Court of Appeal.  The case was argued in esoteric legal language, but the real 
issues before the Court were straightforward.  Had the applicant received the hearing to which she was 
entitled under the Act, and had she received a sufficient explanation of the officer’s decision?  The Court 
answered both questions emphatically in the negative.  Unless the Act’s provisions were applied to ensure 
that applicants were entitled to know the reasons for an officer’s decision and the evidence upon which it 
was based, “the whole proceedings are reduced to an absolute farce.”54  
      The Brent case was a resounding indictment of the government’s admission procedures.  The 
decision was affirmed in 1956 by the Supreme Court of Canada (which also declared the regulation itself 
to have exceeded the authority that could be delegated to officers under the Immigration Act).55  As one 
contemporary scholar explained in 1957, the Supreme Court had effectively nullified a “crucial” 
regulatory provision under which “subordinate officials [had been authorized] to decide whom to admit 
into and whom to exclude from Canada.”56  The unfettered discretion that had characterized immigration 
policy for eight decades was no longer tenable.  The government would be forced to respond with a 
revised regulation and amended admission procedure, but the political damage caused by CBA and 
Supreme Court criticisms would continue to grow.   
      During the fall of 1954, the issues raised by the bar association and Brent erupted in the media.  
The ordinarily Liberal-friendly Winnipeg Free Press led the attack, reacting critically to a series of public 
statements by the minister which had defended his department with old arguments about absorptive 
capacity and the need to maintain flexibility and discretion.  Such statements, the Free Press scolded, 
were not policy but “high-sounding and meaningless platitudes.”57  Other analyses dismissed Pickersgill’s 
continuing references to Mackenzie King’s 1947 policy statement: “Anyone guided by that clutter of 
generalities,” the Globe and Mail declared, “would soon get lost.”  The Globe and Mail speculated 
insightfully about the minister’s deliberately unenthusiastic approach to immigration: “Mr. Pickersgill 
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does not think, we are sure, that immigration is a bad thing. But he thinks a lot of other people think it is a 
bad thing, and he is anxious to placate them.”58   
      Newspaper accounts during this period thus demonstrated that it was the lack of an identifiable 
policy that troubled the press more than the specific issues raised by the bar association and in the courts.  
Canadians in general might have little interest in legal principles, in immigration, or in immigrants, but a 
government that would not or could not articulate a clear policy was newsworthy.  Equally newsworthy 
was the minister’s tendency to be blunt.  During a November 24 radio interview, Pickersgill offered this 
candid acknowledgment:  
“We have a selective immigration policy and that means we have a discriminatory immigration 
policy,” Mr. Pickersgill said. “But that is not to say we discriminate against any individual 
because of his race.” 
 
When questioned during the same interview about his government’s “cautious” attitude toward 
immigration from Asia and the British West Indies, Pickersgill replied: “We are not going to permit any 
massive immigration from those areas.”59  Such candid (and contradictory) pronouncements could hardly 
be expected to win new friends or reassure critics. 
      Inevitably the mounting criticism of the government’s immigration practices moved into the 
House of Commons as the 1955 session began.  The Conservatives’ Davie Fulton led the assault on 
February 15 as debate opened on departmental estimates.  Seizing upon the various issues raised by the 
bar association and in the press, Fulton declared that the government’s immigration policies were neither 
clear, consistent, nor coordinated.  Neither were they conducted “in accordance with the best interests and 
needs of Canada.”60  His most serious charge, however, concerned the administrative practices of the 
immigration department.  Here Fulton challenged the long-held position of the government (and all 
previous governments) that entry to Canada was entirely a discretionary matter – a matter of privilege but 
not of ‘right.’  Fulton misleadingly over-stated this point, arguing that the degree of administrative 
discretion was so absolute that it provided no legal rights whatsoever, and “cannot be made a matter of 
law.”  The result, Fulton charged, was “administrative chaos amounting … to … administrative 
lawlessness.”61  In support of his argument, Fulton quoted section 20 (4) of the Immigration Act 
regulation, the same provision under which Shirley Brent had been ordered deported. 
                                                          
58 “Mr. Pickersgill on Immigration”, The Globe and Mail, November 9, 1954, 6. Also: “There Is No Policy”, ibid., 
February 21, 1955, 6. 
59 “Influx From West Indies Banned – Ottawa”, Toronto Daily Star, November 25, 1954, 2. 
60 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1955: 2, 1158-62. 
61 Ibid., 1164. 
116 
 
      Much has been made of Fulton’s attack, which was accompanied by a motion of censure of the 
government.62  Contemporary accounts emphasized Fulton’s allegations of administrative abuse.63  He 
had effectively challenged the long-standing policy premise – set out by Mackenzie King in 1947 – that 
immigration was entirely a matter of discretion and privilege, rather than a “fundamental human right.”64  
There simply must be limits to that premise, Fulton protested.  For example, Canadian citizens were 
entitled to apply for the admission of certain relatives.  How could the government maintain “that there is 
no right on the part of the Canadian citizen when he makes an application?”65  Surely, he continued, such 
rights as were created by statute must have some existence beyond arbitrary bureaucratic discretion, and 
be subject to determination “by some judicial or semi-judicial process.”66   
      It was an effective performance.  In the ensuing debate opposition members provided numerous 
examples of alleged bureaucratic abuse, although only Diefenbaker managed to exceed Fulton’s level of 
indignation over “arbitrary” immigration policies.  Raging over the “absolutism,” “tyrannical” practices, 
and “uncontrolled despotism” of the immigration department, Diefenbaker demanded the appointment of 
a royal commission to investigate its abuses.  The Immigration Act’s appeal procedure, Diefenbaker 
thundered, was simply “an appeal to Caesar, to the minister himself. An appeal from the hired man to the 
hired man’s boss.”67  In all, the episode made for spectacular political theatre, and the press coverage was 
duly sensational,68 focusing primarily on the allegations of shocking and reprehensible admission 
practices.  (Remarkably, little attention was paid to another of Fulton’s charges: that the government had 
“neglected British immigration” and failed “to put sufficient emphasis on … this potential source of most 
desirable immigrants.”69)   
      Pickersgill responded in the House with a vigorous and thorough defense of his department’s 
conduct.  Fulton’s description of a system that proffered no legal rights whatsoever was, he argued, 
grossly exaggerated.  There was the right to apply for admission, for oneself or others, and the right to 
seek review of a departmental decision.  These were ‘rights,’ even if the process did not provide recourse 
to the courts.  As for the notorious Canadian Bar Association report, Pickersgill read the entire document 
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into the record, describing its recommendations as “innocuous” and noting that the CBA itself had 
ordered further study before deciding whether to endorse the ‘preliminary’ findings of its own sub-
committee.70  There were also, he argued, important issues of privacy and security which justified the 
practice of not providing applicants with evidence or detailed reasons when admission was being 
denied.71   
      Pickersgill concluded with an affirmation of the principles that had animated immigration policy 
since Confederation.  Parliament, he noted, “has always reserved to the government the right to select the 
persons who may be admitted to this country as immigrants.”  It had established certain principles to 
ensure the selection of those “who will have to change their ways least in order to adapt themselves to 
Canadian life and to contribute to the development of the Canadian nation”:   
That is why a deliberate preference is shown for immigrants from countries with political and 
social institutions similar to our own. That is why a deliberate preference is given to the relatives 
of Canadian citizens and other persons already resident in Canada. And that is why a deliberate 
preference is given to people possessing qualifications or occupations which give them an 
opportunity for employment or establishment.72 
 
Walter Harris brought the fractious debate to an end on February 18, reminding the opposition 
that the current statutory regime had been thoroughly reviewed in 1952 when the new Immigration Act 
was tabled.  “Not a single member of the opposition groups advocated in that committee a change to a 
system of legal decisions as to who would be admitted to Canada.”73 
      Fulton’s motion of censure was easily defeated.  Years later in his memoirs, Pickersgill recalled 
with satisfaction his detailed defense of his department, theorizing that “a speech that exhausted the 
audience often exhausted the subject.”74  That may have been true within the Commons, but the political 
damage arising from negative press coverage would continue, especially as non-daily publications turned 
their attention to the government’s immigration problems.  The opposition, as Saturday Night observed, 
now had a new “target” in Jack Pickersgill.75  A lengthy Maclean’s article recounted in detail the 
government’s recent immigration troubles, also describing “polite but mounting suggestions … from 
trade and embassy officials, and from foreign governments, that Canada’s immigration policy may be 
damaging our national reputation abroad.”76  At the very least, the administrative and procedural 
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deficiencies which the debate had exposed, and which were soon to be confirmed by the courts in the 
Brent case, would have to be addressed.   
      Perhaps the most surprising aspect to the immigration controversy in early 1955 was that it had 
not erupted sooner.  To perceptive observers, there were obvious explanations.  MPs from all parties were 
“constantly pressed by their constituents” seeking help with immigration matters.  They in turn brought 
such requests to the minister, knowing that a favourable outcome would often depend on ministerial 
discretion.  Walter Harris, Blair Fraser noted, was the most ‘sat-with’ member in the House of Commons.  
As minister, he had “made friends” on all sides for his willingness “to interpret the regulations with 
compassion and a sense of humor.”77  In short, Walter Harris as immigration minister had enjoyed 
widespread cooperation and respect.  This enabled him to administer a highly discretionary program even 
when faced with competing and contradictory interests – labour unions and other groups opposed to 
immigrants, and individuals and employers demanding more of them.78  It is impossible to know whether 
the bitter 1955 debate would have been avoided if Harris had still been the immigration minister.  What is 
clear is that his successor was less popular, and that when presented with an opportunity to attack the 
government with sensational allegations and criticisms in early 1955, the opposition did not hesitate.   
      Pickersgill appeared unperturbed by the controversy surrounding his department and gave no 
indication that any of its policies would be altered.  The government’s official response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brent came later, in the form of an “obscure order-in-council.”79  P.C. 1956-785 
explicitly divided admissible immigrants into four classes, based primarily on country-of-origin (i.e. 
racial) criteria.80  As the Cabinet’s deliberations made clear, the real focus of the new regulation had little 
to do with the legal and procedural issues cited by the courts: 
The main purpose of the revision was to prevent undesirable persons from remaining in Canada if 
they had once managed to enter and, in the face of the judgment in the Brent case, it was 
impossible to do this under the old regulations.81 
 
Appeal procedures were also modified, with equal reluctance.82   
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When a friendly journalist requested a summary of the government’s current immigration policy, 
Pickersgill provided a detailed and typically candid response.  As ever, he confirmed, Canada was seeking 
“suitable and desirable immigrants” in such numbers as could be readily absorbed … without altering the 
fundamental character of the population.”  Occupational criteria were applied to identify “those who will 
contribute something to the Canadian economy and who will be easily integrated.”  And racial 
preferences remained unchanged: “Experience has shown,” Pickersgill confirmed, that British, French 
and American citizens “are the most adaptable to the Canadian way of life.”83   
The minister thus appeared determined to carry on as before, unaffected by recent criticism.  A 
1955 departmental review of the handling of applications from Chinese immigrants resulted in changes to 
the review process which ran contrary to those demanded by Fulton, the CBA, and the courts.  
Henceforth, Pickersgill decided, there would be no further appeal in cases where the original rejection had 
already been reviewed at the officer level.  Such cases, he reasoned, served only to create “unnecessary 
delays” for officials who might otherwise be productively engaged dealing with new applicants.84  
(Chinese immigration, Pickersgill agreed, was a perennial source of difficulty for the government.85)  
Other ethnic groups fared no better in the short term.86   
Pickersgill seemed equally un-phased by media criticism.  He explained to one journalist that 
giving would-be immigrants reasons for their rejection would amount to “telling a Communist how we 
found out he is a Communist,” or might reveal to subversive organizations the “secret techniques we have 
for ferreting them out.”87  It was true, Pickersgill confirmed, that immigration policy was selective.  “But I 
do not understand there is any real difference between the words selection and discrimination.”88  When 
the same journalist reported that the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration had criticised 
Canadian immigration policy, Pickersgill seemed prepared to simply ignore the charge.  Only an 
                                                          
83 LAC J.W.Pickersgill Records, MG32 B34, Vol. 45, File 22 – I-2-428E Comments on Policy 1954-1955, Pickersgill to 
John LeBlanc, June 9, 1955. 
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85 Ibid., Fortier to Pickersgill, July 27, 1956. 
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87 Fred Bodsworth, “What’s behind the Immigration wrangle?” Maclean’s Magazine, May 14, 1955, 12 
88 Ibid., 127. 
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apologetic letter from the ICEM’s deputy director, assuring Pickersgill that the organization had 
expressed no such concern, provoked a reaction from the minister. “I was not the least disturbed by the 
article,” Pickersgill jovially replied, “since it contained so many other inaccuracies.”89  
Such bravado was undoubtedly intended to show resolve in the face of opposition criticism.  
Pickersgill certainly had no intention of letting the opposition or the media dictate the government’s 
immigration policy.  Accordingly his public demeanor suggested business as usual.  By mid-1955, 
however, the St. Laurent government began to implement a series of significant changes.  And as with 
previous transformations to immigration policy, both domestic and international pressures would provide 
the impetus.   
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Chapter Six  
The St. Laurent Years, 1955-1957: 
Change, and Defeat 
 
The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was formed in 1952, one of numerous 
international initiatives to address the enormous and ongoing challenge of postwar refugees and displaced 
persons.  Canada was one of fifteen founding member countries.1  Upon learning of media reports that his 
organization had criticized Canadian immigration policy, the ICEM’s deputy director was mortified.  
“Please believe in all my regret,” he wrote to Pickersgill, adding that the May 1955 Maclean’s article had 
attributed opinions to ICEM representatives which “had never been voiced to Mr. Bodsworth [its author] 
… nor to anyone else.”2  
Clearly the ICEM did not want to appear to be meddling in the domestic affairs of one of its 
volunteer members.  As we have seen, Pickersgill readily accepted the apology and seemed prepared to 
consider the matter closed.3  There is evidence, however, that the ICEM had indeed made pointed 
observations about Canada’s immigration program.  In January 1955, the Financial Post reported that the 
ICEM had recently produced “an impressive study of the importance of immigration to Canada” which, 
while not overtly critical, had identified several economic benefits that would accrue from a “stepped-up” 
immigration program.  First, there would be increased levels of investment created by population growth, 
which would “counterbalance fluctuations in world trade.”  Secondly, an expanded domestic market and 
reduced dependence on international trade “would strengthen the Canadian economy in relation to the 
U.S., reducing the time lag between rises in standard of living in Canada as against the U.S.”  In other 
                                                          
1 Although Canada’s contributions to the organization were primarily financial, some 196,000 immigrants and 
refugees would be settled in Canada under ICEM auspices between 1952 and 1962, when the Diefenbaker 
government withdrew from the organization: Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 18-20, 429n32. 
2 LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records MG 32 B34 Vol. 62, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. 1954-
1957 (file no. 48), Jacobsen to Pickersgill, June 3, 1955. 
3 See above, Chapter 5, page 118n89. 
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words, a sufficient level of immigration could eliminate the problem of emigration from Canada to the 
United States.4  
The ICEM had evidently given the matter of Canadian immigration policy considerable thought.  
They suggested a precise target of 170,000 immigrants for 1955, a substantial increase over the postwar 
yearly average of 140,000.  The ICEM also noted understandingly the annual fluctuations in economic 
activity and employment levels in Canada that were caused by severe weather, and the demands for 
shipping during “tourist season” which made immigrant transport difficult:  “This results in the failure to 
achieve optimum performance.”  Such challenges, the ICEM concluded, suggested that Canada should be 
planning its immigration strategy “further in advance.”5  
It is evident that the ICEM was keenly interested in Canadian policy, and that the Canadian 
government was paying attention to their views.  A draft cabinet memorandum prepared for the minister 
in May 1955 noted a recent appeal from the ICEM concerning an initiative for “moving refugees from 
China,” and recommended that the minister seek approval for funds to be made available in support.6  The 
document also noted the continuing refugee crisis confronting the United Nations: “The High 
Commissioner for Refugees has under his mandate 300,000 refugees in Europe whose problems remain 
unsolved. Among them are 75,000 who are still living in camps in Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece.”  
A proposal had been submitted to the UN General Assembly to address the crisis by integrating refugees 
into their current countries of residence, at a projected cost of $16 million.  The Canadian delegation 
supported the idea, but emphasized that any contribution “would be influenced by the extent to which 
other governments were also prepared to make funds available.”7 
While these organizations raised potential policy concerns, other groups were making more 
immediate demands closer to home which had to be addressed.  First came a request from the government 
of Jamaica for the admission to Canada of Jamaican women to work as “domestic servants.”  Pickersgill 
took the matter to cabinet on May 5, 1955, no doubt recollecting the government’s difficulties with 
Canada’s Black community the previous year.  His colleagues acknowledged (with little apparent 
enthusiasm) that the existing restrictions on British West Indies immigration were “somewhat 
                                                          
4 “They’ve Got People to Spare And Canada Should Absorb More, Says Migration Council,” Financial Post, January 
15, 1955, 29. No byline appeared on this article; however, the ICEM identified its author as “Mr. Peter Newman.” 
[Jacobsen to Pickersgill, footnote 2 above]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records MG 32 B34 Vol. 62, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. 1954-
1957 (file no. 48), “Draft Memorandum for Cabinet. Confidential.” May 3, 1955. (There is no evidence that 
Pickersgill raised the matter in Cabinet.) 
7 Ibid., 2-3. 
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anomalous” given the agreements now in place with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.8  Approval was quickly 
granted for the proposal, “as a gesture of good will and in the interest of Canada’s important trade 
relations with Jamaica.”  It was modified to include 25 domestic workers from Barbados together with 75 
from Jamaica, and implemented in late 1955.9  So significant was the initiative to Canada’s Black 
community that a delegation from the Negro Citizenship Association travelled to Montreal to meet the 
first group of young women as they arrived.  It was, as Donald Moore recorded, “the first time that Negro 
migration of any kind to Canada has been planned.”  Moore also recognized the pressure on this group of 
young immigrants as “ambassadors” for future Caribbean immigration to Canada: “The part they play in 
the home may bring to Canadian businessmen the knowledge that, in these same parts, secretaries, 
stenographers, accountants and skilled mechanics may be found.”10 
In subsequent years the domestic worker program was expanded in numbers and to include 
workers from other Caribbean countries.11  Pickersgill recollected the initiative in his memoirs, with some 
pride, as the first change he made to immigration policy.  Other changes followed, modest in scope but 
humanitarian in nature.  The “automatic exclusion of Armenians and Lebanese as Asians” was formally 
eliminated.  Pickersgill also approved the installation of immigrant processing facilities in Greece, despite 
the political risk that Greek Communists might be inadvertently admitted to Canada.12  An April 1955 
Cabinet decision facilitated the return of any citizens of Japanese origin who had been repatriated to Japan 
after the war, thereby forfeiting their status as Canadian nationals and British subjects.13  Members of this 
group – approximately 600 in number – could return if they wished to do so, on humanitarian grounds 
although they did not otherwise fall within “admissible classes under existing regulations.”  Another 
change applied to immigrants from Yugoslavia and other Soviet satellite states, relaxing rules to permit 
                                                          
8 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 14344, May 6, 1955 “Immigration; admission of domestics from Jamaica,” LAC 
RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2657, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184. 
9 Ibid., Also: Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 14423, June 8, 1955, “ Immigration; admission of British West Indians 
for domestic service.” LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2658, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184. 
10 City of Toronto Archives, Fonds 431, File 1, Box 607200, Delegation to Ottawa: brief and background material, 
“Director’s report on the occasion of welcoming to Canada the first 100 Negro immigrant girls from Barbados and 
Jamaica, Montreal, November 3rd, 1955,” 4. 
11 A May 1956 Immigration Branch memorandum announced the extension of the program “to include Trinidad 
and British Guiana,” and increasing from the number of workers from 100 to 200: LAC Immigration Branch Records 
RG 76, vols. 940-941, Circulars (Unnumbered) Series A – 1956 Binder #24, part 2, “Subject – Domestics from BWI, 
Barbados, Trinidad and British Guiana”, May 28, 1956.  The decision was made in cabinet in March: Cabinet 
Conclusions, Item No. 14995, March 29, 1956, “Immigration; admission of coloured domestics,” LAC RG2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 5775, Microfilm Reel No. T-12185.  
12 PIckersgill, Seeing Canada Whole, 428. 
13 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 14301, April 20, 1955, “Japanese Immigration; return of former residents to 
Canada and special cases.” LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2657, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184. 
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entry to Canada of the parents or children of Canadian citizens of Slavic origin.14  Revisions to the 
Assisted Passage Loan Scheme, implemented in December, extended the availability of loans from single 
immigrants and the “heads” of families to all immigrants found to be “suitable, desirable, and 
adaptable.”15  Minutes of the Cabinet’s deliberation on this issue summarized the political dilemma which 
immigration continued to pose: 
On the whole, the majority of the population was against immigration most of the time unless it 
improved their own personal positions. On the other hand, there was a general feeling that the 
country should grow faster than it could grow without immigration.16 
   
Some of these policy revisions may have had minor significance individually. Collectively, 
however, they reveal a dichotomy between Pickersgill’s public statements and the policy directions he 
had begun to pursue.  It is also evident that some of these policy directions were taken against the advice 
of his officials.  A January 1955 Immigration Branch memorandum from Director C.E.S. Smith was 
particularly illustrative.  Responding to a request from his deputy minister that “some consideration” 
might be given to immigration agreements with British West Indian countries, similar to those in place 
with India, Ceylon, and Pakistan, Smith offered a brutally frank summation: 
It has long been the policy of this Department to restrict the admission to Canada of coloured or 
partly coloured persons. This policy has been based on unfavourable experience with respect to 
Negro settlements such as we have in Halifax, the generally depressed circumstances of the 
Negro in Canada and an understanding that the Canadian public, apart from certain minority 
groups, is not willing to accept any significant group of Negro immigrants.17         
 
Smith continued, disingenuously explaining that Blacks were not absolutely excluded under the 
regulations, and never had been. Those who were British subjects, US citizens, close relatives of 
Canadian residents, or who presented “cases of exceptional merit” were, at least technically, admissible.  
It was through careful application of “administrative controls,” Smith explained, that de facto exclusion 
had been maintained.  In an effort to appear balanced, Smith concluded with an outline of arguments both 
                                                          
14 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 14466, July 11, 1955, “Immigration policy; immigrants from Yugoslavia, the 
U.S.S.R. and satellite countries.” LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2658, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184. 
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16 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 14724, November 30, 1955, “Financial Measures to assist immigration.” LAC RG2, 
Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol 2659, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184. (One year later, the Assisted Passage 
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17 LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records MG 32 B34 Vol. 46, File 22 – I-2-1076, British West Indies 1953-1957, “A Review of 
Immigration from the British West Indies,” January 14, 1955, 1 
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for and against immigration agreements with British West Indian countries. Not surprisingly, the latter 
category was much lengthier: 
Argument Against an Immigration Agreement   
 
It is not by accident that coloured British subjects other than the negligible numbers from the 
United Kingdom are excluded from Canada. It is from experience, generally speaking, that 
coloured people in the present state of the white man’s thinking are not a tangible community 
asset, and as a result are more or less ostracized. Despite what has been said to the contrary, many 
cannot adapt themselves to our climatic conditions. To enter into an agreement which would have 
the effect of increasing coloured immigration to this country would be an act of misguided 
generosity since it would not have the effect of bringing about a worthwhile solution to the 
problem of coloured people and would quite likely intensify our own social and economic 
problem. I think that the biggest single argument against increasing coloured immigration to this 
country is the simple fact that the Canadian public is not prepared to accept them in any 
significant numbers.18 
 
Lest there be any confusion about his advice (which was unlikely) Smith concluded “that the 
disadvantages outweigh the advantages, and I would recommend that no action be taken in this regard this 
year.”   
Although Smith’s memorandum addressed a proposal for a general agreement between Canada 
and the British West Indies, it is reasonable to assume that Pickersgill would have received identical 
advice from his immigration director concerning “girls” for domestic service.  It is also clear that 
Pickersgill disregarded that advice.  For Canada’s Black community, the struggle for fairer immigration 
rules was in its infancy, and community leaders like Donald Moore remained justifiably critical.  Years 
later, however, a publication commemorating the 1954 Negro Citizens’ Association delegation to Ottawa 
explained that Moore and Pickersgill eventually grew to admire one another.  “On visits to Toronto, the 
immigration minister would call Mr. Moore to find out if there were any cases that needed his immediate 
attention.”19  Neither politics nor public opinion would permit major changes to immigration policy, but 
Pickersgill was at least prepared to make incremental adjustments to the rules, and to the nation’s 
‘fundamental character.’ 
Pickersgill once again disregarded the advice of his officials in July 1955, following 
correspondence from representatives of another ethnic community.  The Ukrainian Canadian Committee 
requested that “a suitable man” be dispatched to Europe, to identify Ukrainian refugees remaining in 
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Germany and Austria and to facilitate their immigration to Canada.20  Pickersgill referred the request to 
his deputy minister Laval Fortier, who immediately objected to the idea, fearing criticism or similar 
requests “from other groups.”21  Pickersgill, however, overruled, announcing his commitment to the 
mission.  Sending someone from within the Department, he reasoned, would ensure that the government 
retained “final control” over the project.  Pickersgill also directed that the emissary should “look at all 
people in the remaining camps in Europe and not merely those of the Ukrainian race.”22  Dr. V. J. Kaye, a 
Ukrainian-Canadian academic and civil servant currently working in the Citizenship Branch, was 
appointed to the task, and the decision was duly conveyed to an appreciative Ukrainian Canadian 
Committee.    
Kaye (whose actual name was Vladimir Kysilewsky) departed Canada on November 3, 1955.  
Accompanied by Donald Reid, the assistant director of Canadian immigration in the United Kingdom, he 
spent six weeks traveling through Europe, visiting camps in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland, 
and meeting with representatives of many refugee groups.  Immediately upon his return to Canada, Kaye 
submitted a detailed report of his findings and recommendations.  The statistics alone were staggering; ten 
years after the war some 22,000 refugees remained in Italy, more than 32,000 in Austria, and some 
247,000 in Germany.  “Conditions in all camps,” he reported, “were distressingly bad.”23  There were, 
however, a number of measures that could be taken to alleviate the problem, and Kaye’s 
recommendations documented these in detail.   
First, there was the problem of families that had become ‘split’ or separated, or whose emigration 
was prevented because of aged or disabled family members.  Here Kaye recommended a relaxation of 
“existing rigid regulations,” permitting separated families to reunite and allowing “weaker” family 
members to emigrate with their family so long as “sufficient guaranty” was made for their support.  Next, 
he urged a relaxation of rules applicable to refugees who had been convicted of minor criminal offences, 
many of which had involved theft of food or various black market activities.  Canadian health 
requirements, he continued, were perceived to be “unduly high [and] exacting” by camp authorities, 
refugee agencies, and the UNHCR.  “It would alleviate considerable hardship if Canadian medical 
authorities would accept applicants passed as healthy by local official medical authorities.”24   
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21 Ibid., “Memorandum to the Minister,” July 15, 1955. 
22 Ibid., Pickersgill to Fortier, July 18, 1955. 
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All of Kaye’s recommendations urged a more humanitarian policy approach.  He pointedly 
suggested that authorities should make better effort to inform relief agencies as changes were made to 
Canada’s immigration regulations, and about the availability of financial assistance from voluntary 
agencies to cover the costs of medical and x-ray examinations.  Kaye also noted that many refugees of 
Baltic, Ukrainian, and Russian origin had served in German army units during the war and had later 
misrepresented their military history in order to avoid repatriation to the Soviet Union.  Such conduct, he 
argued, “should not be held against them, provided they now make a true and correct statement.”25  
Mindful that the impetus for his mission had come from Canada’s Ukrainian community, Kaye appended 
to his recommendations a detailed summary focused on the Ukrainian populations in the European camps.  
He noted that the largest Ukrainian groups were in Germany and Austria, at 22,000 and 7,500 
respectively, with those living in Austria under the greatest danger of repatriation.  Kaye estimated that 
around 2% of the Ukrainian refugees in Germany now wished to emigrate to Canada, and approximately 
12% of those living in Austria.26   
Pickersgill acted swiftly on receiving Kaye’s report, referring it to his officials for review.  Not 
surprisingly, immigration director C.E.S. Smith (temporarily acting for Fortier as deputy minister) 
expressed reservations about several of Kaye’s recommendations.  While supportive of admission for 
refugees who had reliable sponsors to look after them, Smith opposed many of Kaye’s other suggestions.  
With “separated families,” the usual scenario was that some members had remained in Europe, unable to 
join relatives in Canada, on account of medical conditions.  Smith disagreed with the recommendation 
that such persons should be admitted so long as they were “well enough to travel and provided the head of 
the family has made adequate arrangements for their … maintenance.”27  Current procedures for such 
cases required approval from provincial authorities who would be responsible for providing medical 
treatment.  At most, Smith argued, immigration officials might be instructed to inform the heads of 
families in Canada about those procedures.  Any relaxation of the rules regarding criminal convictions 
was especially troubling to the senior bureaucrat: “I don’t think it was Parliament’s intention to grant their 
admission.”  Similarly, he foresaw problems with the admission of disabled refugees, warning that 
Canada already had “a number of amputation cases … for whom we find it difficult to obtain permanent 
employment.”28  
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Smith’s memorandum contains numerous hand-written margin notes bearing the initials JWP.  
Without exception, they indicated Pickersgill’s support for Dr. Kaye’s recommendations (over the 
objections of Smith and deputy minister Fortier) and they directed his officials to “get something going” 
on each one.  On February 16, 1956 Pickersgill wrote to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, setting out 
the policy decisions that had been implemented as a result of Kaye’s report, applicable to both sponsored 
and unsponsored refugees.  Permanent residents of Canada would now be permitted to apply “for the 
admission of any bona fide refugee, whether friend or relative,” and approval would be granted upon 
demonstration of satisfactory settlement and employment arrangements.  For separated-family cases, the 
government undertook to review all applications including those previously denied.  Refusals based upon 
medical conditions might now be reversed on receipt of confirmation from provincial health authorities 
that satisfactory arrangements were in place for treatment.  The Department was also prepared to review 
cases where admission had been denied by reason of some “relatively minor” criminal conviction, where 
the sponsor was a close relative of the prospective immigrant.  With regard to unsponsored immigrants, 
Pickersgill pointed out that the selection criteria had recently been relaxed to place less emphasis on 
“specific occupational qualifications.”  Lastly, the assisted passage program would be extended to offer 
benefits to dependents where, in the opinion of an officer, the head of the family was likely to secure 
employment quickly.29   
European refugees were not the only such group in need of the government’s attention in late 
1955.  A September memo from Fortier advised the minister of yet another urgent request, this time from 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, an organization created in 1949 to address the problem of 
Palestinian refugees.  Its officials, Fortier explained, were now asking “whether Canada would be 
prepared to accept a limited number of refugees as immigrants.”30  There were more than 900,000 
refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Gaza, he noted, most of whom were agricultural peasants.  
However, “It is not from these that immigrants would be selected, but among the fraction of refugees who 
have been taught in the English language and who have professional training and technical skills.”   
Despite this reassuring detail, Fortier immediately made his (and Smith’s) advice clear, perhaps 
anticipating his minister’s response: 
I have submitted this [request] to the Director of Immigration and in a memorandum dated 
September 15, he states: “I do not believe that encouragement should be offered in this regard and 
that Canada should continue as they have done in regard to the Shanghai refugees, i.e. in 
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supplying funds for their assistance rather than take any given number for resettlement here. 
Their ways of life are entirely different to ours and, no doubt, adjustment would take a 
considerable time. 
 
Unless there would be some advantages from an international point of view … I am inclined to 
agree with Mr. Smith. We have, a couple of years ago, accepted … a certain number of Greeks 
for open placement but we met some resistance from potential employers, and we could expect 
that employers would offer the same resistance for these Palestinian refugees.31 
 
Once again, Pickersgill’s senior officials were advising against any agreement to accept 
immigrants from a traditionally non-preferred group, and once again he disregarded their counsel.  A 
subsequent Branch memorandum summarized the progress of the initiative.  “It was decided that Canada 
could admit 100 Palestinian refugees and their dependents,” Fortier confirmed, “– about 300 to 400 
persons.”  Continuing his report, Fortier could not hide his own antipathy toward the initiative: 
This, of course, is on an experimental basis and the admission of an additional number dependent 
(sic) on the result. Selection is to be confined to Jordan and Lebanon as screening facilities are 
inadequate in Syria and Egypt. It was considered that they should be selected from among those 
with trades and skills most likely to find opportunity in Canada. A preferred occupational list has 
been sent to the Charge d’Affaires in Beirut.32  
 
Within the government, the main impetus for this initiative appears to have come from the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs.  “I should be grateful if you could give your earnest attention to 
this matter,” Lester Pearson wrote to Pickersgill on September 22, adding that the United States had 
already agreed to take 2,000 Palestinian refugees.  He continued:  
In view of our continuing financial assistance to the UNRWA, our increasing interests in the 
Middle East area and the sorry plight of the refugees, a token gesture by the Canadian 
Government would, I consider, have very beneficial results.33    
 
Unable to resist his senior colleague’s persuasion (or perhaps his charm) Pickersgill agreed to the 
plan. It is clear, however, that in this case the immigration minister shared the significant political 
reservations of his senior officials.  At Pickersgill’s insistence, the press release announcing the admission 
of Palestinian refugees to Canada came from the Department of External Affairs, not from Citizenship 
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and Immigration.34  And, as an August 1956 summary made clear, the final numbers were considerably 
smaller than the original request of 300 to 400: 
A large number [of refugees] had to be refused. … [I]n some cases the head of the family was 
over-age, [while others] were found to be suffering from trachoma or tuberculosis. 
 
When examinations were completed, a total of 98 individuals had been accepted … - 40 single 
persons and 13 heads of families with 45 dependents. Their occupations were welders, diesel and 
automotive mechanics, house painters, typists, etc. 
 
The first group of twenty-six persons, Smith acknowledged, arrived in April 1956, and “created a 
very favourable impression.”  By August the number had increased to thirty-eight.  The newcomers were 
carefully distributed among larger centres: Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, London, and Port Arthur, with the 
“remainder” expected to arrive over the ensuing months.  These reduced numbers, staggered arrival dates, 
and the wide dispersal of the Palestinian refugees throughout eastern Canada undoubtedly reassured the 
deputy minister and the immigration branch director that the risk of political damage had been 
minimized.35       
The precise demographic impact of the various policy changes and initiatives of 1955-56 cannot 
be measured.  (As noted earlier, Canada’s official immigration statistics did not distinguish refugees from 
other immigrant groups or even recognize refugees as a distinct category until 196936.)   Some insights, 
however, may be drawn from the published data.  For 1956 and 1957 immigrants entering from Germany 
increased in number to 26,061 and 28,430 (from 17,630 in 1955), suggesting that the government’s 
refugee initiative in that country brought some results.37  The number of immigrants born in Greece 
increased during the same period, from 2,927 in 1955 to 5,078 in 1956 and 5,464 in 1957.38  Similarly, 
immigrants of Yugoslavian origin increased to 5,771 in 1957, from 1,416 in 1955.39  The number of 
immigrants identified as “Negro” in origin increased slightly, from 414 in 1955 to 572 in 1956 and 723 in 
1957, a result of the “domestic service” program.40  An increase in immigrants of Jewish “origin” was 
also documented, from 1,660 in 1955 to 6,037 in 1957, although no record seems to have been made of 
the countries of origin for this group.  Surprisingly, however, both Ukrainian and Baltic (Estonian, 
                                                          
34 A hand-written margin note on the November 10 memo stated: “Let publicity come from External. JWP 10. XI. 
55.” (See footnote 30, above.) 
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36 See above, Chapter 3, page 46n2. 
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38 Ibid., 181, “Chart 5.- Birthplaces of Immigrant Arrivals 1955-57.” 
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Latvian, Lithuanian) immigration to Canada declined, or increased only slightly, during the years in this 
period.41    
By mid-1956, Pickersgill might have reflected with considerable satisfaction on his time as 
minister.  The parliamentary uproar of the previous year had passed, and the initiatives undertaken in 
response to various international pressures had been implemented without public furor.  The extensive 
bureaucracy he led had grown since 1950, but its costs (as they were presented to Parliament) appeared to 
be carefully contained.  His Department’s projected overall budget for 1956-7 of $9,160,832 represented 
a slight increase over the previous year’s $8,874,205, but remained far below the $20.5 million budgeted 
for the year 1950, when the department was established.42   
The Immigration Branch consisted of a main office with an annual budget of $850,000, and a 
much larger Administrative Services section containing three separate divisions.  The Admissions 
Division was broadly responsible for policy “relating to the admissibility of immigrants and non-
immigrants, implementation and control of the regulations and procedures dealing with admissions, 
appeals and deportation, [and] decisions on application by persons residing in countries where full 
immigration facilities are not available.”43  The Operations Division was charged with “the provision of 
inspection and office facilities and the management of field operations in the five immigration districts in 
Canada and the 20 offices abroad.”  It was also responsible for staff training, the development of 
operational policy and procedures for border inspection and overseas processing, performance standards, 
and discipline.44  The Settlement Division conducted surveys across Canada “to determine the need for 
and the opportunities available to newcomers.”  It assisted immigrants with their search for employment 
or to establish their own business, operating in conjunction with municipal and provincial authorities or 
agencies.45  
The third and largest component of the Immigration Branch’ operations was its Field and 
Inspection Service.  It had a budget for 1956-7 of slightly less than $6 million and was divided into two 
areas.  The mandate of the “Field and Inspection Service – Canada” was the “examination of all persons 
seeking entry into Canada and their admission or rejection in accordance with the provisions of the 
Immigration Act; for boards of inquiry; [and] for detention and deportation of undesirables.”  By 1956 
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there were 346 “officially designated ports of entry across Canada” (an increase from 269 in 1950), of 
which 124 were staffed by full-time immigration officers.”46  The other area was the “Field and 
Inspectional Service – Abroad.”  Its mandate included:  
the development and identification of the immigration potential through publicity by films, 
posters, lecture tours, office interviews and counselling; the selection of suitable and desirable 
immigrants; the civil and medical examination of immigrants and the issue of visas.47 
 
The Section maintained the Branch’s twenty overseas offices: London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Belfast, 
Dublin, Paris, Hanover, Karlsruhe, Brussels, Berne, Rome, Athens, Oslo, Copenhagen, The Hague, 
Vienna, Stockholm, New Delhi, Hong Kong, and Tel Aviv.  With this number of international locations, 
an annual budget (for 1956) of $1.8 million seemed modest; in any event it was less than one-third of the 
overall Field Service budget of $5,857,351.48 
Archival records for the Department of Citizenship and Immigration also document a near-
obsessive attention to controlling expenditures.  An October 1954 letter from his predecessor (and now 
finance minister) Walter Harris exhorted Pickersgill toward “renewed effort to achieve the greatest 
possible efficiency in the operational activities of the Government.”  Overall, Harris confided, 
government revenue levels were a cause for concern, and a deficit of some $200 million was anticipated 
for the current year.  Moreover, the increasing size of the civil service was receiving “a good deal of 
adverse publicity.”  Harris therefore requested his colleague’s “personal cooperation in examining all 
possibilities” for economy in his department’s operations.49 
It is probable that other cabinet ministers received similar communications at budget time.  
(Pickersgill received an almost identical letter a year later, in October 1955; this time, Harris attributed 
budgetary pressures to expenditures “of a relatively uncontrollable nature” such as old age security, 
family allowances, and tax rental payments to the provinces.50)  It is clear, however, that Pickersgill took 
the requests to heart, ensuring that yearly expenditures relating to immigration were scrupulously 
monitored and kept to an absolute minimum.  For example, briefing materials for his Department’s 1955 
estimates carefully noted that the replacement periods for staff uniforms were being extended.  
Henceforth, an immigration officer would be entitled to “1 summer and one winter suit … every second 
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year,” an overcoat “every fourth year,” and “2 uniform caps, one summer and one winter every second 
year.”51  For the 811 immigration officers eligible for uniforms in 1956, the Department submitted a 
budget item of $82,999, approximately $100 per officer.  Such parsimony appeared entirely consistent 
with the government’s perennial efforts to avoid both publicity and scrutiny of its immigration program.  
It was essential to avoid any appearance that the department was extravagant in its operations (or its 
employees excessively fashionable in their dress).          
As a topic of debate in Parliament, immigration had all but vanished by mid-1955 as other issues 
began to engage the attention of the opposition. A fractious debate over proposed amendments to the 
1951 Defence Production Act in June and July 1955 was one such issue which proved damaging to the 
government.  The amending bill proposed to continue indefinitely the operation of the Department of 
Defence Production, removing an expiry date for the department set by the original legislation.  The bill’s 
technical status as a “money bill,” allowed the opposition to seize an opportunity to filibuster the measure 
by unlimited debate.  Removing the expiry date would mean a continuation of the Act’s executive powers 
in respect of any contracts, materials, or services designated as essential for defence production purposes, 
and the opposition objected to the perpetuation of such broad “regulatory and requisitioning powers.”52  
Echoing the criticisms his party had directed toward Liberal immigration policy in 1949,53 Donald 
Fleming launched the debate, charging the government with arrogance, the pursuit of absolute power and 
the subjugation of Parliament.54  Pickersgill later speculated that he might have recognized the danger 
posed by this matter “if I had not been so fully absorbed in my own departmental difficulties in 
Parliament.”  As it was, however, “the government made every imaginable mistake” in its handling of the 
Defense Production bill.55  The resulting political damage was extensive.  More allegations of Liberal 
contempt for Parliament would damage the government during the bitter 1956 debate over the 
construction of the Trans-Canada Pipeline.   
Although the debate over immigration had subsided, there were still concerns confronting the 
government in 1956.  The major problem now was numerical: Canada’s annual immigration intake had 
shown an alarming decline since the postwar high of 194,400 in 1951, to 154,000 in 1954 and less than 
110,000 in 1955.56  The reasons for the trend were clear; improving economic conditions in Europe meant 
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a reduction in the number of people seeking to emigrate from Britain and from other traditionally 
‘preferred’ European countries.   
As in 1955, Cabinet records for 1956 show the government exploring several initiatives to 
address the problem of declining intake.  On May 4, Pickersgill confirmed the obvious to his colleagues: 
“The potential source of immigrants from Europe was drying up.”  In particular, a shortage of farm labour 
was now anticipated for the year, particularly in Ontario.  The mining industry was also experiencing 
labour shortages.  There was, however, a potential solution.  A “steady stream of refugees from East 
Germany” were currently making their way into West Germany and Austria.  Canada’s labour deficit 
could be quickly addressed, Pickersgill noted, “by dispensing with the normal procedures for security 
screening” for a period of about six weeks.  He reassured his colleagues that “[n]o publicity would be 
given to such action, of course, and the risk of getting planted communist agents in this short period 
seemed rather small.”  Undoubtedly the avoidance of publicity was also intended to minimize the risk of 
political fallout.  Cabinet quickly approved the proposal.57 
Two months later, immigration was back on the Cabinet’s agenda.58  This time, both the analysis 
of the issue and the proposals offered to address it were more detailed.  The recent reduction in intake, 
Pickersgill now explained, was not solely attributable to improved conditions in Europe.  There had also 
been extensive “adverse publicity given abroad to employment conditions in Canada” in 1954-5 by 
“individuals or organizations only interested in migration … for commercial or other needs.”  Another 
factor was “the more complete social security benefits available in most European countries.”  The 
minister recommended a number of measures to address the problem, beginning with the creation of four 
new immigration offices in Britain and France.  A full-time officer would also be posted in Spain, to 
handle applications from that country and from Portugal.  Overseas advertising would be re-invigorated 
by having the Department take over all responsibility for publicity currently being carried out by 
transportation company agents.  Invitations would be extended to European government officials, 
journalists, and agricultural representatives, to visit Canada and explore opportunities available to 
immigrants, especially in agriculture.  These proposals, however, did not receive immediate support.  
Concerned that their international implications “had not been discussed with any foreign government,” 
the cabinet deferred any decision “pending consideration … by the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs.”59  One week later, Cabinet approved the plan after receiving assurance that the External Affairs 
                                                          
57 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 15018, May 4, 1956, “Financial Measures to assist immigration.” LAC RG2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 2659, Microfilm Reel No. T-12184 
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minister had no objection “in principle,” but stipulated that Pearson should continue to be consulted on 
“the details.”60 
As the government contemplated immigration policy for 1957, it had reason to be optimistic.  
Pickersgill reported that immigrant arrivals for 1956 had increased substantially over the previous year.  
He attributed the increase to several factors, including “knowledge of Canada’s buoyant economy, the 
broadening of selection criteria, the extension of … the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme … and increased 
promotional activity.”61  Having concluded that Canada could absorb more immigrants than could 
possibly be recruited for 1957, the Cabinet established no numerical target for the year.  Selection criteria 
and financial assistance programs would remain unchanged, with “promotional and recruiting activity 
intensified where possible.”62  A confidential memorandum summarized the details agreed upon by 
cabinet on October 25.  Most notably, selection criteria would be maintained from 1956, which meant that 
“immigrants [would] be selected primarily because of their general suitability, desirability and 
adaptability.”63  A further initiative implemented in early November proposed a relaxation of the rules 
applicable to the sponsorship of immigrants by employers.  (Current sponsorship rules required 
employers to have “personal knowledge” of the qualifications of persons they proposed to sponsor. This 
restrictive condition was removed.64)  Communications with immigration staff at “Posts Abroad” advised 
that other branches of government would also participate in the expanded recruitment effort: “The Deputy 
Minister of the Department of Trade and Commerce will be instructing Canadian Trade Commissioners, 
in the countries in which you are located, to take a more active part in the promotion of immigration to 
Canada.”65  Whether this more open approach would have proved permanent, or a temporary aberration, 
cannot be known, as within a matter of days international developments would dramatically alter the 
course of immigration policy for 1957.   
By late 1956, Pickersgill considered the government’s cautious, methodical approach to 
immigration a success.  His correspondence revealed his continuing commitment to the policy principles 
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set out by Mackenzie King a decade earlier.66  And like his former chief, Pickersgill paid careful attention 
to the opinions directed toward his department, not hesitating to provide detailed responses even to 
critical writers.  Never inclined to shy away from a lively exchange of views, Pickersgill’s 
correspondence shows him endeavouring to win over the skeptics and critics one by one.  “I could not, of 
course, agree with you,” he admonished one concerned citizen who suggested that crime rates were 
highest among newcomers.67  To another, he affirmed the government’s commitment to giving 
“considerable preference” to immigrants from Britain, but explained that it was often difficult to find 
British immigrants who were willing to accept “the less agreeable jobs that have to be done.”68  Another 
writer, concerned that “very little is done to assist new arrivals in Canada, received a detailed (three page) 
response outlining the services provided by his department and by the National Employment Service.  
Another received a detailed account of the revised selection criteria implemented for 1956.69   
Like Mackenzie King (but unlike Louis St. Laurent) Pickersgill appeared to pay careful attention 
to the correspondence he received for what it told him of public opinion.  Among those who wrote was an 
old friend, imploring “Dear Jack” to stand firm against any idea of West Indian immigration.  Arthur 
Lower deviously invoked an argument that he knew would resonate with Pickersgill: “[A]s Mr. King used 
to say, people who try to do good cause more harm in the world than those who simply try to avoid evil.”  
Allowing Blacks into Canada, Lower warned, would only perpetuate the myth that “if we are all tolerant 
enough unlike groups can get along together.”70   
Old prejudices obviously died hard.  But Lower’s exclusionist views were by no means unique.  
A March 1956 memorandum from the National Liberal Federation summarized for Pickersgill the views 
expressed by Canadians in a recent CIPO/Gallup poll.  The poll’s premise was convoluted, but there was 
no mistaking its results: “Canadian voters who … are split between those who give general approval to 
Canada’s immigration policies, and those who disapprove, show greater unanimity when given a chance 
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to vote on discriminatory immigration.”71  The question put to respondents, and the results, were very 
clear: 
“At the present time, it is harder for people of some countries to get into Canada than it is for 
others. Do you approve or disapprove of this policy?” 
 
                                          Approve:      59% 
                                          Disapprove:  24% 
                                          No opinion:  17%72 
 
In some regions of the country, approval for this stated policy was even greater.  (The report specifically 
identified the Maritime provinces here.)  Such data almost certainly guaranteed that there would be no 
relaxation of admission restrictions on those immigrant groups traditionally viewed as least-preferred, in 
the foreseeable future.  
With an election looming in 1957, Pickersgill planned a trip to Europe in November 1956.  The 
pretext would be visits to Canada’s immigration offices in Amsterdam, Paris, and England, and his 
attendance at the official opening of a new office at Cologne.  The itinerary also included a leisurely 
weekend in the south of France, visiting old friends from the minister’s Oxford days.  In early November, 
however, the eruption of international crises in Egypt (over the Suez Canal) and in Hungary forced 
Pickersgill to cancel his trip.  As an emergency session of Parliament convened and the government 
contemplated its response to both situations, Pickersgill’s presence was required in Ottawa. 
Both the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising would have significant implications for Canadian 
immigration.73   It was the latter crisis, however, which presented the most immediate concern for 
Pickersgill’s department.  The Hungarian revolution began in October with a series of demonstrations in 
support of recent anti-Soviet protests in Poland.  As the uprising escalated, Hungary’s communist 
government collapsed and was briefly replaced by a more liberal administration.  On November 4, Soviet 
troops invaded, crushing the revolt and installing a new Soviet-backed government.  Several thousand 
Hungarians were killed in the ensuing conflict, and some 200,000 fled into Austria as refugees.  
Immediately there were calls for the international community to help alleviate the refugee crisis 
confronting Austria. 
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The government’s initial reaction to the crisis was restrained.  Speaking on November 13 to the 
Liberal Businessmen’s Club in Toronto, Pickersgill mostly confined himself to generalities, reviewing the 
year’s increased numbers in immigrants from Britain and the U.S.  The Hungarian situation was 
secondary; the government had contributed $100,000 to Red Cross relief efforts and made available an 
R.C.A.F. airplane to carry supplies.  Another $100,000 had been given to the UN High Commission for 
Refugees.  As for any Hungarians who might seek refuge in Canada, Pickersgill confirmed that the 
government would “make the necessary administrative arrangements” to deal with all applications that 
might be received.  He pronounced himself “hopeful” that Canada might get some “new settlers from 
among these refugees,” but cautioned his audience against too much optimism.  Thus far, he explained, 
most of the refugees were “women and children and old people … [who were] not in a position to decide 
right away” whether to undertake the challenge of relocation to a new country.74   
The government’s level of engagement with the Hungarian crisis escalated gradually during 
November.  In the emergency session of Parliament, opposition members demanded a response, moving 
an amendment to the session’s throne speech castigating the government’s failure to take “adequate action 
to extend refuge to the patriots of Hungary.”75  Now on the defensive, on November 26 Pickersgill 
summarized the actions which the government had taken.  During the first week or more of the crisis 
there was little to be done, as few refugees had begun to contemplate permanent relocation.  During that 
period, Pickersgill explained, “I issued instructions to our office in Vienna that priority was to be given to 
applications from these Hungarian refugees.”  He also arranged for additional staff to be transferred to 
Vienna if needed.  When in mid-November it became apparent that some refugees were indeed interested 
in Canada, an offer had been extended to send Canadian immigration staff into the refugee camps, but the 
Austrian government had declined, preferring to control the process by identifying those wishing to 
emigrate and directing them to the Canadian authorities.  Pickersgill acceded, but instructed his 
immigration staff that assisted passage was to be offered to anyone who wanted to come to Canada 
“without regard to what means he had.”  Ordinary application procedures – medical examinations, x-rays, 
and administrative paperwork – had been suspended to facilitate the movement of refugees.76    
As the magnitude of the crisis grew, Pickersgill’s activities moved beyond issuing instructions to 
program staff.  He contacted Canada’s two major airline carriers, along with shipping companies, to 
mobilize all available transportation capacity in a mass ‘airlift.’  Realizing that shelter and settlement 
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challenges would be enormous once refugees began to arrive, he arranged to bring together social 
agencies and the representatives of provincial departments interested in immigration matters.77  He then 
reinstated his own travel plans, re-scheduling a flight to Europe for November 30 following the end of the 
parliamentary session.  Still, some prompting was needed to direct his focus away from England and 
France and toward Vienna.  “I have been wondering,” Norman Robertson, Canada’s High Commissioner 
in London gently suggested, “whether … you should … go straight to Vienna … before coming to 
London.”  It was important, Robertson explained, that  
[T]he emphasis in publicity attending your visit should be on the refugee aspect of immigration 
rather than ordinary emigration from the United Kingdom to Canada which is going on pretty 
satisfactorily and can only be helped by wider information about the welcome and opportunity 
Canada is ready to give the refugees.78 
 
The minister’s itinerary, which initially did not include any time in Austria, was revised accordingly 
(although the weekend in the south of France remained on it).79 
Upon his arrival in Europe, Pickersgill grasped the enormity of the challenge which confronted 
him and assumed direct operational command.  Departmental directives immediately began to issue, 
notifying Immigration Branch staff of decisions already taken and setting out the administrative 
components of the initiative.80  A special “Hungarian Refugee Section” was created in the Immigration 
Branch headquarters to deal with the project.81  The magnitude and the political importance of the 
initiative were carefully explained to immigration staff: 
It is expected that the Hungarian refugee movement to Canada may be more than 30,000 persons 
in … the next four or five months. This estimate is not to be given publicity but inquirers may be 
informed that we expect a substantial movement of refugees into this country.82 
 
Staff were also cautioned that some refugees were expected to be ill or distressed, and unable to undertake 
employment immediately. “There will, therefore, be both short and long term problems associated with 
this movement.”  Numerous volunteer agencies were also being mobilized to help.83 
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Several volumes of Pickersgill’s files related to the Hungarian refugee initiative have recently 
been opened for the first time.  They document the administrative details of a massive undertaking, and 
Pickersgill’s direct coordinating role.  First, there was the logistical challenge of securing passage for the 
refugees (by rail or air) from Vienna to various European ports and airports, and onward to Canada.  The 
minister personally negotiated many of these arrangements, confirming them in writing.  His 
memorandum of agreement with G.W.G. McConachie, President of Canadian Pacific Airlines, provided 
one example:  
The Government of Canada, represented by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, requests 
Canadian Pacific Airlines Limited, to charter, and Canadian Pacific agrees to charter to the 
Government of Canada a minimum of five flights during the month of December 1956, between 
Vancouver, Canada and Vienna, Austria, for the purpose of transporting Hungarian refugees … to 
Vancouver. 
 
Canadian Pacific shall be paid the sum of $2.75 per statute mile.84 
 
Similar negotiations were concluded with other organizations.  For example, a cable from 
Pickersgill confirmed an agreement whereby the ICEM in Geneva would “take over arrangements” to 
transport 800 refugees departing for Canada on January 6, and a further 1,000 later in January.85  The role 
to be undertaken by the Canadian provinces also had to be clarified.  (A November 30 letter from the 
prime minister to the provincial premiers had initially broached that matter.86)  And in one of the 
initiative’s best-known outcomes, Pickersgill called upon his personal contacts among Canadian 
businesses and universities to secure employment and academic placements for Hungarian refugees who 
were university students or faculty members.87   
As with all immigration matters, there were political concerns to be managed.  There were 
interviews, meetings, and public appearances to make while in Europe, to ensure recognition for the 
initiative both internationally and at home.  (At the outset of the trip, a preparatory memorandum had 
carefully noted that “Austrian Radio, Television and Federal Press Service have undertaken coverage,” 
and the CBC was doing likewise.88  This was crucial; only favourable press coverage could ensure a 
favourable public response in Canada to the initiative.)  And there were the domestic problems presented 
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by opposition criticism (now increasingly emanating from the provincial level), and by public 
ambivalence toward immigrants which never completely subsided. 
Pickersgill’s adroit handling of these political issues, both at home and abroad, was perhaps as 
noteworthy as the initiative’s humanitarian nature and scope.  In Cologne, he flattered his German hosts 
“with words of high appreciation for the German immigrants who were very much liked in Canada.”89  
Then, in a series of political and diplomatic master-strokes, he negotiated arrangements with European 
countries that would avoid a perennial domestic problem: 
In order to relieve the situation in the refugee camps in Austria and at the same time to avoid 
overloading the reception machinery in Canada, … I made arrangements … whereby Canada 
agrees to accept 8,000 refugees from the United Kingdom and France after April 1 on the 
understanding those countries take an additional equivalent number immediately.  Arrangements 
were made in the Netherlands also to hold until Spring 2,000 Hungarian refugees.90 
 
This plan benefitted all parties, relieving some of the immediate pressure on Austria and permitting other 
countries to contribute without making long-term commitments.  But most importantly for Pickersgill, it 
delayed the arrival in Canada of thousands of refugees until the following spring, thereby addressing the 
chronic concern that immigration should always be curtailed in wintertime due to seasonal employment 
fluctuations. 
With the provinces, the political issues were especially challenging.  Several, including 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, responded quickly and positively to the prime minister’s call for support.  
Ontario, however, presented concerns.  On November 28, prior to Pickersgill’s departure for Europe, 
Conservative Premier Leslie Frost grandly announced the marshalling of “all the resources of Ontario” in 
response to the Hungarian crisis.  Frost had been distancing himself from the federal Liberals in recent 
months, anticipating the possibility of a more favourable relationship in the event of a change of 
government in Ottawa.  Now he saw political opportunity in Ottawa’s hesitant initial response to events in 
Hungary, and vowed his province “will not wait for Hungarians to be processed by other organizations.”  
Skilled provincial representatives, including recruiters and interpreters, would be dispatched immediately 
to Europe under the leadership of the Province’s Agent-General in England.  “Canadians,” Frost declared, 
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“cannot continue to sit on their hands.”91  It seemed that there would there be no limits to Ontario’s 
largesse in response to the refugee matter. 
There was no mistaking the message within Frost’s remarks, and his government continued to 
claim full credit in December.  Welcoming a group of Hungarian refugees in Toronto, Planning and 
Development Minister William Nickle announced that their flight and reception in Toronto were made 
possible “by the humane and understanding thinking on the part of the prime minister of Ontario, the 
Honourable Leslie Frost.”92  For Pickersgill, the provincial attitude was especially galling because it bore 
no resemblance to the positions being advanced in private.  In November, Frost’s government had 
undertaken to establish a reception facility in Toronto, and to ensure that medical and nursing facilities 
were available for arriving refugees.  By February, however, Ontario was complaining about its ‘capital 
expenditures’ for the initiative, now expected to reach $636,000 by March, and demanding that the 
federal government should reimburse 75% of those costs.93  
An irate Pickersgill responded to Frost following his return from Europe.  The federal 
government had been clear from the outset that the relief effort would only succeed with “all the help we 
can get from everyone able to help us.”94  He reminded Frost that “Mr. Nickle had given me repeated 
indications” that Ontario would accept the reimbursement being offered to all provinces who received 
refugees,” namely $3.00 per day for each person, for accommodation and food:  
This is what we are doing … in the case of any other province which has provided such facilities 
and also in the case of certain public-spirited organizations which have done the same. It is 
obvious that we would not be justified in paying any higher rate to the government of Ontario 
than we are paying to other governments or public-spirited organizations.95     
 
Ottawa, Pickersgill confirmed, was also prepared to reimburse the provincial government for any 
expenditures made on clothing for refugees.  For any who were indigent and in need of hospital care, the 
federal government would reimburse all such costs during the first year, “if the province will in turn 
undertake the full care of all refugees settled in the province at the end of the first year.”96  Although 
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Pickersgill’s files contain no further response from Frost, the provincial premier had no alternative but to 
accept the federal ‘offer.’  Undoubtedly his relationship with Diefenbaker continued to grow closer. 
Pickersgill’s leadership of Canada’s response to the Hungarian crisis was his greatest 
achievement as immigration minister – “as useful as anything I did in public life”97 – and he rightfully 
deserved much credit for the success of the initiative.  (On January 25, 1957, he provided a detailed 
summary to Parliament of his decisions and activities while in Europe.98)   He did not, of course, complete 
the entire project single-handedly.  Parliament acted with near unanimity to approve supply motions of 
$1,000,000, in November 1956, and a further $9,000,000 in January 1957.99  Individual cabinet members 
utilized their provincial contacts to secure university placements for refugees in British Columbia, 
Manitoba, and Toronto; collectively, they granted Pickersgill full discretion to take any action he deemed 
necessary, regardless of cost.  Politically, this was a bold approach.  Finance minister Walter Harris had 
carefully budgeted for a small surplus for the election year ahead, but nevertheless immediately supported 
the carte blanche approval: “Harris said it was the right thing to do, and that whatever the cost, he would 
support me.”100   
Vital support for the initiative also came from beyond the cabinet.  Provincial governments, 
universities, and some private corporations offered resources and support, as did many community groups 
and church organizations, helping especially with settlement activities.  “We have had the most 
magnificent co-operation from voluntary organizations all over this country,” Pickersgill acknowledged, 
“and I cannot speak too highly of them.”101  A final component – vitally important but barely recognized, 
even in Pickersgill’s accounts – was the work performed by immigration branch officers and staff.  The 
minister directed the redeployment of some overseas staff to Vienna and other European cities to process 
the refugees bound for Canada.  Seventeen officers were dispatched from Canada to London alone.  
Several former immigration branch employees have provided brief and modest accounts of the effort 
involved in the project.  As one member of the minister’s office staff recalled: “Everyone in the 
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department engaged in the movement, from the Minister down to the most junior clerk, worked around 
the clock for four full months.”102   
Unfortunately, details of the contributions of program staff seem to have been lost to history.  A 
proper record of them might support the recollections of one former officer who described a gradual 
transformation within the immigration bureaucracy in the decade following World War Two.  During that 
period, the officer recalled, immigration staff “worked directly with those most interested in immigration 
– immigrants and their families – and we began to understand the human values inherent in our work.”103  
These brief insights into the enthusiastic role played by immigration branch staff suggest  that by the time 
of the Hungarian crisis, the ‘gatekeeper’ mentality of Blair, Joliffe, and others, had begun to disappear 
from Canada’s immigration bureaucracy. 
Canada’s twenty-second Parliament was prorogued on April 12, 1957 and an election was called 
for June 10.  As the campaign began, the government directed overseas immigration staff to reduce the 
flow of refugees into Canada.  The “very heavy influx” early in the year was now causing concern, given 
the “possibilities that some will have difficulties in obtaining employment in the fall.”  Open placement 
visas would be discontinued after July 31, and Hungarian refugee admissions would be limited to those 
sponsored by Canadian residents, or to cases of “exceptional merit.”104  
Whether economic considerations factored in this decision, old and familiar political concerns 
almost certainly provided the primary impetus.  Although immigration from Britain increased 
exponentially in the aftermath of Suez, the British immigrants had come under normal application 
procedures which were suspended for the Hungarians refugees.  As Pickersgill later acknowledged, the 
government “anticipated criticism that [it] was more concerned about Hungarians than British 
immigrants”.105  And as Fortier reminded External Affairs undersecretary Jules Leger, “we have to take 
into consideration the Canadian public opinion” which had always favoured immigrants from Britain, 
France, and northern Europe.  Public support for the Hungarian refugees, so strong early in the year, was 
now declining even among Hungarian-Canadian employers.106  We must recognize, Fortier cautioned, 
“that a refugee differs from an ordinary immigrant in that he has not prepared … or chosen to immigrate.”  
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Integration for refugees, therefore, “is expected to be long and difficult.”  In short, the dramatic increase 
in immigration numbers over previous years was raising significant political concerns, especially with an 
election campaign underway. As so often in the past, turning off the tap seemed the most prudent strategy.  
Nevertheless, in its final act concerning immigration policy, the government made one contrary decision, 
applicable to non-refugees; the quota established under Canada’s 1951 agreement with India was revised 
to increase the number of admissions from 150 per year to 300.107 
The long-term impact of the Hungarian initiative on immigration policy is difficult to precisely 
assess.  Following the election, the new government immediately reduced immigrant admissions, and 
would continue to do so throughout its term in office.  Had the Liberals been returned, however, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the lessons of the Hungarian experience would have been more impactful, 
notwithstanding the April decision to reduce the refugee intake.  Canada’s 1957 intake of 282,164 
immigrants (including more than 37,000 Hungarian refugees) was the highest since 1913.108  It affirmed 
the economic analyses that had long argued that the nation’s absorptive capacity was greater than many 
believed, and demonstrated that significant numbers could be absorbed even in periods of declining 
economic growth or reduced employment.  Overall, as one scholar noted, “the Hungarian movement 
might have created a breakthrough in Canadian immigration management from 1957 onwards, but the 
opportunity was allowed to slip away.”109              
The defeat of the Liberal government in 1957 astonished millions of Canadians.  Among post-
election analyses of the results, immigration policy received little attention.  It had not been a major 
campaign issue.  As we shall see, Diefenbaker did make extravagant campaign promises about the 
immigration policies his government would pursue, and these were carefully noted by his opponents.  
However, as with so much of Diefenbaker’s rhetoric, the Liberal government – to its eventual detriment – 
had long since ceased to take him seriously.  “I could not help reflecting,” Pickersgill recollected, “how 
easy it was for the Opposition to take opposite positions on Immigration. While Diefenbaker talked about 
non-discrimination, Fulton and Churchill complained there was not enough discrimination in favour of 
British immigration.”110   
A memorandum to the minister, dated June 10, 1957 and likely written by Fortier, recommended 
that the decisions implemented in April concerning the Hungarian refugee movement should be continued 
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for the remainder of the year.  In fact, Fortier reported, intake from “all countries” should now be 
restricted: 
There is a number of Hungarian refugees who really cause difficulties to officials of the 
Immigration Branch and National Health. Some refuse to leave hostels or centres, others refuse to 
accept employment, while others refuse to remain in hospital and accept treatment.”111 
 
Fortier recommended further restrictions, extending even to “close relative” placements, and the creation 
of a new ‘priority’ system of selection criteria.  The concerns outlined in his memorandum suggested that 
perhaps the April decision to curtail the refugee movement was justified – at least politically.  It also 
showed that the possibility of an electoral upset had not crossed the deputy minister’s mind.   
A hand-written note in the margin of Fortier’s memo indicated the minister’s response: “As 
policy considerations are involved, I feel the decision should be left to my successor. JWP, 14.VI.57.”                  
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The Diefenbaker Years, 1957-1963: 
Inspiring Vision and Lost Opportunity 
 
Immigration was one issue on John Diefenbaker’s mind as he launched his party’s 1957 election 
campaign.  In his opening speech at Toronto’s Massey Hall, Diefenbaker pledged his government to “a 
vigorous immigration policy to bring to Canada immigrants with needed skills and resources.”  To do 
this, he continued, “We will revise the Immigration Act and Regulations. We will overhaul its 
administration to ensure that humanity will be considered and put an end to the bureaucratic 
interpretations which keep out from Canada many potentially good citizens.”1 
As the campaign proceeded, the Conservative leader elaborated on his immigration vision.  At 
Vancouver in May, he promised a more “expansive” policy while acknowledging that immigration “must 
be in numbers which can be absorbed economically without interfering with those who are in the 
country.”  Then came an additional detail.  “Experience had shown,” Diefenbaker announced, “that the 
maximum possible was about four per cent of the total population.”2  During another campaign 
appearance, Diefenbaker revealed the source of the “experience” to which he had alluded.  The recent 
policies pursued by the government of Australia, he explained, had “produced the conclusion” that just 
under four percent of that country’s total population could be absorbed each year through immigration.  
“Such a yardstick applied to Canada would establish a target of 640,000 immigrants in a year, or more 
than four times the number that came to Canada in 1956.”3 
Whether Diefenbaker had seriously considered this extraordinary suggestion, or intended to 
implement it, cannot be determined.  There is no record of any comparative economic analysis 
demonstrating how the experience of another country might apply to Canada.  Nor, it seems, had the idea 
of an annual immigration target equal to four percent of the country’s population been subjected to 
serious study.  But the promise of a “vast and humane” immigration policy resonated, and its inference – 
that Liberal policy had been neither – was unmistakable.  The idea fit easily within the inspiring vision of 
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national development which Diefenbaker presented throughout the campaign.4  Whatever his pre-election 
intentions had been, however, Diefenbaker adopted a very different approach after taking office in June.   
The task of forming a cabinet presented an immediate challenge for the new prime minister.  
“Looks to me as if I have to compose a cabinet of my enemies,” he confided to an astonished colleague.5  
Apparently one such enemy was E. Davie Fulton, a long-time Parliamentary colleague who had recently 
contested the leadership of the Conservative party against him.  (Diefenbaker won easily on the first 
ballot; Fulton finished a distant third.)  Following an awkward negotiation during which he was offered – 
and declined – the role of Speaker, Fulton became minister of justice.  He was also appointed the “acting” 
minister of citizenship and immigration. 
No explanation appears to have been given for this curious acting designation.  (In his memoirs, 
Diefenbaker suggested that he believed modern cabinets had grown too big.6)  Was the suspicious prime 
minister punishing his ambitious young adversary, or simply ensuring that he would be too busy to pose 
any further threat?  Whatever the rationale, Fulton’s “acting” status hardly signalled plans to forge ahead 
with the bold new policy which Diefenbaker had described during the campaign.  When we recall the 
onerous administrative burdens which immigration placed directly upon the department’s minister, the 
appointment seems even more incomprehensible.  
A July 26, 1957 press release announced the new government’s first policy decision on 
immigration.  The Hungarian refugee movement had been reviewed, and the number of refugees accepted 
in Canada was now predicted to surpass 34,000 by August.  The announcement pointed out that this 
number would exceed the 33,305 Hungarian refugees admitted by the United States.  It also noted “the 
very heavy intake of immigrants through normal channels” early in the year.  The “winter accommodation 
situation” in Canada presented an additional concern.  Given these circumstances, “it has been decided to 
continue the refugee program on a somewhat modified basis for the balance of 1957.”  Only those 
refugees sponsored by close relatives or by employers would be admitted.  In other words, the restrictions 
imposed in April by the previous government would remain in effect for the remainder of the year.  
Further restrictions would be applied to non-refugee immigrants:  
In order to keep the total … within the absorptive capacity of our economy and the availability of 
housing accommodation, immigrants coming for open placement, i.e., those with no pre-arranged 
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contract, in most occupations have been issued visas only for arrival in Canada before July 31st, 
1957.7 
The cabinet deliberation which preceded this announcement took place on July 9, some two 
weeks after the government took office.  There Fulton explained that in 1956, a general optimism about 
economic and employment conditions had informed the Liberals’ immigration strategy for 1957.  The 
results, however, largely due to the Suez and Hungarian crises, were now raising concern.  “Unless 
something were done to retard the movement of immigrants, it was estimated that the total for the year 
might exceed 300,000, which would be an all-time record.”8  In his alarm over that prospect, the acting 
minister apparently comprehended neither the inaccuracy of this statement nor the irony in it.  (Immigrant 
intake had indeed exceeded 300,000 in several years earlier in the century, and in the election campaign 
recently concluded, Diefenbaker had proposed even higher levels.)  After a rambling discussion (during 
which cabinet ministers acknowledged that “the long-term interests of Canada resided in a higher rather 
than lower flow of immigrants”) Fulton’s proposal to curtail immigration for the remainder of 1957 was 
approved.  The minutes of this cabinet meeting recorded no comment from the prime minister.9 
The retreat from the campaign vision continued on July 25, when Fulton reported an inquiry from 
the Toronto Star that was causing obvious discomfort: What would be the government’s policy on 
immigration from Ghana?  (The former British colony had recently achieved independence within the 
Commonwealth.)  Fulton’s response, as he explained to his colleagues, had been equivocal: 
The problem of immigration from there could not, of course, be looked at alone. It had to be 
looked at in conjunction with immigration from other prospective Commonwealth countries 
having coloured populations, such as Malaya, the British West Indies, etc. In reply to the query he 
had merely stated that the whole matter of Canadian immigration policy was now under review.10 
 
The prime minister, recently returned from a Commonwealth first ministers’ conference, now 
joined the discussion.  While in London, Diefenbaker informed his cabinet, he had received assurances 
that the “coloured” members of the Commonwealth were unlikely to make an issue of Canadian policy so 
long as restrictions were made “on the grounds that these people could not be readily assimilated into the 
Canadian economy and way of life and not on the grounds that they were coloured people.”11  
Diefenbaker offered no insight as to how such dissimulation could possibly be expected to satisfy 
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“coloured” commonwealth members.  Nor did he recall that before departing for the conference in June, 
he had planned “to assure the non-white peoples of the Commonwealth of reasonable advancement and 
equal opportunities.”12  Only weeks removed from his June election victory, Diefenbaker’s “vast and 
humane” immigration strategy was rapidly dissipating, with no alternative policy under consideration.  
The indirection continued through the autumn, culminating in December when Fulton raised in 
cabinet the issue of immigration policy for 1958.  A “departmental advisory committee,” he reported, had 
reviewed the country’s “employment situation” for the coming year.  Its deliberations now estimated a 
“receptive capacity” for between 180,000 and 200,000 immigrants in 1958.  But there were other factors 
making the situation uncertain.  For example, there was now a “strong possibility” of a reduced supply of 
immigrants from countries which Canada had traditionally favoured.  Also, “reports of adverse economic 
conditions in Canada during the coming winter months” might discourage migration.   
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, Fulton proposed a target number of between 175,000 and 
180,000 for the year.  He also recommended that the government continue to apply the selection criteria 
utilized by the previous government in 1956.  Sensing hesitancy around the cabinet table, Fulton 
emphasized that a decision was needed: “Immigration officers overseas had been waiting for instructions 
for over two months. In order to make their plans for the coming year, [t]ravel companies would also wish 
to know about the programme as soon as possible.”  Despite Fulton’s urging, the cabinet dithered.  
Perhaps there were compelling arguments in favour of high intake levels, but would it not be “wise to 
consider the effect on the Canadian public” of announcing such a plan?13  The discussion teetered back 
and forth.  Any decision could generate criticism; labour might complain of immigrants taking jobs from 
Canadians, whereas any move to curtail intake could be seen as a lack of confidence in the economy.  
Under the circumstances, was there really “a necessity for any declaration at all?”  Why not postpone any 
decision “until, say, the month of April, when more would be known about the economic situation and 
plans could be made for the balance of the year?”14   
That was exactly what the government decided to do.  There would be no decision on 
immigration targets, and certainly no policy announcement, until the following year.  Departmental 
records from the winter of 1957-8 reflect the indecision of the period and the resulting lack of direction 
for Immigration Branch staff.  One memorandum endeavoured to summarize “Activities and 
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Achievements” in immigration since June 1957.  The list was short; a review of policies and procedures 
was underway, examining such items as “security screening, medical policy … and Chinese 
immigration.”  A parliamentary sub-committee had also been struck, but it had ceased operations with the 
dissolution of Parliament in January and “did not reconvene following the election of March 31, 1958.”15  
A January 1958 Immigration Branch bulletin attempted to provide guidance to immigration officers on 
selection criteria but it, too, revealed the extent of the directional confusion:  
Although indications are that the Canadian economy on the whole will continue in a healthy state 
during 1958, there will be greater than usual competition for jobs in the spring as a result of this 
winter’s large number of unemployed. It is, therefore, impossible to estimate with any certain 
degree of accuracy the number of immigrant workers that can be absorbed this year.16 
 
Another memorandum informed staff that “Immigration regulations, policies and procedures are now 
being reviewed,” adding (somewhat superfluously) that “until a final decision has been reached it will be 
necessary to review each case … in accordance with present practice.”17   
Immigration was not the only policy area in which the Conservative government began hesitantly.  
Admittedly, several early decisions – implemented administratively – had created an appearance of 
dynamic action.  There were increases to old age and veterans’ pensions, and developmental grants to the 
Maritime provinces, and for agriculture.18  Legislatively, however, there was inertia, and close observers 
could discern no overall agenda.  Grant Dexter, now returned to Ottawa as the Free Press’ Parliamentary 
correspondent, confided to his editor in October 1957 that he found “no clear thinking in the government; 
no co-ordination. The conflicts in policy continue without the ministers seeming to be aware of them.”  
Especially troubling for Dexter was the absence of any legislative program to implement the financial 
promises made during the campaign: “Not one bill has been drafted.”19   
The policy vacuum continued into the new year.  Then, on January 20, 1958 the Liberal 
opposition moved an amendment to a routine parliamentary supply motion.  A simple motion of non-
confidence would have surprised no one, and would almost certainly have been defeated with CCF 
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support for the government.  Instead, opposition leader Lester Pearson made an audacious proposal.  An 
election, Pearson declared, would not be in the national interest; the economy was in decline, 
unemployment was increasing, and the government’s record in addressing these problems was dismal.  
Rather than permit a non-confidence vote, Pearson announced, the government should simply resign, 
permitting the Liberals to return to government.20 
The Liberal motion (which had been authored by Pickersgill) was both arrogant and naïve.  
Diefenbaker immediately recognized the opportunity it presented, castigating the Liberals in a withering 
two-hour speech.  Ten days later, even though Pearson’s motion had been defeated and his government 
had not fallen, Diefenbaker secured a dissolution of Parliament.  The ensuing election returned the 
Conservative government with 208 seats and the largest parliamentary majority in Canadian history.   
Diefenbaker made few changes to his cabinet following his landslide victory, but on May 12, 
1958 he appointed a permanent minister of citizenship and immigration.  Hamilton MP Ellen Fairclough 
had entered cabinet a year earlier, when Diefenbaker fulfilled a 1957 campaign promise to appoint 
Canada’s first female cabinet minister.  The offer of the secretary of state portfolio had disappointed 
Fairclough, and she nearly declined it.  Now, the appointment as immigration minister seemed equally 
unwelcome.  “There is not a bit of doubt in my mind,” she later recalled, “that it is the worst post in 
government.”21  Like Fulton, Ellen Fairclough undoubtedly wondered why she was being punished. 
Despite its overwhelming Parliamentary majority, the government’s approach to immigration 
remained indifferent, showing no inclination to revive Diefenbaker’s 1957 campaign vision.  On May 22, 
1958, with the year nearly half over, cabinet finally resumed its deliberations on immigration policy.  
Mysteriously, it was Fulton (now designated as the “former” acting minister) and not the new minister, 
who led the discussion.  Fulton reported that in “the absence of any formal immigration programme” the 
focus early in the year had been on recruiting immigrants “who were likely to have little or no difficulty 
in establishing themselves.”  Accordingly, selection criteria were limited to “a very restricted list of 
occupations” (although officers had later been “authorized to select within a broader range”).  As a result, 
immigrant arrivals during January-March totalled 20,000, as compared with more than 62,000 during the 
corresponding period in 1957.  Fulton explained, however, that the Departmental Committee on 
Immigration had studied the country’s labour requirements and was now recommending “a more positive 
programme” and a “somewhat larger movement.”  He recommended a target of 150,000 for 1958. 
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As in the previous December, the cabinet agonized over Fulton’s proposal.  In light of concerns about the 
economy, perhaps prospective immigrants should be warned about “employment and housing conditions” 
in Canada.  There had been a decrease in open applications and an increase in sponsored entries.  No 
explanation for this development was offered, but ministers wondered whether it too was reason for 
concern.  Finally, any target number “might be set too high and lead to adverse criticism.”  The cabinet 
eventually approved Fulton’s proposal after being assured that target numbers were never disclosed to the 
public.  The approval stipulated that the target of 150,000 must be an absolute maximum, and that 
immigration officials must be instructed to inform all prospective immigrants “of current employment and 
housing conditions in Canada.”22  With such qualified endorsement, it was hardly surprising that 
immigration for the year would not reach the target, dropping to less than 125,000.  The decline would 
continue throughout the Conservative government’s time in office. 
Ellen Fairclough’s tenure as minister of citizenship and immigration only confirmed her initial 
ambivalence to the portfolio.  Her memoirs describe few achievements and much frustration with “a high-
profile department that gave me my share of headaches.”23  The Citizenship, and Indian Affairs branches 
brought some satisfaction, as did the agencies under the department’s oversight, including the National 
Film Board, the National Gallery, and the Public Archives.  But the department’s major responsibility – 
immigration – caused nearly unrelenting misery for Ellen Fairclough.  Unsupportive colleagues and a 
meddlesome prime minister certainly did not help, and her relationship with deputy minister Laval Fortier 
was difficult from the outset.  The major problem, however, “was the lack of a good firm policy. I tried 
for months after assuming the portfolio to get the cabinet to consider my suggestions for reform, but I was 
brushed off – so many other things were considered more important.”24     
By mid-1958 the immigration program was adrift in indecision.  Cabinet minutes from that period 
show even routine administrative matters being deferred or decided ambiguously.25  As a result, in the 
early months of her tenure the minister was forced to focus her attention on improving administrative 
efficiency in her department.  In one early memorandum, Fairclough pronounced herself “gravely 
concerned over the lack of co-ordination between the various Divisions of the Department.”26  She 
                                                          
22 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 17075, May 22, 1958, “Immigration; 1958 programme,” LAC RG 2, Privy Council 
Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 1898. 
23 Fairclough, Saturday’s Child, 109. 
24 Ibid., 118.  
25 For example, see: Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 17268, July 14, 1958, “Maintenance of immigration office in Tel 
Aviv, Israel” LAC RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 1898, and Item No. 17406, August 16, 1958, 
“Immigration; open placement for 1959,” LAC RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Vol. 1899. 
26 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records, RG 26, Vol 75, File 1-1-1, Part 2, “Memorandum to the 
Deputy Minister” (undated). 
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instructed the deputy minister to meet with “those concerned” in order to improve communication among 
divisions and with the Department’s information division.  Even these endeavours yielded only modest 
results.  One initiative sought to consolidate the immigration program’s myriad administrative policies 
and procedures.  Staff were notified that a new “Administration Manual” would serve as the “official 
reference book of Headquarters’ instructions,” eventually supplanting all “Official Circulars and 
Headquarters Directives.”27  In the ensuing years, however, administrative and procedural bulletins 
continued to flow unremittingly, suggesting that the goal of a consolidated manual of procedures 
remained elusive.  
Indecision at the political level soon demoralized the bureaucracy.  The Department’s Advisory 
Committee on Immigration, chaired by Fortier, met in September 1958 to consider policy for 1959.  Its 
minutes revealed clearly the extent of the discouragement.  The committee acknowledged that interest 
among prospective immigrants overseas was declining, but made its view clear that Canadian policy was 
also to blame: 
This country’s cutback in immigration had unfortunately created the impression abroad that 
Canada was no longer interested in receiving immigrants. The chairman [i.e. Fortier] hoped that 
following the meeting the Cabinet would give consideration to an immigration programme and it 
would be possible to give instructions to overseas staff which would bring about a spirit of 
optimism. There was little doubt that the current restrictions were causing immigration officers in 
foreign countries to be much less optimistic and consequently less effective in persuading suitable 
and desirable immigrants to come to Canada.28    
 
For civil servants to deliver such undisguised criticism was astonishing.  There was no mistaking 
the deputy minister’s blunt assessment that the government’s failure to provide policy direction had 
demoralized the department.  “It is true,” Fortier acknowledged, “there were difficulties to be faced, but 
Canada still needs immigrants.”  Former immigration director Charles Smith, now an assistant deputy 
minister, concluded the meeting with a final plea for a more vigorous recruitment policy.  Describing the 
country’s employment prospects for the upcoming year as “fair,” Smith reported that “in all districts … 
the number of opportunities developed exceeded the number of immigrants available for placement.”29    
                                                          
27 LAC Immigration Branch Records, RG 76, Vol. 941, H.Q. Directives Series C – 1953-57, Binder #30, “Immigration 
Branch Directive #9 (Re-issued); Subject: Manual of Administrative Instructions For The Guidance of Immigration 
Officers: Purpose and Scope of the Manual.” 
28 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records, RG 26 Vol 101, File 3-18-6, part 2, “Minutes of the 




A month earlier, in August, the minister had urged her cabinet colleagues to make a decision for the 
following year.  Her efforts, like those of her officials, had little impact; the cabinet gave no further 
consideration to immigration in 1958. 
By early 1959 the government’s mishandling of immigration policy deteriorated from bad to 
worse.  Once again, Fairclough’s officials reported that there was reason for optimism: “The capacity of 
the Canadian economy to absorb immigrants should improve in 1959.”30   Such information might have 
been persuasive in securing cabinet approval for a more expansive policy.  Incredibly, however, the 
minister’s presentation to cabinet in February focused elsewhere.  She acknowledged that there were 
opportunities for employment, especially in certain occupations and areas, but the influx of immigrants 
under the Immigration Act’s sponsorship rules was now causing alarm.  ‘Sponsored’ immigrants, 
Fairclough explained, “were admitted primarily because of their relationship to [their] sponsors rather 
than their potential immediate economic contribution to the country.”31  Italians in particular were taking 
advantage of these rules, which resulted in large numbers “arriving without skills of any kind.”32  The real 
‘problem’, of course, was not the sponsorship rules but the fact that immigration from Italy in 1958 had 
exceeded that from the British Isles, and the government feared a public outcry.33  
To specifically reduce the influx of Italian immigrants, the minister recommended a regulatory 
amendment to remove the siblings and married children of Canadian residents from the category of 
immigrants eligible to be sponsored by close relatives.  Cabinet agreed to the proposal, its approval 
revealing the true motivation behind the decision: 
That, in order to increase the quality of the immigration movement in 1959, Regulation 20 (c) 
under the Immigration Act, be amended by deleting brothers and sisters and married sons and 
daughters from the admissible classes of close relatives.34 
 
When news of the amendment became public in March a political firestorm erupted, as the 
opposition Liberals, the press, and Canada’s Italian community reacted with predictable outrage.  
Government attempts to deny any discriminatory intent only exacerbated the problem, and in late April, 
                                                          
30 LAC Immigration Branch Records, RG 76, Vol. 940, Binder #26, part 2, “Subject: Immigration Programme 1959 – 
Unsponsored Immigrants.”  
31 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 18010, February 12, 1959, “Immigration programme 1959,” LAC RG 2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2744. 
32 Fairclough, Saturday’s Child, 115. 
33 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1959: II, 1467.  Presenting her department’s annual estimates, Fairclough 
reported Italian immigration in 1958 at 28,564 and British immigration at 26,662 (Table 1).  This was also the first 
year in which British immigrants were not the largest immigrant group.  
34 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 18010, February 12, 1959, “Immigration programme 1959,” LAC RG 2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2744.  Order in Council 1959-310 was issued on March 19, 1959.  
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after agonizing over the matter in cabinet, the government rescinded the regulation.35  The episode was 
especially humiliating for Ellen Fairclough, whose Hamilton constituency included a substantial Italian 
population.   
In its rush to address the “problem” of Italian immigration, the government had also ignored 
reports of improving economic prospects.  For 1959, cabinet resolved only that intake should be “related 
to absorptive capacity without precise definition in terms of overall numbers.”36   Once again, the 
possibility of a more expansive policy, or one based on a specific immigration target, was rejected.  Later 
in the year, however, the government was presented with yet another opportunity to pursue the “vast and 
humane” immigration policy which Diefenbaker had promised in 1957.  Nearly fourteen years after 
World War Two, more than 100,000 refugees and displaced persons still resided in European refugee 
camps.  In an effort to finally resolve this continuing tragedy, in late 1958 the United Nations designated 
the twelve-month period beginning June 1, 1959 to be World Refugee Year, and requested the assistance 
of its member nations.  Canada’s UN delegation supported the resolution and it appeared that – as so 
often in the past – international responsibilities might bring change to Canadian immigration policy.  
More than six months after the announcement of the initiative by the UN, and despite 
considerable urging by the opposition in Parliament,37 the government had reached no decision as to what 
Canada’s contribution would be.  An inter-ministerial committee examined the various options, including 
a special financial contribution to UNHCR, but otherwise produced no specific recommendation.  
Existing “immigration regulations did not allow for the entry of people with such infirmities [i.e. 
tuberculosis] and immigration authorities had rejected all attempts to liberalize them.”38   The minister 
herself remained unreceptive to requests to consider offering admission to tubercular refugees, including a 
direct plea from her colleague Sidney Smith, the external affairs minister.39  
                                                          
35 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1959: III, 2939. As usual, the cabinet discussion leading to rescission was 
not unanimous; some ministers insisted against any public promise to “remove discrimination entirely” from the 
Act, for fear of “antagonizing … those who had consistently supported the Conservative Party in the past”: Cabinet 
Conclusions, Item No. 18283, April 20, 1959, “Changes in Immigration Regulations,” LAC RG 2, Privy Council Office, 
Series A-5a, Vol. 2744.  
36 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 18010, February 12, 1959, “Immigration programme 1959,” LAC RG 2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2744. 
37 See Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1959: II, 1629-47. 
38 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, 221. 
39 “I have considered the matter very carefully,” Fairclough wrote to Smith, and in her view, Canada had “done her 
share in accepting some 38,000 Hungarian refugees” the previous year; Fairclough to Smith, December 11, 1958 
(quoted in Dirks, 222).   
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On June 12, 1959, with World Refugee Year already officially underway, Fairclough advised her 
cabinet colleagues that “something tangible” would be expected by way of a contribution from Canada.40  
Still, nothing happened.  Finally, on September 11 Howard Green (recently appointed external affairs 
minister following Smith’s death) raised the matter once again in cabinet.  This time, Green outlined a 
proposal for “the admission of about 100 tuberculosis refugees with their families.”  Treatment would, of 
course, be provided in provincial sanatoria, and it was expected that contributions from the provinces and 
charitable organizations would help defray costs.  Green estimated the maximum cost to the federal 
government at $750,000 for the first year, and substantially less thereafter.  Cabinet approved Green’s 
proposal, “on the understanding that the provincial governments and [charitable organizations] would be 
encouraged to contribute as much as possible and that the total cost to the Federal government during the 
first year should not exceed $600,000.”41  The government’s muddled response to the entire issue 
continued into November, when Ellen Fairclough complained that Treasury Board had failed to provide 
the agreed-upon funding, and had suggested that her ministry should re-allocate the $600,000 “from funds 
already authorized.”42     
When the plan was implemented in early 1960, its costs proved only a fraction of what had been 
estimated, and the government responded by announcing two further movements of tubercular refugees 
and their families, in July and December 1960.  In the end, the program brought some 325 refugees and 
more than 500 family members to Canada, but the government’s fumbling approach virtually ensured that 
any potential goodwill would be reduced.  As one opposition MP observed, the offer to accept 100 
tubercular patients was made “at a time when 2,700 beds in tuberculosis sanatoria in Canada are 
empty.”43  Cabinet ministers Howard Green and Ellen Fairclough could muster only weak explanations 
when confronted with opposition and press complaints about Canada’s meagre response to the initiative.  
Canada, Green protested, had already accepted several thousand “other” refugees in 1959-60, and the 
government had anticipated greater support from “churches and other organizations of a similar nature” 
than had materialized.44  Fairclough in particular managed to enrage Ontario premier Leslie Frost with 
comments suggesting that a lack of provincial support had prevented the federal government from doing 
more.  “I don’t know what Mrs. Fairclough is talking about,” Frost exploded.  The prime minister had 
                                                          
40 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 18510, June 12, 1959, “World refugee year,” LAC RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series 
A-5a, Vol. 2745.   
41 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 18817, September 11, 1959, “Special contribution to the World Refugee Year,” 
LAC RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2745. 
42 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 19085, November 20, 1959, “Estimates for the World Refugee Year Program,” LAC 
RG 2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2745. (Cabinet mediated the interdepartmental spat, ordering Treasury 
Board to release the funds by way of a supplemental allotment to the Department of External Affairs.) 
43 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1960: I, 1122.  
44 Ibid., 1137. 
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requested his government’s support for the initiative and it was given: “If the federal government feels we 
should do more I wish they’d tell us.”45   
Frustration was beginning to wear on Ellen Fairclough as the Diefenbaker government 
approached the mid-way point of its mandate having articulated no clear policy on immigration.  In 
January 1960, she informed her colleagues that she had prepared “recommendations” for amendments to 
the Immigration Act, which meant the Act could be revised during the upcoming session.  As usual, 
however, there were multiple concerns.  The whole subject of immigration was “inherently contentious” 
and a new bill would undoubtedly “unleash a storm of controversy both from those wishing for more and 
those wanting less immigration.”  Moreover, she acknowledged, “there was not complete unanimity” 
among the various government departments as to what revisions were needed.  Security procedures would 
also come under scrutiny, which would cause particular discomfort given the program’s longstanding 
practice of not disclosing reasons for denying entry or deportation.46   
To avoid these potential headaches (and perhaps ease the pressure she was feeling) Fairclough 
suggested an alternate approach.  A royal commission should be appointed, with a wide-ranging mandate 
to examine the “principles” of immigration policy, its administration, and appropriate legislative and 
regulatory revisions.  A royal commission would of course require several years to fulfil such a broad 
mandate; the government would therefore be relieved of its commitment to take legislative action until 
sometime after the next election.  A cabinet committee was struck to examine Fairclough’s 
recommendation.  Its composition virtually ensured the fate of the proposal; members included Fulton 
and Green, along with Ellen Fairclough.  Two weeks later, Fairclough returned to cabinet with a report on 
the committee’s deliberations.  A majority of members had supported the idea, but justice minister (and 
former immigration minister) Davie Fulton had not.  Fulton’s objections were two-fold.  First, the 
determination of immigration policy was primarily “a political or executive decision” and not something 
that should be determined by royal commission.  Secondly, Fulton pointed out, most of the department’s 
problems arose not from “general policy” matters but from “procedural questions, particularly the security 
procedure.”  Fulton well understood that exposing security procedures to public scrutiny would subject 
both the department and the RCMP to sensational questions which they would not want to answer 
“because of security considerations.”47   
                                                          
45 “More TB Refugees? Ellen, Frost Clash,” Toronto Star, December 19, 1959, 1-2.   
46 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 19254, January 6, 1960, “Proposed Royal Commission on Immigration,” LAC RG 2, 
Privy Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2746. 
47 Cabinet Conclusions, Item No. 19337, January 20, 1960, “Royal Commission on Immigration,” LAC RG 2, Privy 
Council Office, Series A-5a, Vol. 2746. 
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In the end, Fulton’s arguments prevailed, and the cabinet wisely rejected the proposal of a royal 
commission.  For Ellen Fairclough this meant resuming the challenge of defending ineffectual policy 
against widespread criticism.  From the opposition front bench Jack Pickersgill led the parliamentary 
attack as immigration critic.  Pickersgill continually reminded the government of Diefenbaker’s 
extravagant campaign promises in 195748, all of which he had catalogued in a volume distributed to 
Liberal MPs and “anyone else who was interested.”49  Immigration, Pickersgill recalled, was one area 
about which “I was always vigilant.”50  He led the attack on the 1959 regulation designed to curtail Italian 
immigration, and regularly taunted the government over its failure to deliver on promised legislative and 
policy changes.51  Pickersgill’s penchant for colourful comments usually ensured favourable press 
coverage for the opposition (but not, of course, for the government).52 
In March 1960, a new source of aggravation emerged when the Senate announced plans to 
resuscitate its Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour.  The committee had been moribund since 
1953; now, Winnipeg senator William M. Wall proposed that it be reconstituted with a mandate to 
examine the activities of the Department.  Frustrated by the government’s failure to act, or even articulate 
a policy, Wall pointed in particular to the Gordon Commission’s conclusion in 1957 that “the economic 
advantages of continued immigration are substantial enough to justify … a stable immigration policy even 
through periods of mild recession.”53  
A detailed memorandum was needed to enlighten the minister on the Senate committee’s former 
activities and broad mandate.54  “Senator Wall now proposes that the committee be authorized … to 
review the operation of the Immigration Branch, Citizenship Branch and the Registration Branch.”  Even 
worse (as Department of Labour officials informed their deputy minister), “If this motion is passed by the 
Senate it would appear that senior officials of the department will be called before the committee as 
witnesses.”  Assessing the Senate plan to reconvene the committee, Labour officials apprehended that the 
government would face criticism over issues both old and new:  
                                                          
48  For example, see LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records MG32 B34, Vol 102 (untitled press clippings file), “New 
Immigration Controls Tory Policy – Pickersgill,” Toronto Daily Star, August 9, 1957.  Also: Canada, House of 
Commons, Debates, 1957-8: I, 97-100. 
49 Pickersgill, Seeing Canada Whole, 499.  A copy of this volume is found in LAC J.W. Pickersgill Records MG32 B34, 
Vol 102, Diefenbaker, Rt. Hon. John. Promises 1957-57, “Re: Diefenbaker’s Promises in the 1957 General Election.” 
50 Ibid., 529.  
51 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1960: II, 2127. 
52 See, for example, “The Tories Need a Tonic,” Saturday Night 74, no. 14, August 15, 1959, 16-7; 43. 
53 Canada, Debates of the Senate, 1960: 388-9. 
54 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records RG26, Vol. 101, File 3-18-2, vol. 2 (1960), The Senate – 
Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, “Confidential – Memorandum to the Minister,” March 8, 1960. (A 
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Senator Wall … is particularly concerned about the drop in the Immigration movement in 1958 
and 1959 as compared to 1957. He took strong exception to the fact that the drop in movement 
was mentioned in the annual report of the Immigration Branch by one sentence which referred to 
diverse factors and adverse publicity abroad. … He also took exception to the arbitrary powers of 
Special Inquiry Officers, the regulatory power of the Governor-in-Council under Section 61 of 
the Act and he stressed the fact that no significant changes had been made in the Immigration Act 
regulations since the government came to power in 1957.55  
 
     The prospect of investigation by the Senate provoked a defensive response from Fairclough’s 
department.  A lengthy memorandum, prepared for the deputy minister by immigration branch officials, 
replied to the “main points” now being raised by the Senate.  To begin with, there were the direct 
criticisms: 
(1) A vigorous policy of higher immigration is a necessity 
(2) Why is policy not clear? 
(3) Why is policy not consistent?      
 
These points, the memorandum explained, required “political” answers.  “Until the government 
enunciates a policy, civil servants can speak only in vague generalities, still based on Mackenzie King’s 
statement of policy in 1947.”56   An additional complaint, that no legislative amendments had been made, 
was of course “true except for minor changes,” and there could be no response from the civil service on 
the issue until such time as amending legislation was introduced.  As for the recent decline in 
immigration, an explanation was readily available if the government was prepared to acknowledge its 
own responsibility for the problem: 
It can be shown that after the restriction … which was ordered early in 1957, immigration fell off 
drastically and it has not been possible to reverse the decrease. It will be necessary to explain 
what the Department has done in an attempt to get immigrants. Dealing with this point may 
require us to produce material from our files to prove our case; however if this takes place it may 
be very difficult to refuse to produce other documents.57  
  
The memorandum continued, noting additional concerns the Senate might raise, such as the 
“arbitrary” powers granted by the Act to immigration officers and to the cabinet.  Any of those could be 
changed or removed by Parliament, but until such time as the government chose to act “it is our 
responsibility to administer the legislation as it is written.”  In addition, the Senate might search for 
“discrepancies between our Regulations and administrative practices,” and the potential for 
embarrassment in this area was substantial:   
                                                          
55 Ibid., “For Chief, Immigration Services,” March 28, 1960. 
56 Ibid., “Subject: Proposed Review of immigration by the Senate,” March 28, 1960, 1. 
57 Ibid., 2. 
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One instance … is the control of immigration from a country by the size of staff allocated, such 
as in Italy or Greece. 
It must be admitted … that we could put into Italy sufficient staff to clear up the backlog there if 
we were willing to do so and it may be necessary to explain why we are not prepared to increase 
Italian immigration. Once again, this necessitates policy guidance.58     
 
In both tone and content, this was another extraordinary briefing document, and it is 
unimaginable that the previous government would had been subjected to such blunt ‘advice’ from its 
bureaucracy.  The memorandum seemed to alternate between reprimanding the government for its 
indecision on policy, and lecturing them on their legislative responsibilities.  Clearly, immigration 
officials were distancing themselves from the Diefenbaker government while, at the same time, defending 
their program’s long-entrenched policies, procedures, and rules.  They were not, however, focused on 
presenting their best policy options, or preparing their minister for the questions she might encounter, as 
they had invariably done for previous ministers.  It was little wonder that Ellen Fairclough did not feel 
well supported, or that Laval Fortier was removed as deputy minister the following month.59  His 
successor, personally selected by the minister, was former deputy minister of health and welfare Dr. 
George Davidson.60   
Ellen Fairclough persevered in her efforts to manage her department and to fulfil the 
government’s various immigration commitments.  One way to identify possible administrative 
improvements would be a visit to the department’s overseas offices.  Such a trip had been planned in 
1958 and 1959, and cancelled both times.  Fairclough rescheduled the excursion once again for the fall of 
1960, and once again the prime minister intervened.  Diefenbaker, she recalled, “now felt the time was 
inopportune because of the imminence of cabinet changes.”  Instead, he ordered Fairclough to “go across 
the country and speak wherever I could,” undoubtedly hoping that her popularity might bolster the 
declining popularity of his government.61  The opportunity to visit her department’s overseas offices 
would never return, and the minister was understandably left feeling “at a distinct disadvantage 
administratively.”62  
Fairclough undertook her public speaking assignments energetically, but the role of apologist for 
a government that had fulfilled few of its immigration commitments must have chafed.  The texts of many 
of her speeches from this period survive.  They are replete with the familiar concepts and terminology that 
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previous (Liberal) governments had always invoked to describe – and justify – immigration policy.  
Absent new initiatives or ideas, her only recourse was to remind audiences of the importance of the 
concept of ‘absorptive capacity’, and the need for ‘flexibility’ to adapt to changing economic conditions 
and “avoid dislocation.”63  Invariably there were happy examples of penniless immigrants who had ‘made 
good.’  In one presentation that must have mystified her Jewish audience, Fairclough rhapsodized about 
Canada’s postwar efforts to “gladly welcome newcomers to our shores [and] integrate them into our 
community.”64  Other speeches placed greater emphasis on Canada’s recent record with refugee 
admissions, and on refuting criticism in that area.  Fairclough often reminded her audiences that 
government’s role “is to give a lead”; there were “other avenues … open to private individuals and 
organizations who justly feel that they have a duty to help these unfortunate people.”65   
The government, the minister now seemed to be arguing, had done more than its share in offering 
sanctuary to refugees, and it was time for others to contribute more.  Of all the immigrants admitted since 
the war, “probably not less than 300,000” could be categorized as refugees.  “In absolute figures, no other 
country … with the one exception of the United States, has taken more refugees than Canada.”66  Such 
observations were literally true (although they mostly applied to the period before her government came 
into office) but they could hardly have brought fulfilment to a minister of Ellen Fairclough’s ability who 
had intended to do much more.   
Fairclough did not abandon her efforts to persuade her colleagues to support a more focused 
immigration policy, but those efforts yielded little fruit.  In a detailed presentation to cabinet in April 
1960, she began with a summary of the concerns and criticisms that were compounding as the 
government continued to waffle.  The Conservatives had promised a policy of national development and 
new immigration legislation, but immigration policy was still operating under principles enunciated by 
Mackenzie King in 1947.  After thirteen years, continued reliance on the policies of previous 
administrations “was becoming a weak defence.”  The backlog in unprocessed sponsored applications 
was also growing at an alarming rate.  This made it difficult to deal with open-placement applicants, and 
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it meant continuing to bring unskilled labour into the country instead of the “professional” and “skilled” 
people now needed to generate wealth and employment.  Moreover, a new concern had now been 
identified; Canada’s increased postwar birthrate would mean a substantial increase in the number of 
young adults entering the workforce during the ensuing decade.67   
To address these diverse concerns, Fairclough argued, the only viable solution would be a plan 
“to force the rate of growth of the economy.”   She pleaded for support for such a plan.  Canada needed a 
substantial inflow of immigrants, and needed to establish a long-range immigration policy, based upon 
reasonably consistent annual targets.  Experience had shown that an average rate of inflow of one percent 
of population was entirely realistic, and could be adjusted – slightly – upward or down to meet temporary 
conditions.  The backlog in sponsored-immigrant applications needed to be resolved and avoided in 
future; a continued and unregulated influx of “Mediterranean” migrants could result in “a ‘little Italy’ 
complex.”  Lastly, the minister sought approval to implement a program that would emphasize the 
selection of immigrants best suited to bring “economic benefit” to Canada.68        
In short, the minister was seeking support for both an immigration strategy and a “population 
plan.”  However, the minutes of the cabinet’s discussion of her proposal once again revealed a 
government incapable of agreement or decisive action.  There were so many things to worry about and 
whose impact might bring confusion or criticism.  What about the thousands of young Canadians soon to 
enter the workforce?  Would immigrants deprive them of job opportunities?  What about farmers and 
agricultural workers, who would have to be absorbed into other occupations in future, especially if 
unemployment among laborers and unskilled workers remained high?  It was all so bewildering.  In the 
end, there were few specifics to the decision.  The minister was authorized to proceed with a “substantial 
[but unspecified] flow of immigrants,” selected for their ability “to establish themselves in Canadian 
social, cultural, political and economic life.”  It was clear that Ellen Fairclough would be on her own to 
interpret and implement these vague principles (and to absorb any blame if problems arose).  Under the 
circumstances, it seems almost comical to note the cabinet’s conclusion that this muddled deliberation 
“should provide guidance to the minister and the basis for a statement when her estimates [come] up in 
the House.”69   
Immigration policy – such as it was – would remain unexamined for another eighteen months.   In 
March, 1961, three full years into its majority mandate, the government took stock of its agenda for the 
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current session, particularly its legislative commitments which remained unfulfilled.  One such 
outstanding commitment, of course, was a revised Immigration Act.  A draft bill was under preparation, 
but the cabinet decided instead that the item “should be deleted from the legislative programme for the 
present Session.”  To justify the decision, the government cited a convenient precedent.  The previous 
Liberal government had announced plans to introduce a new Act in its 1951 throne speech, “but in fact 
had not done so until two sessions later.”70   
In October 1961, the minister made one final suggestion to break the policy impasse.  A cabinet 
committee had approved revisions to the regulations under the Immigration Act.  If the government was 
not prepared to proceed with a new Act, or amend the current one, perhaps regulatory amendments would 
suffice for the time being.  (Subsequent passage of a new statute would, of course, require new 
regulations. Fairclough – perhaps preferring not to complicate the matter – avoided that detail.)   
As always, there were potential problems.  The proposed new regulation could address the 
longstanding criticism that Canadian law discriminated against prospective immigrants on the basis of 
nationality, race, and colour but this, in turn, might result in complaints that the selection criteria were 
now “anti-British.”  Nevertheless, the minister now proposed to eliminate from the selection criteria “all 
reference to questions of nationality, geography or regions of the world,” replacing them with criteria 
based on “skills and qualifications.”  The ensuing cabinet deliberation noted other worries.  Additional 
immigration staff might be needed to administer the expanded selection criteria; the agreements with 
India, Ceylon, and Pakistan might have to be reviewed; and perhaps the new regulation should also revise 
the immigration appeals process, to ensure conformity with the provisions of the new Bill of Rights.71   
Characteristically, the cabinet deferred its decision on this latest proposal, electing instead to refer 
the draft changes to the Department of Justice.  Fifteen days later on November 2, with the issue still 
undecided, the prime minister reported to cabinet on questions he had answered at a press conference 
earlier that day.  One question concerned immigration policy.  In his response, Diefenbaker recounted, 
“he had said that the immigration laws were implemented mainly through the regulations, and that the 
government was going to amend these regulations.”72   
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This was not the first time that Diefenbaker had publicly announced a major policy decision 
without prior cabinet agreement, or without notifying his ministers.  The minutes of the November 2 
cabinet meeting recorded the startling news with bureaucratic restraint, indicating simply that cabinet 
“noted” the statements by the prime minister at his press conference.73  On that same day, as Diefenbaker 
was informing cabinet that the government would proceed by way of regulatory revisions, the Globe and 
Mail was confidently advising its readership that a “final draft” of a new Immigration Act was nearing 
“full approval” in cabinet.74     
While it is possible that the Globe and Mail had simply reported incorrect information, the 
cabinet record suggests a different explanation for the chaotic decision-making process.  On October 18, 
cabinet had deferred its decision on a new regulation, referring the matter to the Department of Justice.  
The minutes recorded no comment by the prime minister, and the subject was not discussed again until 
November 2 when Diefenbaker informed cabinet that he had announced a decision that morning.  Any 
consultation or consensus that preceded Diefenbaker’s decision did not happen at the cabinet table.  
Moreover, as the Globe and Mail also noted, “there have been indications of sharp divisions of opinion” 
within the government about how best to proceed with any legislative revisions: 
One suggestion is that [changes] could be limited mainly to putting the act in line with the 
Canadian Bill of Rights. Another is a liberalization of policies which in the main have limited 
immigration to people of European stock.75 
 
The Globe also noted another sudden announcement related to immigration policy.  The prime 
minister had just returned from a five day visit to Japan.  While there, he had “revealed a new attitude to 
Japanese immigrants,” announcing a “plan” to liberalize admission rules for managerial and technical 
employees of Japanese businesses operating in Canada.76  Once again, there is no record of any previous 
discussion of this policy initiative in cabinet, or evidence that it might have originated within the 
immigration bureaucracy.  Diefenbaker, apparently, had simply announced it to his Japanese hosts.      
With her instructions at last having been clarified, Ellen Fairclough returned to cabinet on 
January 18, 1962 with a draft regulation approved by the Department of Justice.  The government’s 
lawyers had modified the proposed wording somewhat.  The November draft had “sought to establish 
equality of treatment of all categories of close relatives from all parts of the world.”  It proposed not only 
more generous treatment toward traditionally non-preferred countries, but also “reducing to some extent 
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the categories of close relatives … admissible from the traditional sources in Europe.”  The Department 
of Justice, however, restored provisions permitting the sponsorship of the close relatives of Canadian 
residents from traditionally favoured European countries.  Although the revision appears to have been 
based upon political rather than legal considerations, it nevertheless represented astute advice; by 
ensuring that less favoured groups could be “moved forward” without simultaneously “withdrawing 
privileges from more favoured groups,” public criticism might be avoided.77   
After some discussion, the cabinet approved the proposed regulation and on the following day, 
January 19, 1962, Ellen Fairclough announced the changes in parliament.  There were two parts to the 
new immigration regulation.  The first implemented the changes outlined above, through new “visa 
requirements” and redefined “admissible classes.”  The second part sought to extend the jurisdiction of 
appeal boards constituted under the Immigration Act, thereby ensuring that each tribunal would be “free 
to conduct its proceedings independently of departmental officials.”78   
The most important provision, the minister explained, was section 31 of the new regulation, 
which would now place “primary stress on education, training and skills as the main condition of 
admissibility regardless of the country of origin of the applicant.”  In other words, 
Any suitably qualified person from any part of the world can be considered for immigration to 
Canada entirely on his own merits without regard to his race, colour, national origin or the 
country from which he comes. This is a substantial advance over the former regulations in that 
the selection of immigrants, in so far as selection on the basis of skills is concerned will be done 
without discrimination of any kind.79     
 
In its actual language, the new regulation deviated significantly from its predecessor.  It began by 
confirming the admissibility of persons with “education, training, skills or other special qualifications … 
likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Canada,” together with their spouses and children.80  
Other ‘close relatives’ – parents, grandparents, and the unmarried children of Canadian residents, were 
also now broadly admissible.81  However, the Department of Justice’ revisions ensured that not all racial 
criteria were removed; the regulation’s final clause stipulated particular eligibility criteria for the close 
relatives of Canadian citizens or residents from European countries “including Turkey”, Central and 
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South America, and from Egypt, Israel, or Lebanon.82  Finally, the new regulation did not negate the 
preferential, race-based categories still present in the governing statute – the 1953 Immigration Act.83  
Opposition reaction to the minister’s announcement was swift and negative.  Liberal immigration 
critic Jack Pickersgill, who seemed to have received advance notice of the revisions, spoke immediately 
after the minister.  He quickly dismissed the claim that the regulatory changes would transform the 
immigration appeals board into an independent tribunal.  The minister, Pickersgill declared, was well 
aware that under the Immigration Act “the final decision in all these cases is vested in the minister and 
cannot be transferred by order in council to anybody else.”  In other words, an amendment to the Act 
would be required in order to vest the appeals process in a tribunal that would function independently of 
the government.  Turning to the revised admission criteria, Pickersgill’s argument was less imaginative.  
The existing regulatory provisions, he declared, were already devoid of “racial or other similar 
discrimination.”  (This was not correct, and in any case selection historically had been carried out 
administratively, under broad discretionary regulatory language.)  In abolishing the current “convenient 
general categories” for the selection of suitable immigrants, Pickersgill argued, the government was 
merely substituting “one set of criteria for discrimination for another.”  (This remark was accurate, since 
application of the new criteria would still be a matter of discretion.)  Moreover, the new criteria would 
“make it necessary to look at every individual case and compare it with every other case” compounding 
the administrative burden on immigration officials.84 
This was not Pickersgill’s most effective parliamentary performance.  The notes prepared for his 
statement in the House revealed a more penetrating analysis of the revisions which, inexplicably, he did 
not include in his actual parliamentary remarks:   
[I]t seems to me that the clear purpose of these Regulations is … to make it easier for the 
Department to restrict rather than expand immigration. They have obviously been concerned 
about the increase in sponsored immigration and the increased number of applications, and if 
more attention is to be paid in future to these so-called criteria of education and skills that means 
that less attention will be paid to sponsored applications. Moreover it is going to be utterly 
impossible with the present staff or anything like the present staff to make any intelligent 
selection of immigrants on a personal basis.  Indeed one is being substituted for the apparent 
criteria of skills and education but in fact the purely capricious opinion of each Immigration 
Officer overseas or in the United States.85 
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Pickersgill nevertheless made his point.  He concluded his brief speech noting that five years had 
now passed since the prime minister’s extravagant campaign pledge of a bold new immigration policy.  
Now, with only months remaining before another election, he reminded the government that its promise 
in 1957 had been “not to change the regulations but to change the act, and that has not been done.”86 
The revised selection criteria set forth in P.C 1962-86 were the Diefenbaker government’s legacy 
to Canadian immigration policy.  Scholars have generally acknowledged the regulation’s importance in 
removing discriminatory racial criteria from the selection process, but their analyses have at times been 
restrained.  To Freda Hawkins, the regulation represented “the main effort and achievement of Mrs. 
Fairclough’s ministry.”  Hawkins suggests that the changes evolved from a “more critical approach” and a 
“desire for change”87 within the immigration department.  She offers no particular evidence for this 
conclusion, however, and given the department’s long history of resistance to change, the assessment 
seems exceedingly generous.  Economist Alan Green concludes that the old selection policy based on race 
and national origin “had been swept away,” but notes that application of the new skills and educational 
criteria was still conditional, “since it was based on the training of the applicant and the need in Canada 
for the particular immigrant’s skill (a carry-over from the past).”88  Valerie Knowles perceptively 
connects the new regulation to the Bill of Rights which the government proudly enacted in 1960: “Since 
the bill rejected discrimination by reason of race, colour, national origin, religion, or sex, the government 
could no longer justify selecting immigrants on the basis of race or national origin.”89  In contrast, other 
studies barely mentioned the 1962 revisions.90  In her own memoirs, Ellen Fairclough mentioned them 
only briefly, modestly noting that they “at least marked the beginning of reform.”91  None of these 
analyses recognize any connection between the 1962 regulation and earlier postwar revisions to 
immigrant selection criteria which sought to replace racialized categories with those emphasizing 
“occupational” qualifications.92  Nor do they acknowledge the adjustments to some racial restrictions that 
had been implemented administratively (and without corresponding regulatory revisions) during the final 
St. Laurent years.93 
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The immediate impact of the changes was not dramatic, and their effect would not begin to 
appear until after the Diefenbaker government left office in 1963.  By late 1963, however, immigration 
rates from previously non-preferred countries were increasing.  In that year, arrivals from Hong Kong 
rose to 1,008, from 426 in 1962.  From India, 737 newcomers arrived, an increase of 200 over the 
previous year; 1964 would see a further increase, to 2,400.  Arrivals from the West Indies also increased, 
to 2,227 in 1963 from 1,480 in 1962.94  Overall, immigration continued to decline throughout the 
Diefenbaker period, to 71,689 arrivals in 1961 and 74,586 in 1962.  The year 1963 saw a slight increase 
to 93,151.95  The fact that immigration from Britain comprised most of the increase in 196396 suggested 
that even though the government had revised the admission criteria, its actual immigration policy had not 
substantially changed.   
Although opponents dismissed the 1962 regulation as too little and too late, it nevertheless 
marked an important milestone, establishing non-racial criteria that would form the basis of later 
legislative and regulatory selection regimes.  The question remains, however, why the Diefenbaker 
government did not follow through on its early promises of legislative reform and a liberalization of the 
nation’s immigration policy?  Surely the overwhelming mandate of early 1958 represented – at least 
briefly – an endorsement of the campaign vision Diefenbaker articulated for immigration.  Why, then, 
were the regulatory revisions of 1962 not implemented sooner, and accompanied by broader legislative 
change?   Economic, political, and personal factors all offered plausible explanations, and indeed each 
seems to have contributed to the prolonged inaction.  As we have seen, early in its mandate the 
government became concerned with a reduced rate of economic growth and increasing unemployment, 
and those concerns were exacerbated (in their view) by the exceptionally high immigrant influx of 1956-
7.  Fearing public outcry over competition with newcomers for available jobs, they reacted in the 
traditional manner – by turning off the immigration ‘tap.’ 
The world views of the government’s influential ministers, and of the prime minister himself, 
comprised another key factor.  Davie Fulton showed no inclination toward reform during his year as 
acting immigration minister, and his parliamentary record on immigration issues while in opposition had 
clearly demonstrated other priorities.97  As one recent study has shown, prominent Conservatives like 
Fulton and Gordon Churchill had long been engaged in “a … battle to bolster Canada’s British identity 
against the onslaught of communists, wayward immigrants, and a Liberal party willing to placate 
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outsiders in return for votes.”98  In addition, there were disparate components to John Diefenbaker’s idea 
of Canadian citizenship, including his devotion to Britain and the Commonwealth, and his vision of “One 
Canada” in which all groups united together as “un-hyphenated” citizens.  These notions were not easily 
reconcilable to each other, or to Diefenbaker’s broader vision of Canada as a land of immigrants who 
“despite their ethnic and religious differences, were united because they were all citizens, subjects of the 
same monarch, and members of a diverse and unified Commonwealth.”99  Despite Diefenbaker’s early 
optimism in 1957, such complicated principles could hardly be expected to offer a clear path to policy 
reform, and in the end they did not.    
Thirdly, there were political concerns, similar to the fears about immigration that had worried all 
previous governments.  Analysing the results of a recent Gallup Poll in October 1960, the Montreal Star 
reported that the “segment of the population objecting to increased immigration is considerably larger 
than it was in 1953, when the Gallup Poll measured points of view on the same basis as today.”  
Statistically, 67% of Canadians ‘disapproved’ of the idea of increased immigration in 1961, an increase 
over the 52% response to the same question in the 1953 survey.100  The poll revealed an even clearer 
message from within “the ranks of labour, where almost three of four want no increased immigration.” 
On April 19, 1962, three months after implementation of the new regulation, Parliament was 
dissolved, and the ensuing election reduced the Conservative government to another minority.  Among 
the cabinet changes that followed the election was the appointment of Ottawa MP Richard A. Bell as 
minister of citizenship and immigration.  Bell was known to be an enthusiastic supporter of immigration 
and a capable administrator.  From his appointment on August 9, he undertook “to get things moving 
again in immigration and to develop a deliberately expansionist policy.”101  He appears to have enjoyed 
some success in restoring morale within his department, which he discovered to be extremely low in both 
domestic and overseas offices, and in convincing his officials that a more expansive policy would soon be 
implemented.  However, given the magnitude of the problems to be overcome – from unclear policy 
direction to lack of support within parliament or from the prime minister – Bell’s time as minister was too 
short to effect any substantial change.  There was no parliamentary discussion of his plans, or even a 
review of his department’s estimates (ordinarily the occasion for a thorough policy debate) prior to the 
                                                          
98 Spittal, “The Diefenbaker Moment,” 292-3.    
99 Ibid., 295-6. 
100 “Hold Immigration, Say Seven In Ten,” Montreal Star, October 10, 1960. 
101 Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 135. 
171 
 
government’s collapse in February 1963.  For this reason, Hawkins’ description of Bell’s tenure as a 
“resurrection” within the immigration program appears exceedingly generous.102     
By the time of the Diefenbaker government’s disintegration and defeat, all opportunities to pursue 
the “vast and humane” immigration policy promised in 1957 had been squandered. 
                                                          







The introduction to this thesis posed several questions, each based upon the premise that some 
important aspects of Canada’s postwar immigration policy had not previously been identified.  Between 
1945 and 1957, immigration to Canada reached historic levels, surpassed only by those of the early 
twentieth century, and included groups to whom admission had been denied under traditional selection 
criteria.  The common characterization of postwar policy as a mixture of altruism and self-interest did not 
seem to comprehensively explain the demographic transformation that began after 1945, the complex 
influences on policy during that period, or the differing values and sensibilities among politicians, policy-
makers, and ‘ordinary’ Canadians of the time.     
Several themes have emerged from this exploration.   
The first of these themes was revealed by examining the development of the legislative, 
regulatory, and administrative framework through which the immigration program was conducted.  
Successive post-Confederation governments crafted a regulatory system which delegated broad 
discretionary powers to ministers and senior civil servants.  Within that system – often admired by 
scholars for its ‘flexibility’ – policy-makers generally functioned unencumbered by legal, Parliamentary, 
or public oversight.  Changes to policy were implemented by regulation or cabinet order, and could 
subsequently be reversed or revised quickly, without the need for debate or statutory amendment.  
Postwar governments inherited this established infrastructure, and there is little evidence that they 
contemplated significant change as they proceeded to administer immigration policy in the postwar 
environment.  Mackenzie King, for example, may have recognized that many immigrants would be 
needed to sustain economic growth and prosperity, but his chief concern was to reassure Canadians that 
no “fundamental alteration” to the nation’s demographic character would ensue.1    
Change, however, did come, and an examination of the nature and causes of change in postwar 
immigration policy has been a second theme of this work.  Initially, there were the pressures of 
international responsibility.  In particular, the obligation to help resolve the postwar chaos in Europe led 
to initiatives to admit immigrant groups identified as refugees and “displaced persons.”  Other policy 
changes followed during the St. Laurent years, particularly after the creation of a Department of 
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Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, and many of those were implemented despite entrenched resistance 
from within the immigration bureaucracy.  Under the Department’s first minister, Walter Harris, there 
was a renewed effort to increase immigration levels and streamline admission procedures.  These 
measures still focused primarily on countries that were traditionally ‘preferred’ as immigrant sources, but 
immigration from Germany and Italy (recent wartime enemy states) also began to increase.  A new 
“Assisted Passage” loan program was implemented, and agreements were negotiated for small yearly 
quotas from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon.  Passage of the 1953 Immigration Act modernized the legislation 
(to some extent), and revised several admission criteria on humanitarian grounds, even though other 
traditional, exclusionary criteria were retained.    
The Department’s second minister, Jack Pickersgill, pursued bolder initiatives than Harris, but the 
circumstances of his tenure both allowed and required him to do so.  The economy had expanded 
consistently in the decade since 1945, and with it the nation’s capacity, and requirement, for immigrants.  
This development also furnished the government with an economic argument for increased immigration 
levels.  When traditionally ‘preferred’ sources for immigrants became unreliable in the mid-1950s, 
Pickersgill began to look elsewhere.  He eased admission restrictions on other groups – from Palestine, 
Greece, the Ukraine, and the Caribbean – despite the objections of his officials and his own predisposition 
toward a “conservative” immigration policy.  Each of these initiatives brought only incremental change 
initially, but it is improbable that those who undertook them failed to appreciate their longer-term 
implications.  In 1956, Pickersgill led an initiative of much greater magnitude, as he astutely recognized 
that the Hungarian Revolution presented Canada with an opportunity not to be missed.     
A combination of economic and political concerns seemed to impede the Diefenbaker 
government from making good on many of its initial immigration promises.  In their reticence, however, 
the Conservatives did not differ greatly from their predecessors; concerns about the economy, public 
opinion, and politics, were never far from the minds of all postwar policy-makers.  Near the end of its 
mandate, the Diefenbaker government overcame these concerns, at least in part, proclaiming important 
regulatory amendments to admission criteria in 1962.    
Whenever possible, postwar governments – particularly those of Mackenzie King and Louis St. 
Laurent  – preferred to implement changes to immigration policy without exposing them to public 
attention.  King’s May, 1947 Parliamentary speech, for example, revealed few details of the 
unprecedented “Displaced Persons” initiative that would be undertaken only days later.  As we have also 
seen, adjustments to selection criteria, admission procedures, or other administrative directions to officers 
and staff were invariably communicated via internal directives or memoranda, materials that were not 
available to the public or the press.  A casual reader would almost certainly have been surprised by a 1957 
174 
 
departmental memorandum which summarized the range of services and financial support programs for 
newcomers that had been implemented during the postwar period.  The extensive list included an 
emergency hospitalization, medical, and dental program, emergency transportation assistance, emergency 
food and shelter, and a family assistance program to provide monthly allowances to parents equivalent to 
the federal Family Allowance program (for which immigrants did not qualify during their first year in 
Canada).  A series of “Medical Welfare Agreements” with six provinces and the Northwest Territory 
provided additional coverage for services provided under provincial healthcare programs.2  Expenditures 
relating to these programs would have been itemized in the annual estimates of the Department and 
therefore subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, but their implementation seemed to pass unnoticed.   
While international pressures and domestic economic conditions propelled many postwar policy 
changes, it is important to note that there were also impediments.  Some barriers to change were 
bureaucratic in nature, and an examination of those barriers formed a third theme of this thesis.  As we 
have seen, the post-1945 agendas of several federal departments presented differing priorities and goals 
related to immigration.  The Department of External Affairs sought to ensure that Canada responded 
favourably to the international pressures concerning refugees, and its officials were frustrated by 
Immigration Branch reticence in that area.  Relations between the departments of Labour and Mines and 
Resources (which still housed the Immigration Branch), functioned harmoniously as the war ended, but 
soon deteriorated under jurisdictional disputes and competing priorities.   
As deputy labour minister Arthur MacNamara explained to his counterpart Hugh Keenleyside in 
1947, his department’s priority was “immigration controlled by certainty that employment will be 
available for those brought into the country who will be seeking work.”3  Labour officials thus developed 
a definite conception of their department’s role in the postwar immigration process, which they described 
to the Senate standing committee in 1949:  
The responsibility for the placement in employment of all immigrants becomes the responsibility 
of the Labour Department. In the case of displaced persons, they are specially selected by 
representatives of the Department in Europe to fill applications filed by employers under the 
group movement plan.4    
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Initially, Labour’s important role in the selection process enjoyed the support of Mines and 
Resources.  A March, 1947 cabinet memo requested the establishment of a joint committee of the two 
departments, to ensure the ongoing availability of Labour’s expertise:  “It is believed that the Department 
of Labour can undertake this work through its placement service more economically than would be the 
case if the Immigration Branch … were to organize a service of its own.”5   
The interdepartmental “Labour-Immigration Committee” was duly established, but within weeks 
was beset by conflict.  On May 3, 1947 an impatient Keenleyside scolded his immigration director Arthur 
Joliffe that the committee’s first three meetings had not resulted in “the admission of a single new 
immigrant to Canada.”  Now that the prime minister had announced the government’s strategy for 
increased postwar immigration, it was essential that the committee “gets on with its work in a much more 
expeditious manner.”6  Instead of resolving their differences, however, relations between the two 
departments spiraled downward.  It had come as a “shock,” MacNamara complained, to learn of Joliffe’s 
belief that Labour “was encroaching on his responsibilities.”  Joliffe now seemed to be arguing that “the 
Immigration Branch is quite competent to look after selection and placement and that all that he would 
require from Labour was an expression of opinion as to the need in Canada.”  This, MacNamara declared, 
was unacceptable: “The Labour Department is not prepared, and on this point the Minister [i.e. labour 
minister Humphrey Mitchell] is most emphatic, to second its officers to any other Department and place 
them under the absolute authority of some other government agency.”7  
Keenleyside attempted to repair the rupture which the developing turf war had caused.  He 
pleaded for good-will on the part of both departments, and a clearer “demarkation [sic] of 
responsibilities.”  Less diplomatically, he summarized the problem as “disorganization of the whole 
field,” and a tendency of “certain officials” from Labour to “act independently of immigration 
authorities” whom the government had intended to be in control of the selection process.  There was a 
role for Labour in the process, Keenleyside acknowledged, but it was a subordinate one whereby 
Labour’s officers “must function under the control of Immigration.”  Settlement work in particular was a 
separate matter from the movement of displaced persons arriving under bulk labour arrangements, and 
must remain within the purview of the “Immigration Settlement Service.”8  
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By 1948, the Immigration Branch and the Department of Labour were fighting openly over who 
should have primary responsibility for overseas recruitment, and the reporting relationship between them.  
An External Affairs memorandum summarized the untenable situation: 
The tug o’ war between Immigration and Labour is developing every day and there must soon, I 
think, be a show-down…. Are we not [in] a position in which we shall have to insist upon a more 
accurate definition of the relation which the position of Canadian Government officials, from 
whatever Department they may come, bears to the Chief of Mission when they are serving in his 
territory?9   
 
With stronger, less petulant leadership, the two departments might have resolved their 
differences.  Hugh Keenleyside, however, retreated to the diplomatic service in 1949 after only a short 
period as deputy minister, leaving others to continue the squabble.  Mines and Resources minister J. A. 
Glen recognized the problem as one of differing, but equally important, departmental priorities.  Labour’s 
role, he acknowledged, was to supply the demand for workers, whereas “my Department is charged with 
carrying out the declared immigration policy of the government which is to very materially increase the 
movement of immigrants to Canada.”  Solutions, however, evaded Glen, who concluded: “I can see no 
reason why the various functions of the two departments should conflict.”10  After the formation of the 
Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, Laval Fortier quickly summarized for its new 
minister Walter Harris all of Labour’s transgressions and the longstanding irritants between the 
departments.  There should be “close cooperation between the Immigration Branch and the Department of 
Labour,” Fortier wrote, with “Labour Department officers attached to the Immigration Organization.”  
But it was essential that such arrangements “must function under the control of Immigration.”11  As we 
have seen, it was Harris, after his appointment as minister, who finally established his department’s lead 
responsibility in immigration matters with his cabinet colleagues.12  
Within the Immigration Branch, the primary impediment to change was not conflict but inertia.  
Beginning with Frederick Blair in the 1920s, management of the immigration bureaucracy remained for 
decades the preserve of a very small group – Blair, Arthur Joliffe, Charles Smith, and later, Laval Fortier.  
The influence of the notoriously racist Blair may have diminished by the time of Fortier’s appointment in 
1950, but it had cast a long shadow over immigration policy and over Blair’s successors who, in 
                                                          
9 LAC Privy Council Office Records RG 2 Vol. 166, File I-50-5, “Confidential Memorandum to the Acting Under-
Secretary,” October 7, 1948. 
10 LAC Privy Council Office Records RG 2 Vol. 166, File I-50-7, Glen to Mitchell, February 9, 1948. 
11 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records RG 26, Vol. 101, File 3-18-3, Immigration-Labour 
Committee – General File, “Re – Immigration-Labour Relations,” February 2, 1950. 
12 See above, Chapter , [ pp. xx-yy.] 
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Keenleyside’s description, had been “trained in the bad school of Blair.”13  The combination of 
intransigent leadership and unwavering commitment to restrictive admission practices virtually assured 
that the Immigration Branch would generate few new ideas or innovative policy options.   
Outside the bureaucracy, other institutions that might have been expected to demand change, 
seldom did.  Opposition politicians, as we have seen, rarely expressed disapproval of discriminatory 
practices or preferential rules.  Within the press, postwar reporting on immigration issues often focused 
on opposition arguments more opportunistic than substantive.  There were, of course, exceptions, but few 
journalists advocated for change in ways that might have been expected of them, or might have 
substantially influenced policy.14  On the subject of immigration, the Canadian media did not show itself 
to be a beacon of tolerance, inclusion, or change. 
A fourth theme of this study, and one never far from the forefront, has been the influence of race 
and racism on policy.  As in earlier periods, it is beyond dispute that racial preference and prejudice 
remained significant components of postwar immigration policy.  It was evident in administrative 
selection practices, and in the preferential and exclusionary language of the legislation and regulations.  
The archived records of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration contain a file entitled “Habits and 
Characteristics General File.”  Among its contents are a 1954 memorandum from the Department’s 
“Research Division” to the Citizenship Branch director, entitled “Body Odour as a Racial Characteristic.”  
The document summarizes in detail the results of a recent “scientific” study examining the apparently 
common notion that “certain groups of people can be identified by a typical body odour and that this 
odour is a racial or biologically inherited characteristic.”  Noting that “Negroes and Jews are most often 
cited in support of this view,” the writer explains that tests had been conducted by taking perspiration 
samples from Black and White subjects, and giving them to Whites to smell.  In the end, the researcher 
conceded, the “majority of subjects were unable to tell,” but that result did not influence his advice on the 
matter: “While the experiment does not disprove the argument that there are “racial” differences in body 
odour, it raises some doubts concerning the possibility that such differences can be accurately 
                                                          
13 QUA Grant Dexter Papers, Series I – Correspondence 1930-1961, Vol. 4, File 30, Correspondence – General 1947 
Jan. – June, “Ottawa memo – Max Freedman, Thursday, April 2, 1947,” 4.  
14 One such exception was Pierre Berton’s 1948 Maclean’s article “No Jews Need Apply” which exposed systemic 
discrimination toward Jews and other minority groups in Ontario.  Another young journalist, Peter C. Newman, had 
also begun to explore immigration issues.  In one 1952 article, Newman asked rhetorically: “Are We Doing Enough 
to Help Our Immigrants?” Others with genuine concern for immigration issues were Saturday Night editor B.K. 
Sandwell, and Michael Barkway, who in 1957 identified a variety of increasingly complex economic and social 
challenges which immigration policy needed to address. See Barkway, “A Turning Point for Immigration?”  
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perceived.”15   The branch director dutifully forwarded the memorandum to the deputy minister, for his 
information.16   
That such odious nonsense could be seriously considered, and retained in the department’s files, 
affirms the continuing influence of racism on postwar immigration policy.  The foregoing chapters, 
however, have also described numerous policy changes, beginning as early as 1947, which removed 
preferences and reduced or eliminated exclusionary, race-based criteria, culminating with the 1962 
regulatory amendments.  It is therefore reasonable to return to the questions concerning race that were 
posed in the introduction to this thesis: Were those responsible for postwar immigration policy 
universally and uniformly racist, or were any motivated by ideals more progressive and humane than 
scholars have generally acknowledged?  Can it be said that any endeavoured to lead or shape public 
opinions about immigration and race, rather than simply follow them?   
Senior immigration bureaucrats consistently advocated the continuation of preferential, 
exclusionary, and racist, admission criteria.  Experience had convinced them that political problems were 
more easily avoided by exclusion rather than admission.  Not all decisions were motivated by racism, 
however, and the actions of several postwar immigration ministers suggested more progressive world 
views than have previously been recognized.  This was particularly evident with the two St. Laurent-era 
ministers.  
Undeniably both Walter Harris and Jack Pickersgill subscribed to many of the views about race 
that were prevalent in their time.  Harris in particular showed little concern for traditionally non-preferred 
ethnic groups, and toward some – especially the Black community – his actions were, at times, egregious.  
They were not, however, uniformly regressive.  Harris was wounded by a German sniper in 1944, but it 
was he who removed the ‘enemy alien’ restriction on immigration from Germany in 1950.  When 
confronted by opposition criticism of that decision, Harris replied that “service in the German army by a 
German national should not be held against him. That is his duty in time of war.”17  It was a remarkably 
broad-minded response.       
  In an earlier parliamentary speech, given years before his appointment to cabinet, Harris spoke 
eloquently about Canada’s immigration history and “the great numbers …who will undoubtedly want to 
come to this country when the war is over.”  As in previous times, he acknowledged, there would be 
concern that newcomers might not assimilate.  But the current war had provided “the test” of such 
                                                          
15 LAC Department of Citizenship and Immigration Records RG 26, Vol. 75, File 1-1-7, Subject: Habits and 
Characteristics General File, “Body Odour as a Racial Characteristic”. 
16 Ibid., Dr. F.E. Jones, Chief, Research Division to E. Bussiere, Director, December 15, 1954. 
17 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953:4: VI: 6827. 
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concerns.  Many immigrants from Europe and their descendants, Harris noted, were now in uniform, and 
in numbers as great “as the percentage of those who came from the British Isles.”  For that reason, he 
concluded, “I do not think we need to fear the coming to this country after the war of the people of 
various races.”18   
These do not seem to be the thoughts of an unregenerate racist.    
  Jack Pickersgill’s personal views on immigration were – if anything – less progressive than those 
of his predecessor.  Pickersgill authored the government’s 1947 policy statement on immigration, and the 
principles it set out were as much his own as Mackenzie King’s.  Throughout his life, Pickersgill held fast 
to the opinion that immigration to Canada was, foremost, “a matter of domestic policy” – a “privilege” 
rather than a “right.”  And yet, despite his admittedly “conservative” point of view, Pickersgill made more 
changes to admission criteria than any other postwar minister.  Both Harris and Pickersgill had seen 
something of the world – Pickersgill during his student days and his travels with prime ministers; and 
Harris through military service.  Both understood that negative public opinion regarding ‘others’ could be 
overcome, and so the process of transforming the race-based components of immigration policy – 
removing barriers based on race, and replacing them with occupational or educational criteria – began 
during their ministerial tenures.  It is therefore inaccurate to conclude (as some scholars have done) that 
the “point of departure” for this process of change occurred at some “indefinable moment, buried deep in 
the Diefenbaker era.”19   
One question remains concerning immigration policies of the postwar King, St. Laurent, and 
Diefenbaker governments:  Was there a deliberate plan to manage postwar immigration, or does the 
history of this topic simply offer an example of public policy as – in Charles Lindblom’s classic phrase – 
the “science of muddling through”?   Mackenzie King’s 1947 immigration statement revealed his 
government’s intention to promote increased immigration.  If not a detailed plan, the speech did disclose a 
general strategy to be pursued, seeking to meet Canada’s requirement for immigrants through careful 
selection.  Subsequent governments – including Diefenbaker’s – professed allegience to the principles set 
out by King, even as they moved beyond King’s pledge that immigration would not result in  
“fundamental alteration in the character of our population.”20    
 Diefenbaker’s 1957 election campaign presented a plan for extensive reform of immigration 
legislation and policy, but ultimately his government delivered less than their Liberal predecessors.  The 
                                                          
18 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1943: I, 15.  (Harris, temporarily on leave from overseas military service, 
had been chosen to speak in the debate on the Throne speech opening the 1943 session.)   
19 Hawkins, Canada and Immigration, 337. 
20 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1947: III, 2646. 
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records of Diefenbaker’s immigration ministers as agents of change were indifferent at best.  During his 
year as acting minister, Davie Fulton made no move to implement the “vast and humane” changes 
promised during the 1957 campaign, and in fact reduced immigration levels immediately upon taking 
office.  Fulton’s priorities remained, as always, fixated on the preservation of Canada’s British heritage.   
Ellen Fairclough held the immigration portfolio longest during the Diefenbaker period but 
achieved mixed results.  The attempt to curtail Italian immigration revealed a profound insensitivity to 
ethnicity.   Yet, as we have seen, Fairclough advocated continuously within cabinet for clearer policy 
direction on immigration.  The 1962 regulatory amendments were an important development,  albeit one 
better understood as the  continuation of a process that had been initiated earlier, and administratively, by  
previous governments.  Fairclough’s successor, R. A. Bell, did not hold the immigration portfolio long 
enough to make any significant impact on policy.   
Only after the defeat of the Diefenbaker government would the postwar momentum that was lost 
after 1957 be recaptured.  The Departments of Labour and Citizenship, and Immigration, were 
amalgamated (as Manpower and Immigration) in 1965, at last resolving the longstanding friction between 
the two entities.  In 1967, new regulatory provisions implemented a system of “assessment points” to be 
applied in determining admission eligibility.  This new points system created a more objective assessment 
process, reducing the discretionary powers long held by immigration branch staff.21  With these measures, 
“discrimination on the basis of race or nationality was eliminated for all classes of immigrants.”22             
Modern public-policy scholarship has sought to understand the “dynamics of policy stability and 
change over time” by identifying the “drivers” – events, ideas, and influences – that lead to policy 
change.23  These often include unforeseen events or emergencies, routine political developments such as 
change in government, or evolving public perceptions and changing societal norms.  In postwar Canada, 
the key “drivers” of change to immigration policy included international responsibilities and pressures 
upon the government, bureaucratic inertia and intransigence, entrenched racial biases, and – above all – 
political concerns. 
Policy change is a dynamic process, but as one scholar has noted, in many instances “current 
policy is the result of a long, evolutionary process.”24  So it was in postwar Canada, where changes to 
immigration policy were implemented gradually and incrementally, between 1945 and 1963.  The first 
                                                          
21 Green, Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy, 40-1. 
22 The Immigration Program: A report of the Canadian immigration and population study, 33. 
23 Henstra, “The Dynamic of Policy Change,” 399-403.  The author’s explanation of policy drivers is helpful in 
understanding influences that both propel and impede change.   
24 Ibid., 400. 
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steps were King’s May 1947 statement on immigration policy, the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, 
and the Displaced Persons initiative following the war.  The two St. Laurent-era immigration ministers 
continued the process with a series of successive revisions to admission criteria.  The evidence reveals a 
perceptible acceleration of this transformation process under J. W. Pickersgill, beginning around 1955.  
The process of transformation which was undertaken hesitantly and reluctantly after the war, had become 
noticeably more progressive between 1955 and 1957, through the removal of various preferential criteria.  
The Diefenbaker government’s regulatory revisions in 1962 marked the final transformational step during 
this period.  
It is noteworthy that the postwar administrations of Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent, and John 
Diefenbaker all contemplated a major immigration initiative at some point during their mandate.  In each 
instance, however, the proposal to substantially increase immigration levels was abandoned in favour of 
less dramatic policy revisions, or even temporary reductions.  Canada’s long and unsettled immigration 
history had taught that political dangers were more likely to be avoided by proceding slowly, avoiding 
public scrutiny, and implementing change incrementally.               
History had also demonstrated the importance of ‘flexibility’ in this policy area, to permit quick 
reaction to unforeseen events, to respond quickly to economic requirements, and to meet the relentless 
demands of politics.  With an established and ‘flexible’ regulatory framework in place, Canada’s postwar 
governments set out to deal with immigration and administer policy as best they could, just as earlier 
governments had done.  And, as always, they strove to manage the perennial “problem” of immigration 
“with the least possible fuss and publicity.”      
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